

Conflicts, participation and co-management in protected areas

A case study of Lobéké National Park, Cameroon

Cosmas Kombat Lambini, Julia Bayer, Tobias Beyer, Konstantin Engelbrecht,
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Cosmas Kombat

Team Leader

E-Mail: cosmasworld@gmail.com

Julia Maria Bayer

M.A. European Studies

E-Mail: julia.m.bayer@gmx.net

Tobias Beyer

M.Sc. Sustainable Resource Management

E-Mail: tobias.beyer@posteo.de

Konstantin Engelbrecht

M.A. Social and Cultural Anthropology

E-Mail: konstantin.engelbrecht@posteo.net

May Hokan

Veterinary Medicine

E-Mail: may.hokan@gmail.com

Yannic Kiewitt

M.Phil. International Peace Studies

E-Mail: yannic.kiewitt@gmail.com

Nicolas Mielich

M.Sc. Forest Sciences

E-Mail: niko_mielich@hotmail.com

Henrice C. Stöbesand

M.Phil. Development Studies

E-Mail: henrice.stoebesand@posteo.de

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Editor	Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin SLE Postgraduate Studies on International Cooperation for Sustainable Development Hessische Str. 1-2 10115 Berlin Germany Phone: +49 30 2093-46890 FAX: +49 30 2093-46891 E-Mail: sle@agrar.hu-berlin.de Website: www.sle-berlin.de
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Preface

For 57 years, the Centre for Rural Development at the Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin has annually trained 20 post graduates to become professionals equipped with excellent knowledge and skills in the field of development cooperation.

Three-month empirical research projects conducted in cooperation with German or international development agencies form an integral part of this one-year course. Participants work in interdisciplinary teams supervised by experienced team leaders and carry out innovative, future-oriented research on development problems that prevail on the ground on a local or national scale. This strengthens global knowledge and provides partner organisations in the host country with strategies and tools. Here it is vital to involve a wide range of actors in the process, which includes surveys and consultations at household, expert and policy level.

Most studies are linked to rural development themes and have a socio-economic focus, such as the enhancement of agricultural livelihoods or the design of regimes to manage natural resources sustainably. Up to now our partner countries have either been developing or transformation countries, and occasionally fragile states. In the future, however, studies will also be conducted in the global north, since the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are global concerns. New methodologies have been introduced in some studies, e.g., production of handbooks or guidelines. Further priorities are evaluations, impact analysis and participatory planning. In these cases the respective host country serves as a test region.

Throughout the years, SLE has carried out more than 200 cooperation projects in over 90 countries. The results are published in this series.

The present study on conflicts, participation and co-management in Lobéké National Park in Cameroon was carried out in cooperation with the KfW (German Development Bank) and FTNS (Foundation pour le Tri-National de la Sangha).

We wish you a stimulating read.

Yours sincerely,

Prof. Dr. Bernhard Grimm
Dean of the Faculty of Life Sciences
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin

Dr. Susanne Neubert
Director of the Centre for Rural
Development (SLE)

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Special thanks go to our fantastic Cameroonian research counterparts Mercy Rinyu Shei and Douglas Michael Tchatchouang as well as our PhotoVoice-consultant Adreanna Rodriguez, who supported us during fieldwork in Lobéké. Our research benefitted greatly from their commitment and expertise.

We also cordially thank MINFOF representatives in Yaoundé for sharing insightful information that helped us to prepare our field research. Many thanks go to the eco-guards of LNP who supported our daily research in and around LNP and were open to participate in interviews, workshops and focus group discussions.

Our sincerest thanks go to the local people living around LNP for allowing us insights into their lives and for openly sharing their viewpoints with us. We want to warmly thank everyone who participated in our research and express our gratitude to the village of Mambélé where we found a second home during our stay in Lobéké.

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Last but not least, we would like to thank the SLE staff, particularly Dr. Susanne Neubert, who provided valuable support and guidance before and after our research.

Executive summary

Protected areas safeguard the planet's natural resources from depletion and exploitation, and directly contribute to Sustainable Development Goal No. 14 'Life under Water' and No. 15 'Life on Land'. These goals are anchored in the 2010 Aichi-Biodiversity Targets and the Convention of Biological Diversity (CBD) of 1993.

However, protected areas have shown to create tensions between conservation goals and anthropogenic land-use – especially so in impoverished rural settings. While most protected areas not only intend to protect flora and fauna but also aim at preserving local livelihoods, they, by their very nature, restrict traditional resource use and curtail popular livelihood sources such as subsistence hunting. Resultant conflicts between park residents and park personnel are a common theme affecting protected area governance across the globe.

On top of that, many parks and natural reserves are severely underfunded, and have weak monitoring and enforcement capacities. Multi-national wildlife trafficking networks exploit the power vacuum to poach commercially valuable species.

Lobéké National Park (LNP) is emblematic for the aforementioned governance challenges. First, the local population lives largely in conditions of extreme poverty, and the park can contribute only little to socio-economic development. As a result, adjacent communities have a predominantly negative perception of the park which puts additional constraints on their livelihoods. Second, concessions of private companies in the park's buffer zone cause unclarity and tensions regarding land use and land rights, and further curtail local resource use. Third, high levels of both large- scale and small-scale poaching contribute to continued species loss. Fourth, the park rangers ('eco-guards') have been accused of using violence and committing human rights violations against residents.

The study aims at providing a comprehensive analysis of the current governance challenges of Lobéké National Park with a focus on participation of the local population and park-people conflicts. It provides feasible recommendations for stakeholders, which aim at guaranteeing a more efficient and equitable governance of the park and its buffer zone. Stakeholders of the study include actors from the international, national and local level.

IV Executive summary

Background

Lobéké National Park is a UNESCO world heritage site in the Southeast of Cameroon. It forms part of the wider Tri-National de la Sangha, a protected area that spans across three countries in the Congo-Basin: Cameroon, Central African Republic and the Republic of the Congo. The park has a total size of 215,000 ha and is co-managed by the Cameroonian Ministry of Forests and Fauna (MINFOF) and the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF). Financial assistance to Lobéké National Park is provided predominantly by the Sangha Tri-National Trust Fund (FTNS), which is partially funded by the KfW Development Bank.

The buffer zone around the park (596,000 ha) is comprised of different concession zones that are designated either for community use or managed by private enterprises (logging companies, hunting safari companies and one mining company). Roughly 23,000 people live in the 28 villages adjacent to Lobéké National Park. The majority of the local population belongs to the Baka, which is considered an indigenous people by the Cameroonian state.

Study Design

This study relies on Elinor Ostrom's theory of common-pool resource governance. Lobéké National Park and its buffer zone are conceptualised as a common-pool resource as they are rich in natural resources (wild-life, timber, ivory, minerals, medicinal plants, etc.), but face difficulties in regulating access and overexploitation. Mascia et al. (2017) offer a typology of governance domains to assess the success of conservation in marine protected areas. This typology has been adapted for the purpose of the study to include four dimensions, which were the focus areas of the research: park management, participation, local livelihoods, and conflicts.

Methods

The primary research goal is a comprehensive analysis of the current situation and existing governance challenges. The phase of data collection was split between six weeks in the Cameroonian capital, Yaoundé, and six weeks in the Lobéké area. The research team also travelled to the Tri-National de la Sangha national parks in the Central African Republic and the Republic of the Congo for comparative analysis.

The study took an explorative approach and employed qualitative research methods: 15 expert interviews with stakeholders in Yaoundé, 40 semi-structured interviews with local stakeholders, 10 community meetings, 21 focus group discussions and 8 transect walks. Furthermore, the research team used two visual

and interactive methods: PhotoVoice (20 interviews) and the Theatre of the Oppressed (10 plays), when working with the local population and eco-guards. Over the course of six weeks in the field, the research team interacted closely with stakeholders living in Lobéké's buffer zone and could make several participant observations that facilitated the understanding of local conditions.

Accounting for the explorative character of the study, an iterative strategy of content analysis was employed. Empirical data obtained through the various methods was categorised into key topics during the stay in Lobéké. Where possible, data was triangulated with academic literature, policy reports and spatial data generated with the use of the Geographic Information System (GIS). Finally, preliminary results were mirrored back to stakeholders in two workshops on the local and the national level respectively.

Main Findings

Park Management

The management of Lobéké National Park lacks the administrative and financial capacity to effectively safeguard wildlife and biodiversity within the confines of the park. Its primary responsibility to monitor biodiversity and enforce rules established in the management plan is troubled by a lack of qualified staff, managerial conflicts, and insufficient financial funding. Poaching in the Lobéké area has not decreased, and measures to combat illegal hunting are inadequate or absent.

Lobéké National Park is co-managed by MINFOF (planning and decision-making authority) and WWF Cameroon (implementing partner giving financial and technical advice). The MINFOF-employed 'Conservator' is head of the Park Management, WWF is represented by the Programme Manager.¹

The park management faces several challenges. First, the park's five management units (Administration and Finance, Surveillance, Ecological Monitoring and Research, Co-Management and Eco-Development, and Ecotourism) are severely understaffed, and positions are filled with unqualified personnel. In combination with frequent absences of the Conservator, the lack of adequate staff hinders the effective implementation of management procedures and retards important decision-making processes.

¹ The distinction between the two entities is often hard to make for the local population, leading to confusion, for example when people complain to WWF about the behaviour of MINFOF-employed eco-guards.

VI Executive summary

Second, and related to the first point, the working and living conditions of park staff, particularly of the eco-guards, are inadequate: housing conditions are poor, leaves of absence to visit families are too short (guards are recruited from all parts of Cameroon) and bonuses are not paid as promised. As a result, working in Lobéké is unattractive and perceived as a “punishment”.

Third, conflicts between the two management entities MINFOF and WWF Cameroon and their financing partner FTNS make the park management inefficient and ineffective. Since mandates and responsibilities are not clearly defined and adhered to, FTNS is increasingly changing its role from a financier to an implementing organisation. The managerial conflicts put into question the current management set-up and open discussions on alternative solutions, e.g. the idea of a new ‘super-structure’ in the form of a Cameroonian national level agency.

Fourth, the national park does not generate any revenues and is severely underfunded. Despite its rich wildlife, eco-tourism is practically non-existent in Lobéké with only 96 visitors in 2016. The main reasons for lack of tourist influx are the contentious political instability in the border region, the park’s limited accessibility and its poor touristic infrastructure. Djembe, a tourist-site in the East of the park, is dysfunctional, and current visa regulations hamper touristic circuits across the Tri-National de la Sangha protected area.

Currently, LNP is entirely dependent on external funding, mainly provided by the Sangha Tri-National Trust Fund (81%), but also by international NGOs (15% – channelled through WWF Cameroon) and MINFOF (4% – covering the employee salaries). FTNS funds are supplied by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) via the KfW Development Bank and the French Development Agency (AFD). From 2009 to 2018, LNP received not more than 1.86 million EUR through project financing, 75% of it as of 2016. The majority of financing (58%) is used to cover administrative costs and infrastructure. Most community related activities that were explicitly budgeted for could not be found on site.

Fifth, the park’s main operational activity, anti-poaching, is not effective. The park management has to address two types of poaching in and around the national park: large-scale poaching relies on professionally organised networks and targets endangered species such as elephants. Small-scale poaching is carried out by local residents and is a transgression of ‘usage rights’. The usage rights allow the local population subsistence hunting of common species and the

consumption of bushmeat for proteins as long as clearly defined rules (e.g. type of species, hunting equipment used, designated zones) are adhered to.

The management tries to respond to these two types of poaching by applying a two-fold strategy: on the one hand, its “soft- power”- approach focusses on awareness-raising campaigns on usage rights and illegal forest exploitation. On the other hand, its “hard- power”- approach relies on armed patrols by eco-guards in the park’s core zone (and to a lesser extent in its buffer zone). However, the research found that both approaches are in great need of improvement. The soft-power approach is largely ineffective, as its design is top- down, fails to integrate local needs and does not address the root causes of poaching (poverty and lack of employment, alternative food sources). While the hard- power approach has mixed evidence of effectiveness, it could benefit from a stronger involvement of the local population as is common practice in other TNS parks. An integration of locals in anti-poaching measures is expected to increase local support for conservation efforts and will likely foster a respectful relationship between the local population and eco-guards.

Sixth, logging and mining in LNP’s buffer zone pose a threat to biodiversity and may jeopardise the park’s status as UNESCO world heritage site. The research found that besides private enterprises exploiting resources in their concessions, both illegal logging and mining take place in the vicinity of the park. However, there are no explicit strategies by the park management to deal with these threats.

Participation

The management plan and Cameroonian forest law provide several participatory mechanisms, such as revenue-sharing, community zones and stakeholder platforms. However, the research indicates that the bulk of participatory mechanisms are not or only partially functional: local communities are not adequately integrated into the management of the park, the park’s community zone is ineffective, revenue- sharing mechanisms are inefficient and inequitable, and the delegation of power to local communities via community- based resource management is troubled by weak capacities, lack of transparency and control, elite capture, social stratification within “communities”, and neglect of local needs. In addition, there is evidence that the information and consultation process about the establishment of the park and the related zoning and gazetting process of its buffer zone were deficient. As a result, the local population has little opportunity to participate in the governance of LNP and its buffer zone, and current levels of participation do not comply with international standards.

Viii Executive summary

LNP's management plan and Cameroonian forest law emphasize both the instrumental and the normative value of participation and provide several mechanisms to increase local participation in resource governance.

However, the gap between theory and actual practice is huge. First, it appears that the local population was not appropriately informed about the establishment of the park nor involved in related land- use planning. Accounts of local communities indicate that adequate consultations following the principle of Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) – as stipulated in the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples- had neither taken place when Lobéké National Park was established, nor when the zone was declared UNESCO heritage site. This is in line with findings of other studies. Furthermore, the zoning process of the buffer zone largely neglected local needs and did not involve Baka communities. As a result, the current regulatory framework of concessions in the park's buffer zone fails to adequately protect customary use rights.

Second, the research found that the participatory elements in the governance of the park fail to foster equitable participation of local communities. First, the management plan outlines multi-stakeholder platforms as a means to integrate the interests and expertise of local stakeholders. However, these platforms meet irregularly, if at all, and do not sufficiently represent the local population. Second, employment of locals by the park management is only sporadic. As a result, there is no integration of local knowledge in current conservation practices. Third, the park's Community Zone fails in its main function, namely to grant the local population (constrained) usufruct rights to forest resources. While laudable in theory, its implementation is severely flawed: residents must obtain a costly permit in the headquarters of the park management to get admission, and access is only granted for maximum two weeks during a short period of the year. In addition, the siting of the zone in the park's West makes it virtually inaccessible for people from villages in the North and the South of the park, and most communities do not even know of its existence.

On top of that, shortcomings of participatory mechanisms in the park's buffer zone were revealed. Neither the redistribution of annual forestry fees from logging companies nor the collaborative convention between local communities and private companies ("Mambélé Convention") appear to function in an effective, equitable, and efficient manner. The direct management of forest resources and revenues by local communities through community hunting zones, community forests and carbon zones were also found to be deficient.

There are three Community Hunting Zones (ZIGCs) in the buffer zone, which are managed by committees of community representatives (COVAREF). These zones grant the local population the right to subsistence hunting. COVAREFs can also take the decision to lease the zones to hunting safari companies to gain financial revenues. This is currently the case in all three ZIGCs. However, there is strong evidence that the commercial interests of safari companies take precedent over the usage rights of the local population: safari companies keep residents from subsistence hunting in the ZIGCs. Furthermore, the taxes paid by the companies are rarely channelled back into local communities, as the COVAREF are troubled by issues of non- transparency, lack of control, and elite capture. Baka and women are misrepresented in the COVAREF and have little opportunity to influence decisions- making processes.

Areas of the non-permanent forest zone close to villages have been designated as community forests, and their main purpose is to generate funds for community projects by exploiting and commercializing timber. They are managed by a communally appointed steering board. Evidence of their effectiveness is mixed. On the one hand, community members felt empowered and eager to manage the forest zones. On the other hand, the participatory promise of community forests is challenged by 'elite capture', limited capacity and restricted access and exclusion of the Baka population. Furthermore, the siting of the forests is reportedly done in Yaoundé and does not appear to be well communicated with the respective communities: the geographical limits of the community forests often misrepresent the demographic distribution of people living around the park, and the zones contain agricultural fields and low-quality wood.

In a more recent development, carbon zones for emission trading under the international REDD+ mechanism have been established in four community forests. In these areas, logging, agriculture and hunting are prohibited, and NTFP collection requires authorization. Steering boards of community forests have high expectations of REDD+, and consider it a fair conservation strategy. However, remuneration has not arrived yet, and local communities might lose another usage zone to conservation without receiving any benefits.

Livelihoods

Adjacent communities to Lobéké National Park significantly depend on forest resource use and land access for their livelihoods. However, the park and concessions granted by the Cameroonian state to private companies severely limit the space available to residents to pursue common livelihood activities such as subsistence hunting, collection of non- timber forests products (NTFP), and agriculture. Despite

X Executive summary

the high risk to exacerbate local poverty, the park management and private companies do little to counter these restrictions and have largely failed to offer local people alternative livelihood strategies.

The main livelihood activities of both Baka and Bantu groups living in the park's buffer zone are hunting, collection of Non-Timber Forest Products (NTFPs), agriculture, husbandry, and fishing. These activities are predominantly carried out for subsistence and to a lesser degree for income generation.

While cacao crops and NTFPs were found to have the highest potential for commercialization, high investment costs, lack of knowledge, restricted access to land, lack of value chains (for NTFPs) and insufficient market access (for both) limit substantial yields. Therefore, cacao plantations and the collection of NTFPs are economically not rewarding.

Other minor income sources for the local population are charcoal production, working as harvest hands, small-scale commerce, and artisanal mining. Sporadically, residents are employed by park management for inventory and tourism. The Mongokele Mining Company and four hunting safari companies offer mostly short-term or seasonal employment to local workers. The biggest formal employers in the buffer zone are the three logging companies CTSC, SEFAC and the Vicwood-Thany Group employing roughly 770 workers, however only a fraction of their workers can be considered 'local'.

Local associations and cooperatives have been established to promote alternative or complementary livelihoods and to collectively overcome some of the challenges to income generation. However, interviews with their members revealed insufficient support from the park management and local authorities. Financial investments, adequate equipment, access to local markets and vocational trainings were identified as the most pressing needs.

In the park's buffer zone, local communities' access to land and forest resources is extremely insecure. Concessionaries severely restrict the exercise of customary use rights, exacerbating local poverty.

Furthermore, the majority of localities in the buffer zone lack access to basic infrastructure, including medical assistance, educational facilities and clean drinking water. Despite the park management's pledge to support socio-economic development and provide basic infrastructure, the research team encountered little evidence thereof. Two logging companies, Vicwood-Thany Group and SEFAC, engage in community development projects but their

involvement is volatile and limited to the proximate surroundings of their sawmills.

Conflicts

The research team identified four main conflicts that hinder the effective and equitable governance of Lobéké National Park and its buffer zone. The fundamental conflict revolves around a perceived antagonism between conservation and socio-economic development. The neglect of local needs alongside continuous levels of extreme poverty has fuelled resentment over conservation costs. Symptomatic of this conflict are perceived threats by wildlife to human safety (human-wildlife conflict) and disputes between law enforcement agents and residents. The former is depicted as the most pressing issue by most residents, as wildlife encroachment is understood as a permanent threat to local food security. Experiences of direct violence among the local population and the eco-guards has created a general atmosphere of fear and mistrust, hindering collaboration. In addition, inner-community conflicts between Baka and Bantu groups challenge equitable community development and affect the needs and aspirations of indigenous people.

1. Value conflict between conservation and development

The majority of local residents holds negative perceptions of conservation and understands it as a threat to their livelihoods. While acknowledging the importance of conservation in safeguarding natural resources, the local population expressed feeling neglected and demanded socio-economic development. Interlocutors called upon the Cameroonian state and the park management to cover their basic needs. The lack of meaningful participation in the governance of Lobéké National Park and the buffer zone contribute to the perception of the park as a 'foreign project'. To garner support among the local population for the national park, the park management ought to turn greater attention to the socio-economic needs of adjacent communities.

2. Human-Wildlife Conflict

There is a very high-risk perception of Human Wildlife Conflict in the buffer zone, and participants frequently reported crop damage caused by elephants, chimpanzees, gorillas and smaller monkeys. Following research participants, frequency and intensity of Human-Wildlife Conflict has increased over the past years. There are few effective non-lethal measures residents can take to prevent crop damage and chase animals from their fields. Filing complaints for compensation is not an option for local farmers: bureaucratic procedures are cumbersome and often local authorities simply ignore the complaints. The lack of

Xii Executive summary

appropriate prevention and mitigation strategies contributes to a feeling of helplessness and anger among the local population. The park management is yet to elaborate a holistic response strategy. The study suggests a thorough analysis of the real impact and risk perception of Human-Wildlife Conflict around Lobéké. Such an analysis provides the basis for generating effective responses jointly with the local population.

3. Law enforcement and local population

Experiences of direct violence between both conflict parties, the local population and eco-guards, have created an atmosphere of fear and mistrust. In its essence, this conflict is about the implementation of usage rights of the local population. On the one hand, interlocutors claimed that eco-guards keep them from doing legal subsistence hunting, confiscate equipment and bushmeat, and resort to violence. In the Theatre of the Oppressed, participants portrayed the eco-guards as violent and unreasonable. On the other hand, representatives of the park management and eco-guards stated they were merely applying Cameroonian anti-poaching law in full respect of human rights in an increasingly militarized environment.

The response of the park management to this conflict is insufficient. The complaint mechanism set up by WWF Cameroon and the national NGO CEFAID is not working effectively and needs to be revised. The frustration of eco-guards with their living and working conditions was revealed as a contributing factor to the conflict. Finally, the research team found that some hunting safari companies are increasingly taking law enforcement in their concessions into their own hands, bypassing the eco-guards and reportedly disrespecting customary use rights of the local population.

4. Baka – Bantu relationship

The social dynamics between Baka and Bantu have a strong influence on the governance of Lobéké National Park, its buffer zone and conservation policies and ought to be considered by the park management and policymakers with great attention. The contentious relationship between the two groups has historic roots, commonly described as a dichotomy between 'modern Bantu villagers' and 'indigenous Baka forest people'.

During the research, Baka participants expressed a feeling of marginalisation and discrimination by their Bantu neighbours, whereas the Bantu interlocutors painted a picture of harmony and blamed the Baka's inherent "backwardness" for their lower socio-economic standing. The vast majority of Baka manifested their

desire for more socio-economic integration into village communities and basic infrastructure (schools, hospitals, formal employment), while maintaining a close relationship to the forest as their cultural heritage. This study argues to move beyond the conventional dichotomy of 'modern – traditional' when designing development programs addressing the Baka population. Simultaneously, holistic development approaches ought to integrate the Bantu as a target group to avoid reinforcing separation between the two groups.

Conclusion

Using the conceptual framework based on Ostrom's common-pool resource theory helps to shed light on four important dimensions of protected area governance and revealed some of the challenges that Lobéké National Park is facing.

The findings of this study highlight three core points.

First, conservation without consideration of local needs is bound to fail. This is not a 'new' insight, but a long-standing policy narrative dating back to Rio de Janeiro 1992 (McShane and Wells, 2004:3). Subsequent demands for the integration of conservation and development are based on the realisation that the two policy goals are mutually dependent: development without regard for the environment is unsustainable and hurts local livelihoods, while conservation without development leads to alienation and land-use conflicts – and "ultimately defeats itself" (ibidem: viii). The theory predicts that development and conservation mutually support each other.

This report however shows that the integration of development and conservation is a challenging task. While the management plan harbours great ideas to integrate local development and conservation objectives, this study shows that the discrepancy between management design and implementation is striking. Participatory mechanisms such as revenue-sharing, community managed hunting zones, a community zone inside the park or complaint mechanisms look great on paper, but do not function properly in reality.

This does not mean that the ideas are wrong. To the contrary – this report supports other studies emphasizing that the involvement of local resource users in protected area governance is not only normatively desirable, but also vital for ensuring effective conservation (Hayer and Ostrom, 2005). When local communities feel that Lobéké national park is 'theirs', it is likely that conflicts become less frequent and severe, rules and regulations are more adhered to and

XIV Executive summary

levels of poaching decrease (also see Husain et al, 2018: 449; Twinamatsiko et al., 2014).

Yet, the gap between theory and practice urges to have a closer look at the variables that hinder effective implementation of these laudable instruments. Following this study's findings, the main causes for their failure are weak administrative capacities, elite capture, neglect of local needs and unrealistic assumptions about the equity of local 'communities'.

Second, the focus on local needs should not neglect the threats posed by the "global": large- scale poaching and resource extraction by private companies in LNP's buffer zone constitute serious threats to biodiversity. Moreover, much resentment over conservation is actually caused by insecure land access and unequal resource allocation in the park's buffer zone. The poor regulation of the commercial activities of private companies has perverse implications. For example, while residents' livelihood and survival strategies such as subsistence hunting are severely restricted and punishable, foreign profit- oriented safari companies can untroubledly defend their business-interests against local resource users.

These problems can hardly be cured by the park management itself. Instead, it is necessary that the commercial activities in the park's buffer zone are better regulated, and that local livelihood needs are considered. This is not a new insight either – LNP's management plan emphasizes the importance of an "integrated management" of its buffer zone, and explicitly refers to the "landscape approach" ("approche paysage"). However, it appears that the attempts to transform this approach from mere buzzword to lived practice are dysfunctional: multi-stakeholder platforms are meeting irregularly, and there is no evidence of "collaborative planning" or "adaptive management" procedures. Again, weak administrative and financial capacities and lack of leadership appear to be the main obstacles.

Finally, the research found that the weak presence of the state in the Lobéké region has an impact on how the local population perceives the park. The absence of many essential government services and authorities has created an expectation towards private actors (WWF as well as private companies) to cover basic needs and provide infrastructure. A stronger involvement of the Cameroonian state is desirable. As conservation is a global objective with primarily local costs, German and international development programs ought to significantly contribute to local development by providing the necessary technical expertise and financial resources.

Recommendations

After analysing the data gathered, discussing the results with stakeholders on the local and national level and investigating best practice examples from available literature, the research team put forth a total of 37 policy recommendations for improving the governance of Lobéké National Park and its buffer zone. Recommendations address specific stakeholders and are grouped into four broad categories, given a priority of either 'high', 'moderate' or 'low'. They include best practice examples where possible. Many of the recommendations build on processes or mechanisms that have already been established but need improvement. The recommendations address four aims:

- Aim 1: LNP's park management is more efficient and effective – Total: 9 recommendations
- Aim 2: Conservation efforts involve the local population and do not harm, but support local people's livelihoods – Total: 12 recommendations
- Aim 3: Conflicts surrounding LNP are decreased and sustainably managed – Total: 12 recommendations
- Aim 4: The buffer zone of LNP is sustainably managed and respects and protects the usage- rights of the local population – Total: 4 recommendations

Zusammenfassung

Schutzgebiete sollen die biologische Vielfalt des Planeten wahren und somit zu den Zielen Nr. 14 „Leben unter Wasser“ und Nr. 15 „Leben an Land“ der AGENDA 2030 beitragen. Diese Ziele sind auch in den 2010 Aichi-Biodiversitäts-Zielen und im Übereinkommen über biologische Vielfalt (CBD) verankert.

Da die meisten Schutzgebiete jedoch keine völlig ungenutzten Areale sind, führen Nutzungsbeschränkungen zur Durchsetzung des Schutzes häufig zu Konflikten zwischen Interessensgruppen — insbesondere in armen ländlichen Gebieten. Während zwar die meisten Schutzgebiete neben Naturschutzzielen auch lokale Lebensgrundlagen langfristig sichern sollen, schränken sie genau diese – naturgemäß – gleichzeitig ein, wie z.B. die Subsistenzjagd. Konflikte zwischen der betroffenen Bevölkerung und der Parkverwaltung sind vor allem dann vorprogrammiert, wenn es nur wenige alternative Einkommensquellen gibt.

Zusätzlich sind Schutzgebiete in Entwicklungsländern in der Regel stark unterfinanziert, so dass sowohl Überwachung als auch Rechtsdurchsetzung häufig lückenhaft sind. Multinational agierende Wilderer-Netzwerke nutzen dies zur Wilderei kommerziell wertvoller Arten aus.

Der Nationalpark Lobéké (LNP) in Kamerun ist fast schon Sinnbild der genannten Herausforderungen. Die lokale Bevölkerung lebt größtenteils in extremer Armut, und da der Park die Subsistenzjagd einschränkt und gleichzeitig nur wenig zur sozioökonomischen Entwicklung der Dörfer beiträgt, wird er von der betroffenen Bevölkerung auch überwiegend negativ wahrgenommen. Kommerzielle Aktivitäten privater Unternehmen in der Pufferzone verschärfen den Unmut über die Nutzungsbeschränkungen. Auf der anderen Seite sind die Rechtsdurchsetzung und Strafverfolgung nicht effektiv genug, um den fortschreitenden Artenverlust aufzuhalten. Die Konfliktlage hat sich längst umgedreht: Parkwächtern (Eco-Guards) werden Menschenrechtsverletzungen an der lokalen Bevölkerung vorgeworfen, wenn sie diese bei Jagdaktivitäten ertappen, seien diese nun regelkonform (in bestimmten Arealen oder bei der Jagd auf bestimmte Spezies) oder auch nicht.

Diese Studie bietet eine umfassende Analyse der aktuellen Herausforderungen des Nationalparks Lobéké und gibt Empfehlungen an Akteure auf internationaler, nationaler und lokaler Ebene, um eine effizientere und gerechtere Verwaltung des Parks und seiner Pufferzone zu ermöglichen.

Hintergrund

Der Lobéké-Nationalpark liegt im Südosten Kameruns. Er ist Teil des trinationalen Schutzgebiets und UNESCO- Weltnaturerbes „Tri-National de la Sangha“ (TNS), das sich über drei Länder im Kongo-Becken erstreckt: Kamerun, die Zentralafrikanische Republik und die Republik Kongo. Der Park hat eine Gesamtfläche von 215.000 ha und wird vom kamerunischen Ministerium für Wälder und Fauna (MINFOF) und dem World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) gemeinsam verwaltet. Die finanzielle Unterstützung des Nationalparks Lobéké wird überwiegend vom Sangha Tri-National Trust Fund (FTNS) geleistet, der teilweise von der KfW-Entwicklungsbank finanziert wird.

Die Pufferzone des Parks (596.000 ha) umfasst verschiedene Konzessionszonen, die entweder für die Nutzung durch die Gemeinschaft bestimmt sind oder von privaten Unternehmen verwaltet werden (Holz-, Jagd- und ein Bergbauunternehmen). In den in der Pufferzone ansässigen 28 Dörfern leben rund 23.000 Menschen. Die Mehrheit der einheimischen Bevölkerung gehört zum Volk der Baka, das vom kamerunischen Staat als indigenes Volk anerkannt wird.

Studiendesign

Diese Studie stützt sich auf die Theorie von Elinor Ostrom zur Verwaltung von Kollektivgütern (Common Pool Resource Governance, CPRG). Der Nationalpark Lobéké wird als Allmendegut konzipiert, da er reich an natürlichen Ressourcen ist (Wildtiere, Nutzholz, Elfenbein, Mineralien, Heilpflanzen usw.), doch aufgrund schwieriger Zugangsregulierung und starker Nutzungsrivalität Probleme der Übernutzung aufweist. Aufbauend auf Ostrom's Allmende-Theorie geben Mascia et al. (2017) eine Typologie von Governance-Bereichen an, welche den Erfolg von Schutzgebieten sichern soll. Diese Typologie wurde für diese Studie angepasst und bezieht vier Dimensionen ein, nach denen die vorliegende Forschungsarbeit strukturiert wurde: Parkmanagement, Partizipation, lokale Lebensgrundlagen („livelihoods“) und Konflikte.

Methoden

Die umfassende Analyse der aktuellen Situation und konkrete Herausforderungen für die Good Governance des Lobéké Nationalparks war primäres Forschungsziel. Die Datenerhebung umfasste jeweils sechs Wochen in Yaoundé und in Lobéké. Außerdem reiste das Forschungsteam zum Vergleich in die TNS-Parks in der Zentralafrikanischen Republik und der Republik Kongo.

XVIII Zusammenfassung

Die Studie basiert auf qualitativen Methoden: 15 Experteninterviews in Yaoundé, 40 halbstrukturierte Interviews mit lokalen Stakeholdern in Lobéké, 10 Gemeindetreffen, 21 Fokusgruppendifkussionen und 8 „Feldbegehungen“ wurden unternommen. Darüber hinaus wurden zwei visuelle und interaktive Methoden eingesetzt: PhotoVoice (20 Interviews) und Soziodrama (10 Theaterstücke). Im Laufe der sechs Wochen vor Ort arbeitete das Forschungsteam eng mit verschiedenen Interessengruppen zusammen und konnte hierdurch auch mit „teilnehmenden Beobachtungen“ das Verständnis der örtlichen Gegebenheiten erhöhen.

Unter Berücksichtigung des explorativen Charakters der Studie wurde die Inhaltsanalyse iterativ durchgeführt: die Daten wurden bereits in Lobéké in Schlüsselthemen kategorisiert, die noch während der Recherche sukzessive überprüft und dann modifiziert wurden. Die Daten wurden mit Politikberichten, Literatur und selbst erhobenen GIS-gestützten Geodaten gegengecheckt (trianguliert). Schließlich wurden die vorläufigen Ergebnisse Stakeholdern auf lokaler und nationaler Ebene in interaktiven Workshops gespiegelt und gemeinsam Empfehlungen entwickelt.

Ergebnisse

- Parkverwaltung

Das Management des Nationalparks Lobéké verfügt nicht über die administrativen und finanziellen Kapazitäten, um Flora und Fauna des Parks wirksam zu schützen: Mangel an qualifiziertem Personal, Führungskonflikte und unzureichende finanzielle Mittel erschweren die effektive Überwachung und Durchsetzung der im Managementplan festgelegten Nutzungsregeln. Wilderei stellt ein großes Problem dar, doch Strategien zur Bekämpfung illegaler Jagd sind unzureichend oder fehlen.

Der Nationalpark Lobéké wird von MINFOF (Planungs- und Entscheidungsbehörde) und vom WWF Kamerun (Durchführungspartner für finanzielle und technische Beratung) gemeinsam verwaltet. Der von MINFOF berufene „Konservator“ ist Leiter des Parkmanagements, der WWF wird durch den „Programme Manager“ vertreten.

Das Parkmanagement steht vor mehreren Herausforderungen. Erstens sind die fünf Managementeinheiten des Parks (Verwaltung und Finanzen, Überwachung, Monitoring und Forschung, Co-Management sowie Ökotourismus) unterbesetzt. Anwesende Mitarbeiter vor Ort weisen nicht die Qualifikationen auf, die für ihre Positionen erforderlich sind. In Kombination mit häufigen

Abwesenheiten des Konservators behindert der Mangel an qualifiziertem Personal die effektive Umsetzung von Verwaltungsverfahren und verzögert Entscheidungsprozesse.

Zweitens sind die Arbeits- und Lebensbedingungen des Parkpersonals, insbesondere der Eco-Guards, mangelhaft: die Wohnbedingungen sind desolat, die Urlaubszeiten für Familienbesuche zu kurz (Eco-Guards werden aus allen Teilen des Landes angeheuert) und Boni werden nicht wie versprochen ausbezahlt. Folglich sind Arbeitsstellen in Lobéké nur wenig attraktiv; tatsächlich werden sie von einigen Eco-Guards als Bestrafung wahrgenommen.

Drittens lähmen latente Konflikte zwischen den beiden Management-Partnern MINFOF und WWF Kamerun Entscheidungs- und Ausführungsprozesse des Parkmanagements. Da Mandate und Verantwortlichkeiten offenbar nicht klar definiert sind bzw. in Disput stehen, ändert der Finanzierungspartner FTNS seine Rolle zunehmend vom Finanzier zu einer Durchführungsorganisation, was die Konflikte weiter verschärft. Der Disput der Co-Management-Partner stellt den aktuellen Managementaufbau in Frage und eröffnet Diskussionen über alternative Verwaltungsstrukturen (wie z.B. die Idee einer neuen "superstructure" in Form einer Schutzgebiets-Agentur auf nationaler Ebene).

Viertens generiert der Nationalpark keine Einnahmen und ist stark unterfinanziert. Obgleich der Park eine reiche Tier- und Pflanzenwelt aufweist, lockt er nur wenige Touristen an: mit nur 96 Besuchern im Jahr 2016 ist Tourismus quasi nicht vorhanden. Hauptgründe für den mangelnden Zulauf an Touristen sind die politische Instabilität in der Grenzregion, die schwierige Zugänglichkeit des Parks und der Mangel an touristischer Infrastruktur. Djembe, ein ehemals attraktiver touristischer Standort im Osten des Parks, ist zerstört, und geltende Visabestimmungen behindern touristische Kreistouren im Schutzgebiet Tri-National de la Sangha.

Zurzeit ist Lobéke Nationalpark vollständig von externen Finanzmitteln abhängig, die hauptsächlich vom Sangha Tri-National Trust Fund (FTNS, 81%) stammen. Geringe Anteile werden von internationalen NGOs (15% über den WWF Kamerun) und MINFOF (4% für die Gehälter der Mitarbeiter) bereitgestellt. FTNS-Mittel werden vom Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (BMZ) über die KfW-Entwicklungsbank und die französische Entwicklungsagentur (AFD) gewährt. Von 2009 bis 2018 erhielt LNP nicht mehr als 1,86 Mio. EUR aus Projektfinanzierungen, 75% davon 2016. Der Großteil der Finanzierung (58%) wird zur Deckung der Verwaltungskosten verwendet. Laut WWF Deutschland benötige der Park jedoch mindestens 1-2 Millionen Euro

XX Zusammenfassung

jährlich, um seinen zentralen Aufgaben nachkommen zu können (WWF, persönliches Gespräch, 11. Dezember 2018).

Fünftens ist die wichtigste operative Tätigkeit des Parks, die Wildereibekämpfung, wenig wirksam. Das Parkmanagement muss, grob unterschieden, zwei Arten von Wilderei ahnden: die kommerzielle Wilderei (large-scale poaching), die hauptsächlich von professionellen, (multi-) nationalen Syndikaten durchgeführt wird sowie die sogenannte Kleinwilderei (small-scale poaching), die von der Lokalbevölkerung getätigt wird und eine Verletzung ihrer Nutzungsrechte darstellt. Die Nutzungsrechte erlauben die Bestandsjagd und den Konsum von Buschfleisch, sofern klar definierte Regeln (z. B. Tierart, Jagdausrüstung, ausgewiesene Zonen) eingehalten werden.

Das Management geht mit spezifischen Ansätzen vor: zum einen konzentriert sich der „soft-power“-Ansatz auf Sensibilisierungskampagnen über Nutzungsrechte und illegale Waldnutzung. Zum anderen beruht der „hard-power“-Ansatz auf bewaffneten Patrouillen mit Eco-Guards im Park und in geringerem Maße in seiner Pufferzone. Beide Ansätze sind stark verbesserungsbedürftig. Der „soft-power“-Ansatz ist weitgehend wirkungslos, da er weder lokale Bedürfnisse berücksichtigt noch lokale Nutzer integriert und die Hauptursachen der Kleinwilderei außer Acht lässt (Armut und Arbeitslosigkeit, Mangel an alternativen Proteinquellen). Der „hard-power“-Ansatz zeigt zwar eine gewisse Wirksamkeit, könnte jedoch von einer stärkeren Einbindung der lokalen Bevölkerung profitieren, wie dies in den anderen TNS-Parks üblich ist. Die Einbindung lokaler Ressourcennutzer in Maßnahmen der Wildereibekämpfung könnte dazu beitragen, mehr Unterstützung für den Naturschutz zu finden und die Beziehung zu den Eco-Guards und dem Parkmanagement zu verbessern.

Sechstens stellen Abholzung und Bergbau in der Pufferzone des Parks eine Bedrohung für die biologische Vielfalt dar und gefährden den Status des Parks als UNESCO-Weltnaturerbe. Die Feldrecherche ergab, dass neben privaten Unternehmen, die in ihren Konzessionen natürliche Ressourcen legal ausbeuten, sowohl illegaler Holzeinschlag als auch illegaler Bergbau in unmittelbarer Nähe des Parks ausgeübt werden. Das Parkmanagement verfügt jedoch über keine Strategie, diesen Bedrohungen zu begegnen.

- Partizipation

Der LNP-Managementplan und das kamerunische Waldgesetz unterstreichen die Relevanz lokaler Partizipation am Naturschutz und am Ressourcenmanagement. Der Großteil der legal verankerten Partizipationsmechanismen ist jedoch nicht oder nur teilweise funktionsfähig: die lokale Bevölkerung ist kaum in die Verwaltung des Parks

integriert, die Gemeinschaftszone (community zone) des Parks ist ineffektiv, Mechanismen des Finanzausgleichs (revenue-sharing) sind ineffizient und kommunales Ressourcenmanagement wird durch schwache administrative Kapazitäten, mangelnde Transparenz und Kontrolle, Korruption sowie soziale Stratifizierung innerhalb dörflicher „Gemeinschaften“ unterminiert. Darüber hinaus gibt es Hinweise darauf, dass der Informations- und Konsultationsprozess über die Einrichtung des Parks und die damit verbundene Landnutzungsplanung seiner Pufferzone unzureichend waren.

Der Managementplan des Lobéke Nationalparks und das kamerunische Waldgesetz betonen sowohl den instrumentellen als auch den normativen Wert von Partizipation und beschreiben verschiedene Mechanismen, welche die lokale Beteiligung an natürlichem Ressourcenmanagement erhöhen sollen.

Die Kluft zwischen Theorie und Praxis ist jedoch groß. Die lokale Bevölkerung wurde entsprechend unserer Ergebnisse weder angemessen über die Errichtung des Parks informiert, noch war sie in die Landnutzungsplanung eingebunden. Aussagen einzelner Dorfbewohner weisen darauf hin, dass die Konsultationen über die Einrichtung des Nationalparks und der Erklärung zum UNESCO-Weltnaturerbe nicht den Prinzipien des Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) entsprachen. Lokale Bedürfnisse, insbesondere der indigenen Baka, wurden in der Landnutzungsplanung der Pufferzone weitgehend außer Acht gelassen. Traditionelle Nutzungsrechte werden in der Pufferzone des Parks daher nur unzureichend berücksichtigt.

Auch weisen die verschiedenen Partizipationsmechanismen in der Praxis erhebliche Mängel auf. So soll über im Managementplan beschriebene „multi-stakeholder“-Plattformen lokales Wissen in Belange des Parkmanagements integriert und lokale Nutzungsinteressen reflektiert werden. Allerdings ist die Bevölkerung nur unzureichend repräsentiert und die Plattformen kommen, wenn überhaupt, unregelmäßig zu Stande. Auch die formelle Beschäftigung der lokalen Bevölkerung durch das Parkmanagement erfolgt nur sporadisch, sodass lokales Wissen kaum in aktuelle Naturschutzpraktiken integriert wird.

Auch die vielfach gelobte Gemeinschaftszone des Parks (community zone) weist zahlreiche Umsetzungsfehler auf und versagt in ihrer Hauptfunktion, der lokalen Bevölkerung (eingeschränkt) Nießbrauchrechte an Waldressourcen zu gewähren. Die Opportunitäts- und Transaktionskosten sind für viele Dorfbewohner zu hoch: so müssen sie im Hauptsitz der Parkverwaltung in Mambélé eine kostspielige Genehmigung einholen, um Zugang zu dieser Zone zu erhalten. Die meisten Menschen können sich diese Genehmigung nicht leisten,

XXii Zusammenfassung

auch gibt es kaum (kostengünstige) Transportmöglichkeiten nach Mambélé. Darüber hinaus wird der Zugang zur Gemeinschaftszone nur innerhalb einer kurzen Periode des Jahres für maximal zwei Wochen gewährt, obgleich viele Dorfbewohner länger oder zu anderen Zeiten des Jahres Zugriff auf natürliche Ressourcen benötigen. Zusätzlich liegt diese Zone im Westen des Parks und ist damit (zu) weit entfernt von vielen Dörfern im Osten, Norden und Süden. Es überrascht ob dieser Mängel daher nicht, dass ein Großteil der Befragten gar keine Kenntnis über die Existenz dieser Gemeinschaftszone hat.

Auch erwies sich die lokale Teilhabe am Ressourcenmanagement in der Pufferzone als unzureichend. Weder die Umverteilung der jährlichen Forstgebühren von Holzfällerunternehmen noch die Kooperationsvereinbarung zwischen Dorfgemeinden und privaten Unternehmen (Mambélé-Übereinkommen) funktionieren auch praktisch.

Die direkte kommunale Bewirtschaftung von Waldressourcen über Jagdgebiete (community hunting zones, ZICGC), Gemeindewälder und Kohlenstoffzonen (carbon zones) zeigte auch deutliche Mängel auf.

In der Pufferzone des Parks gibt es drei kommunale Jagdgebiete (ZICGCs), die von sogenannten „Community Based Wildlife Resource Management Committees“ (Comités de Valorisation des Ressources Fauniques, COVAREF) verwaltet werden, die sich wiederum aus Gemeindevertretern und lokalen Autoritäten zusammensetzen. Die ZICGCs sollen der lokalen Bevölkerung das Recht auf Subsistenzjagd gewähren. Die COVAREFs können auch die Entscheidung treffen, die Gebiete an Jagdunternehmen zu vermieten, um Einnahmen für Mikroprojekte zu generieren. Alle drei ZICGCs in der Park-Pufferzone werden derzeit an Safariunternehmen verpachtet. Offenbar haben ihre kommerzielle Interessen Vorrang vor Nutzungsrechten der lokalen Bevölkerung: laut Aussagen der Befragten halten die Safariunternehmen von der legalen Subsistenzjagd ab, aber verteidigen ihre eigenen Interessen äußerst aggressiv. Darüber hinaus weisen die COVAREF Probleme der Transparenz und Kontrolle auf. Die von den Safariunternehmen gezahlten Steuern scheinen nicht in die lokalen Gemeinden zurückgeleitet bzw. für Mikroprojekte verwendet zu werden. Baka und Frauen stellen in den COVAREFs eine Minderheit dar und haben kaum Möglichkeiten, Entscheidungsprozesse innerhalb der COVAREF zu beeinflussen.

Die kommunale Verwaltung ausgewiesener Gemeindewälder (community forests) steht vor ähnlichen Herausforderungen. Die Gemeindewälder geben den teilhabenden Dorfgemeinden das exklusive Recht über die Nutzung von Holz- und

Nichtholzressourcen und sollen über Nutzholzproduktion Einnahmen für Mikroprojekte generieren. Sie werden von einem von der Gemeinde berufenen Lenkungsausschuss verwaltet. Doch auch hier behindern begrenzte administrative Kapazitäten, Korruption und mangelnde Berücksichtigung der Interessen der Baka eine effektive und gerechte Ressourcennutzung. Darüber hinaus wird die Standortwahl der Gemeindewälder in Yaoundé durchgeführt, offenbar ohne Berücksichtigung lokaler Gegebenheiten: so befinden sich viele Gemeindewälder in der Nähe von Straßen, enthalten landwirtschaftliche Flächen und besitzen nur minderwertiges Holz.

Jüngst wurde in vier Gemeindewäldern Kohlenstoffzonen eingerichtet, die im Rahmen des internationalen REDD+ - Modells Walderhalt finanziell vergüten und somit attraktiv machen sollen. In diesen Zonen sind Abholzung, Landwirtschaft und Subsistenzjagd verboten und die Sammlung von Nichtholz-Waldprodukten erfordert eine Genehmigung. Die Lenkungsausschüsse der Gemeindewälder knüpfen hohe Erwartungen an REDD+ und betrachten die finanzielle Vergütung von Walderhalt als eine faire Art des Naturschutzes. Allerdings sind bisher noch keine Zahlungen erfolgt und es bleibt fraglich, ob diese jemals realisiert werden. Folglich riskieren lokale Gemeinden den Verlust einer weiteren Nutzungszone an den Naturschutz ohne geringsten finanziellen Ausgleich.

Livelihoods

Die lokale Bevölkerung rund um den Nationalpark Lobéké betreibt mehrheitlich Subsistenzwirtschaft und benötigt zur Sicherstellung ihrer Nahrungsversorgung Zugang zu Waldressourcen und Land. Der Park und die Konzessionen, die der kamerunische Staat privaten Unternehmen in dessen Pufferzone gewährt, schränken jedoch sowohl ihren Landzugang als auch ihre Ressourcennutzung stark ein. Folglich werden Möglichkeiten zur Subsistenzlandwirtschaft und -jagd sowie zum Sammeln von Nichtholz-Waldprodukten (NTFP) beschnitten. Trotz dieser armutsfördernden Nutzungseinschränkungen werden diese kaum kompensiert: weder das Parkmanagement noch die privaten Unternehmen bieten ausreichend alternative Lebensgrundlagen oder Einkommensquellen an. Mangelnder Marktzugang und unzureichendes Know-How behindern hier aber eine eigenständige wirtschaftliche Entwicklung sowieso schon.

Lokale Baka- und Bantu betreiben zur Existenzsicherung Jagd, Landwirtschaft und Fischfang, außerdem sammeln sie Nichtholz-Waldprodukte. In geringerem Maße werden diese Aktivitäten auch zur Einkommensschaffung ausgeübt. Zwei Produkten wird ein hohes Vermarktungspotential attestiert:

XXIV Zusammenfassung

sowohl der Anbau von Kakao als auch von NTFP lässt sich mit Zielen des Biodiversitätsschutzes vereinen und die Nachfrage für beide Produkte ist gegeben. Allerdings mindern hohe Saatgut- und Düngemittelkosten, beschränkter Zugang zu Land, nicht entwickelte Wertschöpfungsketten, mangelndes Know-How und unzureichender Marktzugang die Anreize für Investitionen und Ertragssteigerung.

Andere geringfügige Einkommensquellen der Lokalbevölkerung sind die Produktion von Holzkohle, der kleingewerbliche Handel, der handwerkliche Bergbau und Erntehelfertätigkeiten. Sporadisch werden Anwohner vom Parkmanagement für die Bestandzählung und Tourismus beschäftigt. Auch die Mongokele Mining Company und die vier Jagdsafari-Unternehmen bieten saisonal Beschäftigung an, doch auch diese ist kurzfristig und auf wenige Stellen begrenzt. Die größten formalen Arbeitgeber sind die drei Holzfällerunternehmen CTSC, SEFAC und die Vicwood-Thany-Gruppe, die etwa 770 Mitarbeiter beschäftigen. Viele der Mitarbeiter kommen allerdings nicht aus den umliegenden Dörfern, sondern aus der weiteren Region: laut Aussagen der Holzunternehmen mangle es der Lokalbevölkerung an der notwendigen Qualifikation.

Es gibt einige lokale Kooperationen (Associations), die z.T. von der Parkverwaltung ins Leben gerufen wurden und sich zum Ziel setzen, alternative Einkommensquellen zu fördern und über gemeinsame Vermarktung landwirtschaftlicher Produkte Gewinne zu steigern. Interviews mit ihren Mitgliedern ergaben jedoch eine unzureichende Unterstützung seitens des Parkmanagements und der lokalen Behörden: so fehle es an finanziellen Mitteln, an Material und Ausrüstung. Auch notwendige Weiterbildungsmaßnahmen werden offenbar nicht angeboten.

Die Mehrheit der Bevölkerung hat keinen Zugang zu Basisinfrastruktur, wie z.B. zu medizinischer Versorgung, Bildungseinrichtungen und sauberem Trinkwasser. Trotz der Aussage des Parkmanagements, die sozioökonomische Entwicklung zu unterstützen und Basisinfrastruktur bereitzustellen, fand das Forschungsteam nur wenige Hinweise darauf. Die beiden Holzfällerunternehmen Vicwood-Thany Group und SEFAC beteiligen sich an Entwicklungsprojekten, ihre Unterstützung ist jedoch unbeständig und beschränkt sich auf die unmittelbare Umgebung ihrer Sägewerke.

In der Pufferzone des Parks ist der Zugang der Lokalbevölkerung zu Land- und Waldressourcen äußerst unsicher. Laut Aussagen der Bevölkerung sei sowohl die Subsistenzjagd als auch -Landwirtschaft in den Holz- und Safarikonzessionen beschränkt. Auch dies trägt zur wachsenden Armut bei.

Konflikte

Während der Feldrecherche konnten vier wesentliche Konflikttypen identifiziert werden, die das Management des Lobéké Nationalparks vor große Herausforderungen stellen. Grundlegender Konflikt ist der wahrgenommene Antagonismus zwischen Naturschutz und sozioökonomischer Entwicklung. Die Vernachlässigung lokaler Bedürfnisse und anhaltende extreme Armut haben Ressentiments gegenüber Naturschutz geschürt. Symptome dieses Grundkonflikts sind Mensch-Tier Konflikte sowie teils gewalttätige Auseinandersetzungen zwischen „Eco-Guards“ und der Lokalbevölkerung. Ersterer wird von zahlreichen Interviewpartnern als existenzielle Bedrohung beschrieben: Erntezerstörung durch geschützte Wildtiere wie Gorillas und Elefanten erschwert der lokalen Bevölkerung die eigene Nahrungsversorgung. Erfahrungen und Narrative direkter Gewalt haben zudem zu einer Atmosphäre der Angst und des Misstrauens zwischen Lokalbevölkerung und Eco-Guards geführt, welche jegliche Zusammenarbeit und effektive Konfliktbearbeitung behindern. Darüber hinaus beeinträchtigen innerdörfliche Konflikte zwischen Baka- und Bantu-Gruppen ein inklusives Ressourcenmanagement und erschweren Integrationsbestrebungen der indigenen Baka.

1. Interessenkonflikt Naturschutz und Entwicklung

Die Mehrheit der Lokalbevölkerung scheint den Park als Bedrohung lokaler Lebensgrundlagen aufzufassen und nimmt ihn daher vorwiegend als restriktiv wahr. Zwar wird die Bedeutung von Naturschutz für den Erhalt natürlicher Ressourcen anerkannt, doch die Vernachlässigung ihrer legitimen sozioökonomischen Bedürfnisse wird scharf kritisiert. Befragte fordern das Parkmanagement und den kamerunischen Staat auf, ihre Grundbedürfnisse zu decken und in Basisinfrastruktur zu investieren. Der Mangel an Beteiligungsmöglichkeiten am Parkmanagement trägt zusätzlich dazu bei, dass der Park als ein „ausländisches Projekt“ wahrgenommen wird, von welchem die Parkanwohner kaum profitieren. Um die lokale Bevölkerung für den Nationalpark zu gewinnen, sollte das Parkmanagement dringend auf ihre sozioökonomischen Bedürfnisse eingehen und sie stärker in das Management involvieren.

2. Mensch – Tier Konflikt

Laut Aussagen der Dorfbewohner besteht ein hohes Zerstörungsrisiko für ihre Anbaukulturen durch geschützte Wildtiere. Befragte berichteten von Ernteschäden, die durch Elefanten, Schimpansen, Gorillas und kleineren Affen verursacht worden seien. Die Häufigkeit und die Schadensintensität habe in den letzten Jahren zugenommen. Die Farmer kennen nur wenige nicht-letale

XXVI Zusammenfassung

Maßnahmen, mit denen Wildtiere wirksam von Feldern vertrieben und Ernteschäden verhindert werden können. Es gibt die Möglichkeit, Beschwerde einzureichen und Schadenersatz einzufordern, doch der Beschwerdemechanismus involviert drei verschiedene Ministerien, ist umständlich und bürokratisch. Laut Aussagen der Bauern dauere es mitunter Monate, bis Rückmeldung komme - oft würden die Beschwerden mit dem Hinweis ignoriert, sich direkt bei dem Wildtier zu beschweren. Das Fehlen geeigneter Präventions- und Schadensminderungsstrategien trägt zu einem Gefühl der Hilflosigkeit bei und verstärkt die Wut auf den Schutz der bedrohten Tierarten. Das Parkmanagement muss noch eine umfassende Strategie ausarbeiten, welche auch die Risiken durch Wildtier-Übergriffe quantifiziert. Schließlich sollten gemeinsam mit der Bevölkerung Präventions- und Linderungsstrategien erarbeitet werden.

3. Eco- Guards und lokale Bevölkerung

Die Erfahrungen und Narrative direkter Gewalt beider Konfliktparteien haben eine Atmosphäre der Angst und des Misstrauens geschaffen. Im Wesentlichen dreht sich dieser Konflikt um die Durchsetzung lokaler Nutzungsrechte bzw. um ihre Behinderung. Auf der eine Seite beklagt die lokale Bevölkerung, dass Eco-Guards legale Subsistenzjagd verhinderten, Ausrüstung und Buschfleisch beschlagnahmten und Gewalt anwendeten. Im Soziodrama stellten die Teilnehmer die Eco- Guards als uneinsichtig und gewalttätig dar. Auf der anderen Seite gaben Parkmanagement und Eco-Guards an, dass sie unter voller Beachtung der Menschenrechte das kamerunische Gesetz gegen Wilderei in einem zunehmend militarisierten Umfeld lediglich anwendeten.

Die Konfliktlösungsstrategie des Parkmanagements ist unzureichend. Der vom WWF Kamerun und der nationalen NRO CEFAID eingerichtete Beschwerdemechanismus ist ineffektiv und bedarf der Überarbeitung. Es gibt keinerlei Möglichkeit zu Dialog der Konfliktparteien, was der Konfliktbearbeitung oder Auflösung gegenseitiger „Feindbilder“ im Wege steht. Auch ist anzunehmen, dass die schlechten Lebens- und Arbeitsbedingungen der Eco- Guards ihr Verhalten beeinträchtigen. Schließlich sollte die Strafverfolgung der Safariunternehmen unter die Lupe genommen werden. Offenbar haben einige Safari-Unternehmen begonnen, Strafverfolgung in ihren Konzessionen in die eigene Hand zu nehmen. Die Eco-Guards werden dabei umgangen: Berichten zufolge kooperierten die Unternehmen mit dem kamerunischen Militär. Laut Aussagen der Lokalbevölkerung geht auch dieses gewalttätig gegen sie vor. Dies verstärkt Ressentiments gegen uniformierte Rechtsdurchsetzung.

4. Baka-Bantu-Beziehung

Die soziale Dynamik zwischen Baka- und Bantu- Gruppen beeinträchtigt Naturschutz und kommunales Ressourcenmanagement und sollte von Parkmanagement und politischen Entscheidungsträgern mit größerer Aufmerksamkeit bedacht werden. Die konfliktträchtige Beziehung beider Gruppen wird gemeinhin als Dichotomie zwischen "modernen Bantu-Dorfbewohnern" und "indigenen Baka-Waldbewohnern" verstanden.

Baka-Teilnehmer kritisierten Diskriminierung und Marginalisierung durch ihre Bantu-Nachbarn, während Bantu-Teilnehmer ein Bild des harmonischen Zusammenlebens zeichneten und die inhärente "Rückständigkeit" der Baka für ihre Armut verantwortlich machten. Die überwiegende Mehrheit der Baka-Teilnehmer äußerte den Wunsch nach Integration und dörflicher Infrastruktur (Schulen, Krankenhäuser, sanitäre Anlagen), während gleichzeitig eine enge Beziehung zum Wald als kulturellem Erbe herausgestellt wurde. Die konventionelle Dichotomie von „modern - traditionell“ sollte überwunden werden, um diesen Bedürfnissen der Baka-Gruppen adäquat entgegenzukommen. Gleichzeitig müssen ganzheitliche Entwicklungsansätze auch die Bantu-Bevölkerung integrieren, um die konfliktträchtige Trennung beider Gruppen aufzulösen.

Fazit

Die Ergebnisse dieser Studie führen zu drei Schlussfolgerungen:

Erstens: Naturschutz wird ohne die Berücksichtigung lokaler Bedürfnisse keinen Erfolg haben. Dies ist keine „neue“ Einsicht, sondern langjähriges politisches Narrativ, das auf die UN-Konferenz über Umwelt und Entwicklung in Rio de Janeiro 1992 zurückgeht und heute u.a. in der Agenda 2030 verankert ist (McShane and Wells, 2004: 3). Forderungen nach einer Integration von Naturschutz und Entwicklung beruhen auf der Erkenntnis, dass sich die beiden politischen Ziele gegenseitig bedingen: Entwicklung ohne Rücksicht auf die Umwelt ist nicht nachhaltig und zerstört längerfristig lokale Lebensgrundlagen, während Naturschutz ohne Entwicklung zur Entfremdung und zu Landnutzungskonflikten führt — und „sich letztendlich selbst bekämpft“ (ibidem: viii, übersetzt). Laut Theorie sollten sich Entwicklung und Naturschutz gegenseitig unterstützen.

Diese Studie zeigt jedoch auf, dass die Integration von sozio-ökonomischer Entwicklung und Naturschutz keine leichte Aufgabe ist. Zwar enthält der Lobéke-Managementplan ausgezeichnete Vorschläge für die Integration von

XXVIII Zusammenfassung

Entwicklungs- und Naturschutzzielen, doch die Diskrepanz zwischen Managementdesign und Implementierung ist ungeheuer groß. Partizipative Elemente wie Finanzausgleichsmechanismen, kommunal verwaltete Nutzungszonen im Park oder kommunale Jagdzonen und Gemeindewälder sehen auf dem Papier zwar gut aus, ihr Versprechen wird in der Realität aber nicht eingelöst.

Dies bedeutet nicht, dass die Ideen falsch sind. Im Gegenteil – dieser Bericht bekräftigt Studien, die betonen, dass die Einbeziehung lokaler Ressourcennutzer in Naturschutz nicht nur normativ wünschenswert, sondern für die Gewährleistung nachhaltigen Naturschutzes von entscheidender Bedeutung ist (Hayer und Ostrom, 2005; Twinamatsiko et al., 2014). Wenn sich das Ausmaß lokaler Entfremdung vom Park reduziert, werden Konflikte höchstwahrscheinlich abnehmen und Regeln und Vorschriften (besser) eingehalten (siehe auch Husain et al., 2018).

Die Kluft zwischen Theorie und Praxis erfordert eine Ursachenanalyse, welche Faktoren die Umsetzung partizipativer Instrumente behindern. Hauptursachen sind laut dieser Studie die schwachen Verwaltungskapazitäten, Korruption, Vernachlässigung lokaler Bedürfnisse sowie unrealistische Annahmen über die (Verteilungs-) Gerechtigkeit lokaler „Gemeinschaften“.

Zweitens: Auch von nicht-lokalen Akteuren geht Zerstörung aus. Kommerzielle Wilderei und Ressourcenausbeutung durch private Unternehmen in der Pufferzone bedrohen die biologische Vielfalt. Ein großer Anteil des Unmuts über den Park ist zudem auf unsicheren Landzugang und ungleiche Ressourcenverteilung in der Pufferzone zurückzuführen. Die mangelhafte Regulierung privater Unternehmen hat recht paradoxe Konsequenzen. Während zum Beispiel lokale Überlebensstrategien wie die Subsistenzjagd stark eingeschränkt und strafbar sind, können gewinnorientierte Safari-Unternehmen uneingeschränkt ihre Geschäftsinteressen verfolgen und die Lokalbevölkerung von ihren Profiten ausschließen.

Die kommerziellen Aktivitäten in der Pufferzone müssen besser reguliert werden. Private Unternehmen sollten dazu angehalten werden, die lokalen Bedürfnisse zu berücksichtigen und traditionelle Nutzungsrechte zu integrieren. Auch dies ist keine neue Forderung – der Managementplan des Parks betont die Bedeutung des „integrierten Managements“ seiner Pufferzone und verweist ausdrücklich auf den sog. Landschaftsansatz (approach paysage). Die Umwandlung dieses Ansatzes vom Modewort zur gelebten Praxis scheint jedoch gescheitert: Multi-Stakeholder-Plattformen treffen sich unregelmäßig (wenn

überhaupt), Verfahren der „kollaborativen Planung“ oder des „adaptiven Managements“ fehlen ganz. Auch hier sind schwache administrative und finanzielle Kapazitäten sowie mangelndes Leadership Haupthindernisse.

Schließlich zeigt diese Studie auf, dass die schwache unterstützende Präsenz des Staates in der Lobéké-Region die negative Wahrnehmung der lokalen Bevölkerung befördert. Das Fehlen wesentlicher staatlicher Dienstleistungen und Behörden hat die Erwartung geweckt, dass private Akteure (sowohl der WWF als auch private Unternehmen) die Grundbedürfnisse decken und Infrastruktur bereitstellen (sollen). Eine stärkere Einbeziehung des kamerunischen Staates ist wünschenswert. Da Naturschutz ein globales Ziel mit vorwiegend lokalen Kosten ist, sollten deutsche und internationale Entwicklungsagenturen das erforderliche technische Fachwissen und die notwendigen finanziellen Ressourcen bereitstellen, um einen wesentlichen Beitrag zur lokalen Entwicklung zu leisten.

Empfehlungen

Insgesamt wurden 37 Empfehlungen entwickelt, um den Park in eine insgesamt bessere Entwicklungsrichtung zu bringen. Zu diesem Zwecke wurden Datenanalysen und Diskussionen mit Interessengruppen auf lokaler und nationaler Ebene durchgeführt und Best-Practice-Beispiele aus der Literatur recherchiert.

Viele der Empfehlungen bauen auf bereits etablierten, aber verbesserungswürdigen Prozessen oder Mechanismen auf. Die Empfehlungen richten sich an unterschiedliche Stakeholder und sind in vier Zielkategorien unterteilt, denen entweder die Priorität "hoch", "mittel" oder "niedrig" eingeräumt wird:

- Ziel 1: Die Parkverwaltung von LNP ist effizienter und effektiver - Insgesamt: 9 Empfehlungen
- Ziel 2: Naturschutz involviert die lokale Bevölkerung und schadet nicht, sondern unterstützt die Existenzgrundlagen der lokalen Bevölkerung - Insgesamt: 12 Empfehlungen
- Ziel 3: Konflikte um LNP sind reduziert und werden nachhaltig bewältigt - Insgesamt: 12 Empfehlungen
- Ziel 4: Die Pufferzone von LNP wird nachhaltig verwaltet und die Nutzungsrechte der lokalen Bevölkerung werden respektiert und geschützt- Insgesamt: 4 Empfehlungen

Table of contents

Preface.....	i
Acknowledgements	ii
Executive summary	iii
Zusammenfassung.....	xvi
Table of contents	xxxix
List of tables.....	xxxv
List of figures	xxxvi
List of images	xxxvii
List of infoboxes	xxxix
List of maps	xl
Abbreviations.....	xli
1 Introduction	1
1.1 Study area	4
1.1.1 Administrative Organisation	5
1.1.2 Local population	7
1.1.3 Concessions in LNP's buffer zone	8
1.2 Stakeholders	12
2 Aim of the study and research questions	13
3 Conceptual framework	15
3.1 Common-Pool Resource Governance	15
3.1.1 Park Management	17
3.1.2 Participation.....	18
3.1.3 Livelihoods	19
3.1.4 Conflicts	20

4	Methods and data collection	23
4.1	Methods	23
4.2	Data Analysis	27
4.3	Research Assistance.....	27
4.4	Ethical Considerations	27
5	Results.....	29
5.1	Park management	29
5.1.1	Administrative Organisation and Staffing	29
5.1.2	Finance.....	33
5.1.3	Working Conditions	36
5.1.4	Ecotourism	40
5.1.5	Anti-Poaching Strategy	43
5.1.6	Collaboration within the “Trinational de la Sangha”	61
5.1.7	Managerial Conflicts: The Management Triangle	62
5.2	Participation	66
5.2.1	Why Participation?	67
5.2.2	Information and Consultation Process.....	70
5.2.3	Integration of Customary Rights in Forest Zoning	71
5.2.4	Overview Participatory Elements	74
5.2.5	Participatory Mechanisms controlled by Park Management	76
5.2.6	Participatory Mechanisms in Management of Buffer Zone	78
5.2.7	Stakeholders	90
5.3	Livelihoods	94
5.3.1	Livelihood Activities of the Local Population	95
5.3.2	Potential Alternative Income opportunities.....	102
5.3.3	Formal Job Opportunities	110
5.3.4	Restrictions on Livelihood Activities.....	113
5.3.5	Mitigation of Livelihood Challenges	115

5.3.6	Provision of Basic Infrastructure and Community Development.....	116
5.4	Conflicts	121
5.4.1	Conflict 1: Conservation and Development.....	122
5.4.2	Conflict 2: Humans and wildlife	125
5.4.3	Conflict 3: Law enforcement and Local Population	133
5.4.4	Conflict 4: 'Forest people' and 'Villagers'	146
6	Recommendations	159
7	Conclusion.....	165
8	Bibliography	171
9	Annexes	183
Annex 1	Objective system.....	183
Annex 2	Ethical guidelines.....	184
Annex 3	Work schedule.....	186
Annex 4	Citation code	187
Annex 5	Conflict Analysis Tools.....	207
Annex 6	Annex 6 Commitment of honesty ("Engagement sur l'honneur")	209
Annex 7	Distribution of Central African hunter-gatherer groups	210
Annex 8	Mapping of the land and resource use of the Baka inside and around Boumba-Bek and Nki NPs	211
Annex 9	Subsistence activities of villagers from Dissassoué - participatory mapping	212
Annex 10	Area inside LNP that is traditionally used by adjacent communities.....	213
Annex 11	Examples of insufficient community lands.....	214

XXXIV Table of contents

Annex 12	Seasonal calendar and description of Non-Timber-Forest-Products	215
Annex 13	Recommendations workshops Mambélé & Yaoundé	219
Annex 14	Detailed recommendations of the study	227

List of tables

Table 1:	Multi-level overview of stakeholders	12
Table 2:	Guiding questions for the analysis of participation in Lobéké National Park and its buffer zone.....	19
Table 3:	Numbers of visitors in LNP and APDS in the years 2008-2016	42
Table 4:	Hunting rules	45
Table 5:	Participation in Lobéké National Park and buffer zone.....	75
Table 6:	Basic information on COVAREFs	82
Table 7:	Stakeholder analysis	91
Table 8:	Theatre - Workshop Dioula 1	138
Table 9:	Theatre - Workshop Dioula 2	140
Table 10:	Theatre - Workshop Dioula 3	152
Table 11:	Overview of recommendations	160
Table 12:	Seasonal calendar for Non-Timber-Forest-Products	215
Table 13:	Non-Timber-Forest-Products and their processing and utilization ..	216
Table 14:	Mambélé Workshop.....	219
Table 15:	Recommendations developed during workshop in Mambélé	221
Table 16:	Yaoundé Workshop.....	224
Table 17:	Recommendations developed during workshop in Yaoundé	225
Table 18:	Detailed recommendations of the study	227

List of figures

Figure 1:	Four dimensions of common-pool resource governance of Lobéké National Park and its buffer zone	17
Figure 2:	PhotoVoice Participants Characteristics	24
Figure 3:	Organisation chart of LNP Management (units/positions with WWF staff in green)	31
Figure 4:	Shares of budget contribution to LNP by partners	36
Figure 5:	Proportions of planned FTNS budget for the five LNP programmes in 2018.....	36
Figure 6:	Implemented missions according to type	51
Figure 7:	Elephant population 2002 - 2015	52
Figure 8:	The management triangle.....	62
Figure 9:	Main income sources for Baka in the Lobéké National Park periphery	98
Figure 10:	Main income sources for Bantu in the Lobéké National Park periphery	98
Figure 11:	Conflict Map of actors involved in the governance of Lobéké National Park and its buffer zone	122
Figure 12:	PIN – Tool_ Conflict Conservation and Development.....	125
Figure 13:	ABC triangle Human-Wildlife-Conflict	128
Figure 14:	ABC triangle Baka.....	149
Figure 15:	ABC triangle Bantu	151
Figure 16:	ABC – Triangle as proposed by Johan Galtung	207
Figure 17:	Commitment of honesty (“Engagement sur l’honneur”)	209

List of images

Image 1:	Grey parrots (<i>Psittacus erithacus</i>) seized from wildlife traffickers during an eco-guard patrol.....	37
Image 2:	Latrines of Eco- Guards.....	38
Image 3:	WWF Car	39
Image 4:	Poste de Garde	40
Image 5:	Picture of animal classes	44
Image 6:	Eco- Guards killed on duty.....	47
Image 7:	Goats.....	50
Image 8:	Abandoned office building Djembe	54
Image 9:	Trees	57
Image 10:	Working in the forest	59
Image 11:	Illegal artisanal mining site	60
Image 12:	School classroom in Zenga.....	84
Image 13:	COVAREF project budget.....	85
Image 14:	Logging truck	89
Image 15:	Forest.....	96
Image 16:	Farming Plot.....	96
Image 17:	Cassava plantation in Libongo.....	97
Image 18:	Selling Bushmeat.....	99
Image 19:	Hired Baka during Cocoa harvest	100
Image 20:	Local Shop.....	101
Image 21:	Cacao Harvest.....	104
Image 22:	Cacao Field	105
Image 23:	Women collecting Non-Timber-Forest-Products near Dioula.....	106
Image 24:	Border to the Republic of Congo at the Ngoko River close to Socambo	107
Image 25:	Motorbike.....	108
Image 26:	CTSC sawmill in Kika.....	111

XXXVIII List of images

Image 27: Baka housing in Ndongo	113
Image 28: Signpost of the UFA 10-012	115
Image 29: Hospital in Socambo	117
Image 30: Boy drinking water out of the Sangha river	120
Image 31: Pupils in classroom	121
Image 32: A cacao- farm destroyed by monkeys.....	126
Image 33: Hut by the fields.....	129
Image 34: Monkey in kitchen.....	131
Image 35: Fields of Eco- Guards	132
Image 36: Burial ceremony of an eco-guard.....	135
Image 37: Baka Woman	137
Image 38: Informational poster about Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) by the Human Rights Center in Bayanga	143
Image 39: Eco-guard housing	145
Image 40: Finding Work in the village	148
Image 41: Joint celebration of Baka and Bantu	150
Image 42: Fight at Funeral.....	155
Image 43: Drinking Alcohol	155

List of infoboxes

Infobox 1: BMZ Guideline on Human Rights	3
Infobox 2: History of Lobéké National Park.....	4
Infobox 3: Indigenous People in Cameroon: Baka	8
Infobox 4: Buffer- Zone	9
Infobox 5: Local Distinction between WWF and MINFOF	33
Infobox 6: Activities to be financed by international donors in 2018 (e.g. WWF Germany, US Fish and Wildlife Service).....	34
Infobox 7: Elements planned to be financed via FTNS.....	35
Infobox 8: Animal classes	43
Infobox 9: COVAREF and COVILAB	48
Infobox 10: Selected articles of UNDRIP	68
Infobox 11: UFA Management Plans	72
Infobox 12: Revenue sharing in the Cameroonian Forest Sector.....	79

XI List of maps

List of maps

Map 1 :	Overview Trinationale de la Sangha (buffer zone and national parks).....	5
Map 2:	Administrative structure, ethnic identity groups and communities worked with	6
Map 3:	Non -permanent and permanent forest zone with logging concessions	9
Map 4:	Land use planning overlaps and settlements	11
Map 5:	Touristic potential along Sangha river	42
Map 6:	Trophy hunting - zones and research sites.....	46
Map 7:	Chimpanzees distribution	58
Map 8:	Subsistence activities of villagers from Libongo - participatory mapping	73
Map 9:	Synthetic usage map of the UFA 10-063 - dating back to 2003	74
Map 10:	Proposed micro-zoning of ZICGC 1 and 8	83
Map 11:	Distribution of Central African hunter-gatherer groups.....	210
Map 12:	Mapping of the land and resource use of the Baka inside and around Boumba-Bek and Nki NPs	211
Map 13:	Subsistence activities of villagers from Dissassoué - participatory mapping	212
Map 14:	Area inside LNP that is traditionally used by adjacent communities.....	213
Map 15:	Examples of insufficient community lands.....	214

Abbreviations

APDS	Aire Protégé Dzanga Sangha/ Dzanga-Sangha Protected Area
ASDEBYM	Association pour la Solidarité et le Développement Equilibré des Bakas de Yenga et Mambélé
BLAB	Brigade Lutte Anti-Braconnage
CAR	Central African Republic
CG	Republic of Congo
CODDUMA	Comité de Développement Durable de Mambélé
COVAREF	Comité de Valorisation des Ressources Fauniques
COVILAB	Comité Villageois Lutte Anti-Braconnage
CPR	Common Pool Resource
FMU	Forest Management Unit
FTNS	Fondation pour le Tri-National de la Sangha
GIS	Geographic Information System
GIZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
GTZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit
IUCN	International Union for the Conservation of Nature
KfW	Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (German Development Bank)
LNP	Lobéké National Park
MINEP	Ministry of Environment and Nature Protection, Cameroon
MINFOF	Ministry of Forests and Fauna, Cameroon
MINMIDT	Ministry of Mines, Industry and Technical Development, Cameroon
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
NTFP	Non-Timber Forest Products
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PA	Protected Area
PNNN	Parc National Nouabalé-Ndoki/ Noubalé-Ndoki National Park
SI	Survival International
SLE	Seminar für Ländliche Entwicklung (Centre for Rural Development)

Xlii Abbreviations

SMART	Spatial Monitoring and Reporting Tool
TNS	Trinational de la Sangha
WCS	Wildlife Conservation Society
WWF	World Wide Fund for Nature
XAF	Central African CFA Franc
ZIC	Zone Interêt Cynégétique
ZICGC	Zone Interêt Cynégétique à Gestion Communautaire

1 Introduction

Protected Areas² (PAs) are pivotal to combat species loss and conserve nature worldwide. They are understood as a key tool to reconcile global conservation objectives such as the Aichi Biodiversity targets with local livelihoods interests (IUCN, 2019). However, poor governance, conflicts, and a growing demand for natural resources challenge PAs effectiveness and equity (Worboys, 2015:37ff).

This study investigates the challenges of PA- governance by examining the case of Lobéké National Park (LNP), Southeast Cameroon. The park is habitat for a range of critically endangered species such as forest elephants (*Loxodonta cyclotis*), Western gorillas (*Gorilla gorilla*), and grey parrots (*Psittacus erithacus*). As a designated UNESCO World heritage site³, LNP has committed to seek a governance of its resources that balances both conservation and sustainable development objectives (UNESCO, 2002).

However, the park – as the entire Congo basin – suffers from continued species loss and faces difficulties to effectively protect its unique natural resources (Bobo et al., 2015; MINFOF, 2015). Equally alarming, it has been accused of depriving livelihoods and disregarding basic rights of the local population⁴, engendering disputes and conflicts. The purported Human Rights violations in LNP have attracted much international media attention, culminating in the submission of a formal complaint to the OECD by the international NGO Survival International (SI) against the World-Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), the park's co-managing organisation⁵. Two minor interpellations to the German government, which provides funding for LNP via The Sangha Tri-National Trust Fund (FTNS), have followed up on the issue (Deutscher Bundestag, 2017; 2018). The situation on the

² “A protected area is a clearly defined geographical space, recognised, dedicated and managed, through legal or other effective means, to achieve the long-term conservation of nature with associated ecosystem services and cultural values” (IUCN, 2019)

³ TNS encompasses three parks: LNP in the Republic of Cameroon, Dzanga-Sangha National Park (APDS) in the Central African Republic (CAR) and Nouabalé-Ndoki National Park (PNNN) in the Republic of the Congo (see Map 1)

⁴ In the context of this study, the term ‘local population’ refers to Baka, Bantu and any other individuals or groups of people that live in the areas adjacent to LNP

⁵ SI claims that firstly, WWF and the Cameroonian government “denied or seriously curtailed Baka access to the traditional territories and natural resources”; secondly, that WWF allegedly “failed its duty [...] to respect the human rights of the Baka” and thirdly, that eco-guards and other law enforcement officials are accused to violently abuse the Baka (Survival International, 2016).

2 Introduction

ground, however, has so far not been thoroughly studied by independent researchers.

Responding to the pressing need for field assessment, this study explores the challenges and opportunities of LNP to effectively conserve its resources and meeting social equity goals. The latter is not only a moral requirement emanating from global and national commitments to Human Rights⁶ (see Infobox 1) but also instrumental for achieving and sustaining effective conservation (Hayes and Ostrom, 2005; Watson et al., 2014; Twinamatsiko et al., 2014; Schreckenberget al., 2016).

Following the concept of Common Pool Resource (CPR) governance, the study examines LNP's management challenges, the degree of participation of local stakeholders, the livelihood- strategies of the local population, and park- people conflicts undermining local support for conservation efforts. The analysis is firmly based in qualitative research on the ground and informs the development of recommendations on how Lobéké National Park can become both more effective and equitable.

The following sub-chapters describe the study area. Chapter 2 and 3 outline the study's objectives and its underlying conceptual framework. Chapter 4 depicts the study's methodological approach. Chapter 5 discusses the results (5.1 Park management, 5.2 Participation, 5.3 Livelihoods and 5.4 Conflicts) and Chapter 6 gives an overview of the study's recommendations (a detailed list is included in the Annex 14). Chapter 7 concludes.

⁶ Funded by the German Government, LNP is also bound to the BMZ- guidelines on Human Rights

Infobox 1: BMZ Guideline on Human Rights

The Menschenrechtsleitfaden of the Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung, BMZ (in the following: "BMZ guideline") serves as basis for development, evaluation and implementation of German development projects. Central to the guideline are international Human Rights standards (including the collective rights of indigenous people) and principles such as participation, empowerment, and transparency. The guideline also refers to the principle of Free Prior Informed Consent (FPIC), the UN Basic Principles and Guidelines on Development-based Eviction and Displacement and the FAO Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security.

The BMZ guideline commits German development actors to analyse potential (normally unintended) negative impacts of development projects on the realisation of Human Rights. Regarding Human- Rights- risks related to conservation projects, the guideline obliges to ensure the following:

- Integration of all groups in political decision making and the promotion of FPIC
- Promotion of just access to land and water and strengthening of traditional or customary land rights especially of indigenous peoples
- Appropriate compensation and/or promotion of alternative livelihoods or income sources for limited usage of natural resources
- Development of mechanisms that allow a fair sharing of revenues from natural resources
- Transparent and participatory design of environmental protection, especially in view of usage conflicts
- Promotion and strengthening of effective and easily accessible mechanisms for appeal (discrimination-free, gender- and conflict- sensitive) where people feel their rights have been infringed through environmental protection
- Promotion of governmental supervision and regulation of the private sector with regards to human rights

(BMZ 2013)

4 Introduction


1.1 Study area

Lobéké National Park is situated in the far Southeast of Cameroon. It has a total size of ~2,153 km² and consists of a core zone, where human activity is not permitted⁷, and a community zone of ~332 km². LNP is surrounded by six forest management units (Unites Forestières d'Aménagement, UFA) and both private and community hunting areas, covering an area of approximately 4,515 km² (MINFOF, 2014) (see Map 4). The park's designated "buffer-zone" (see Infobox 4) comprises an area of ~5,959 km² (UNESCO 2019). At present, LNP is co-managed by the Cameroonian Ministry of Forests and Fauna (MINFOF) and the World-Wide Fund for Nature (WWF).

Infobox 2: History of Lobéké National Park

First scientific studies on LNP were conducted in the late 80's, demonstrating its unique ecological value and drawing attention to overexploitation of its resources (MINFOF, 2004:18). Between 1994 and 1996, the Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS) started a first conservation project in LNP, which was taken over by WWF and the German Development Cooperation Agency GTZ in 1996 (ibidem). In 2001, Lobéké National Park was created by means of a presidential decree (Republic of Cameroon, 2001), falling under the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) Management Category II (National Park). In 2008, GIZ (then: GTZ) pulled out from the project, leaving the management of the park to WWF Cameroon and MINFOF. Since 2012, Lobéké National Park is part of the UNESCO World Heritage site "Trinational de la Sangha", TNS.

⁷ Apart from tourism, research and anti-poaching efforts



1.1.1 Administrative Organisation


LNP is located in the Division of Buomba-et-Ngoko (provincial capital: Yokadouma), in Cameroon's East Region (regional capital: Bertouá) and administratively belongs to the two sub-divisions Moloundou and Salapoumbé (see Map 1). Both sub-divisions have directly elected councilors that elect one amongst them as mayor. The councils receive grants from the national government through MINATD. Each council is participating in the design of its own development plan designating future development goals (e.g. Council of Salapoumbé, 2012).

In addition, the sub-divisions are governed by representatives of the national state (sub-prefects) and traditional authorities (chiefs). The sub-prefects are appointed by presidential decree and uphold the authority of the state at the local level. The traditional chiefs are appointed by village notables and installed by administrative authorities. They are considered "auxiliaries of the local administration" (CLGF, 2017:43f) and serve as ties between the administration and the villagers. They have limited authority to dispense justice according to

6 Introduction

customary law, in particular on issues of land tenure and civil matters. Formally recognized chiefs are designated a hierarchy 'degree' (in ranking order: first, second, or third) and receive corresponding allowances (Republic of Cameroon, 1977).

In the region of LNP, every recognized village has a chief of second degree, sometimes even two. The chiefs are grouped along ethnic lineages and their territories overlap (see Map 2). Baka and immigrants (so called 'allogènes', "strangers") are not represented by their own chiefs.



Map 2: Administrative structure, ethnic identity groups and communities worked with

Source: MINFOF Cameroon and WRI, WWF Cameroon, Robillard (2010:50), own data

1.1.2 Local population

Following the management plan, LNP's buffer zone is home to roughly 23.245 people living in 28 villages (MINFOF, 2014). The plan states that 26 % of the local population are Baka, 52 % belong to Bantu groups, and 22 % immigrated to the area from other regions in Cameroon (ibidem). Actual numbers, however, might differ: the sub-prefects of Salapoumbé and Moloundou and a WWF employee stated that Baka constitute the majority in their municipalities (l4; l7; l18)⁸.

While the Baka are defined as an "indigenous people" by Cameroon (see Infobox 3), the term „Bantu“ combines several different ethnic groups (Bangando, Kounabembé, Mbimo) that mostly use Bantu- languages and historically have been associated with sedentary agriculture (Lueong,2017:6). In line with Lueong, this report uses the term "Bantu" to refer to all non- Baka, as it is embraced by the local population and used by policy makers and development actors alike. The local population lives of less than USD 1 per day/individual, and more than half of the population is less than 20 years old (MINFOF 2014).

⁸ In general, population statistics of the area are presumably inaccurate. Many residents do not have birth certificates and are not officially registered. Due to crises in Cameroon and neighbouring countries, immigration purportedly rose in recent years. The last available data are extrapolations from old surveys.

Infobox 3: Indigenous People in Cameroon: Baka

Different from many other African countries, Cameroon has voted in favour of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples from 2007 (UNDRIP). Though not legally binding (different from ILO Convention 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples which was not ratified by Cameroon), this declaration carries considerable moral weight by establishing a universal framework of minimum standards for the survival, dignity and well-being of indigenous peoples.

While a universal definition of indigenous people does not exist, Cameroon and the "African Commission on Human and Peoples' Right" define so-called "Pygmy"- groups and Mboros (pastoralists) as indigenous peoples on its territory. This acknowledgement implies specific obligations for their protection. Cameroon's preamble of the constitution states that "the state shall ensure the protection of minorities and shall preserve the rights of indigenous populations in accordance with the law".


Traditionally, "pygmies" are hunter-gatherers and forest-dwellers, and Baka are one of three ethnic groups often referred to as 'Pygmies'. Most Baka consider the term derogatory and prefer "Baka" instead (Lueong, 2017:5). Baka have their own language, "Baka", and their total population in Cameroon is between 40.000 – 60.000.

1.1.3 Concessions in LNP's buffer zone

The Cameroonian Forest Code regulates sustainable forest use in Cameroon. Its zoning plan (Republic of Cameroon, 1995c) defines two main categories of forest estates in Cameroon (see Map 3): forests are either (a) permanent forest estates or (b) non-permanent forest estates (often called 'agroforestry' or 'multiuse' zone'). The permanent forest estates are formally assigned to timber production via concessions to private companies or municipalities ("forêt de production") or protected as conservation areas and wildlife habitats (such as Lobéké National Park). Non-permanent forest estates are often designated as community forests ("forêt communautaire"). The basic zoning structure of permanent and non-permanent cannot be changed unless declassified. All permanent forest of LNP's buffer zone is assigned to forestry operations constituting different forest management units (Unité forestière d'aménagement, UFA).

Infobox 4: Buffer- Zone

The concept of a buffer zone was first mentioned in the Operational Guidelines for the implementation of the World Heritage Convention in 1977 (UNESCO, 1977). A buffer zone is understood as an additional layer of protection to the World Heritage property, and has “complementary legal and/or customary restrictions placed on its use and development to give an added layer of protection to the property”(UNESCO, 2017, § 104). Following the protection requirements of the TNS landscape, the buffer- zone of the TNS must integrate the needs of the local communities with conservation objectives: “It is essential to ensure that the future activities in the buffer zones, including forest and wildlife management, tourism, agriculture and infrastructure are fully compatible with the conservation objectives for TNS so the surrounding landscape will satisfy the needs of local and indigenous communities while indeed serving as a ‘buffer’ for the property” (UNESCO, 2019).



Map 3: Non -permanent and permanent forest zone with logging concessions

Source: MINFOF Cameroon and WRI, own data


10 Introduction

While hunting zones (*Zone d'Intérêt Cynégétique*, ZIC) are superposed on the UFAs and rented out to professional trophy hunters (so-called safari companies) by the state, community hunting zones (*Zone d'Intérêt Cynégétique à Gestion Communautaire*, ZICGC) are largely situated in the non-permanent agroforestry zone around the villages (MINFOF, 2009:34). These zones (see Map 4) are managed by village committees and can be rented out to professional hunters to generate revenues. In LNP's buffer zone, all community hunting zones are leased to foreign owned safari companies. ZICGC have to develop 'simple management plans' to be approved by MINFOF and ZIC have to adhere to a 'cahier de charge' (Loi N°94/01⁹, Art. 92 § 2)¹⁰.

There are several mining concessions around LNP and even inside the park (see Map 4). Currently, no company has officially started exploitation, but one concession in the south of the park is under exploration.

⁹ Law on Forests, Wildlife, and Fisheries, Republic of Cameroon, January 20th 1994

¹⁰ While the simple management plans are available, the 'cahiers de charge' are either outdated or not obtainable



Map 4: Land use planning overlaps and settlements

Source: MINFOF Cameroon and WRI, WWF Cameroon, own data

12 Introduction

1.2 Stakeholders

The following stakeholders are key for the study:

1. The management of LNP (MINFOF and WWF Cameroon) and LNP employees
2. The local population (both Baka and Bantu groups) including local politicians
3. Civil society organizations and community associations
4. The private sector active in LNP's buffer zone: Logging companies, sports hunting enterprises ("safari companies") and mining companies

Level	Stakeholders
International	FTNS, KfW, WWF International
National	MINFOF, WWF Cameroon, Civil society organizations (CEFAID, and others)
Local	Baka and Bantu groups; LNP- employees; Local politicians; Logging and safari companies; Civil society organizations (i.e. OKANI); Community associations
Source: own data	

2 Aim of the study and research questions

The study aims at providing a comprehensive analysis of the current management of LNP with a particular focus on participation of the local population and conflicts between stakeholders.

Correspondingly, the research supplies five outputs: (1) an assessment of the management of LNP, (2) an analysis of the park's strategies against threats to biodiversity in and around LNP, (3) an analysis of current participation opportunities of the local population, (4) an assessment of livelihood strategies in the park's periphery, and (5) a conflict analysis. The outputs respond to the following research questions:

- *How does the LNP management work and what can be improved?*
- *How are threats to biodiversity approached by the park management and in what way could these approaches be optimised?*
- *How does the local population currently participate in the LNP management and what are the existing problems and constraints?*
- *What are the current livelihood strategies of the local population and how are alternatives promoted by the park management (and other stakeholders)?*
- *What are the main conflicts between stakeholders of LNP and what are the specific positions, interests and needs of conflict parties?*
- *What instruments currently exist in LNP to solve/transform these conflicts in a non-violent and sustainable way and how can they be improved?*

Based on the analysis, feasible recommendations are formulated and tailored to the study's main readership: MINFOF, WWF, KfW, FTNS, (inter-) national NGOs and the local population.

It is envisaged that stakeholders will implement the recommendations to improve the protection of biodiversity while enhancing prospects of poverty alleviation and peaceful co-existence of local stakeholders¹¹. The recommendations correspond to four objectives:

- Objective 1: LNP's park management is more efficient, effective, and equitable

¹¹ Ideally, some recommendations can already be integrated in the next management plan 2019-2023 yet to be drafted.

14 Aim of the study and research questions

- Objective 2: Conservation efforts involve the local population and do not harm, but support local people's livelihoods
- Objective 3: Conflicts surrounding LNP are decreased and sustainably managed
- Objective 4: The buffer zone of LNP is sustainably managed and respects and protects the usage- rights of the local population

The recommendations, once implemented, shall meet these objectives by: 1) safeguarding the interests and needs of the local population, 2) promoting sustainable livelihood strategies in line with conservation objectives of LNP, 3) solving conflicts in a sustainable and non-violent way, 4) enabling effective conservation mechanisms. For a detailed objective system of the study see Annex 1.

3 Conceptual framework

This study merges different analytical concepts to match the focus of the research. As an overarching concept, it uses Ostrom's Common-Pool Resource Governance due to its focus on the sustainable use of resources and respective governance systems. Mascia et al. (2017) offer a typology of common-pool resource governance to assess the impact and success of conservation in marine protected areas. Based on initial literature review and consultations with the KfW and other stakeholders, this typology was adapted to the context of Lobéké National Park and its buffer zone. The amended framework includes four dimensions: park management, participation, conflicts and livelihoods.

3.1 Common-Pool Resource Governance

In his essay 'The Tragedy of the Commons' (1968) Hardin theorized that (unmanaged) common-pool resources face problems of overexploitation due to their very characteristics: they are finite, access to them is unlimited and their size or features make the exclusion of potential resource users difficult or costly. Consequently, in the absence of clearly defined regulations, resource users will try to exploit the common-pool resource with the end of maximizing their own income/utility.

Following the economist Elinor Ostrom, the problem of overexploitation can be solved by designing and implementing effective and equitable governance systems. These governance systems are bottom-up in nature as they follow the assumption that rules and property rights defined, implemented, monitored and enforced by resource users themselves are likely to perform better than top-down approaches (Ostrom, 1990).

The concept of common-pool resource governance has been widely applied to community managed areas (such as pastures, fishing grounds or irrigation systems). Recently, common-pool resource governance has been extended to the analysis of the management of protected areas. Mascia et al. (2017) determine four domains of marine protected area governance that are pivotal in assessing its efficiency: 1) decision-making arrangements (participation), 2) resource-use rights, 3) monitoring and enforcement systems, and 4) conflict-resolution mechanisms.


Many of the attributes of common-pool resources described above apply to Lobéké National Park and its buffer zone. The area is rich in natural resources

16 Conceptual framework

(wildlife, timber, ivory, minerals, medicinal plants, etc.). The lack of physical barriers makes resources easily accessible to the local population and external actors, while hard to control for the park management. As many people in the buffer zone of LNP rely on forest products, the levels of exploitation increase, and the natural resources are stretched to their limits. Attempts to regulate the access to resources by a more restrictive enforcement of the rules have reportedly led to conflicts, particularly between the local population and the park management (Pyhälä, Orozco, and Counsell, 2016; Survival International, 2016). Furthermore, poaching (both small-scale and large-scale) increases the pressure on wildlife. These observations indicate that the management in its current form is ineffective in reducing the pressures on the park and the surrounding buffer zone at large.

Conceptualising Lobéké National Park and its buffer zone as a common-pool resource helps to explore local conditions and to assess its current governance. Simultaneously, this exercise reveals possible points for improvement, which will be listed as policy recommendations tailored for specific stakeholders at the end of this report.

Adapting the governance domains proposed by Mascia et al. (2017), this study looks at four dimensions: park management (covering strategies against threats to biodiversity), participation, conflicts and livelihoods (see Figure 1). The subsequent sections explain the conceptual understanding of these dimensions as well as their relevance to common-pool resource governance.



3.1.1 Park Management

The term “park management” in this study refers to the management structure present on site at the LNP Headquarter in Mambélé, the so called “Service de Conservation”. The park management of LNP is based on a collaboration between MINFOF and WWF. It is responsible for enforcing resource-use rules in the national park and its buffer zone and serves as a warden of the Cameroonian forest law (Loi N°94/01¹²).

Studies have found that staff and budget capacity of park management are strong predictors of conservation impact (Gill et al., 2017; McConney and Pena, 2012; Bruner, Gullison and Balmford, 2004). Hence, this study examines LNP’s administrative organisation and staffing, funding and budgeting, working conditions of staff, and potential to generate revenues through ecotourism. Furthermore, attention will be paid to the park management’s response to activities that threaten biodiversity. In LNP and its buffer zone, poaching (often

¹² Law on Forests, Wildlife, and Fisheries, Republic of Cameroon, January 20th 1994

18 Conceptual framework

small-scale by local people and large-scale by professional transnational crime syndicates), logging and mining (both legal in the allocated concessions and illegal forms) put pressure on the environment, biodiversity and natural resources.

3.1.2 Participation

Participation can be very broadly understood as the involvement of stakeholders in processes and decision-making that concern them. It is an essential dimension of common-pool resource governance. As Ostrom (1990) remarked, users of resources are more likely to adhere to rules and regulations if these are established in a consultative manner and adequately reflect their interests and needs. Mascia et al. (2017:100) find that participation in decision-making and self-governance increase the effectiveness of the governance of protected areas. Following Young et al. (2010), participation can strengthen the relationships between stakeholders and deepen mutual understanding of different viewpoints, hence minimizes conflicts. More normative rationales for participation emphasize its support of democratic values and human rights principles.

Generally, one can distinguish between different levels of participation including information and consultation, partnership and dialogue, and delegation of power (Baker and Chapin, 2018).

The study aims at analysing participation in Lobéké National Park and its buffer zone by examining both theory and practice of participatory mechanisms provided by Cameroonian forest law and LNP management plan. The following questions (based upon Young et al. 2010 and Norad 2013) will help to better analyse how participation is implemented and conducted in Lobéké National Park and the buffer zone:

Table 2: Guiding questions for the analysis of participation in Lobéké National Park and its buffer zone	
<p>Which kinds of participation take place?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Which responsibilities are linked to which degree of participation? <p>On which scale does participation happen?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Who participates and in what way? <p>To which degree is participation possible?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Who controls access to participation? – Who funds participatory actions? – Who leads discussions in meetings? – How is information accessible for different actors? 	<p>Who promotes/ demands participation for which reasons?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Whose interest is represented by whom? – How do interests flow into decisions and rules/laws (regulated or by prevalence)? <p>What are the results of participation?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – By whom/ how is the implementation of the rules controlled? – How are the regulations/ agreements met?
Source: based on Young et al. 2010 and Norad 2013	

3.1.3 Livelihoods

Protected areas are often located in structurally weak and remote regions that are characterized by high poverty rates and few formal job opportunities. Consequently, people depend on forest resources (timber, bushmeat, non-timber forest products, etc.) to generate income or sustain themselves (Tieguhong and Nkamgnia, 2012).

There is diverging empirical evidence whether local livelihoods can be significantly improved by protected areas. However, there is little doubt about the link between peoples' livelihoods needs and conservation outcomes. Studies have shown that satisfying local livelihood needs reduces conflicts and improves conservation performance (Hayes and Ostrom, 2005; Baynes et al., 2015).

Local livelihood needs are strongly connected to the issue of local access and usage rights (Brooks et al., 2013), and the framework of common-pool resource governance puts a strong emphasis on access to and use of natural resources by the local population. It is considered a crucial factor for successful governance and avoidance of overexploitation (Mascia et al., 2017).

Given these reflections, the dimension of livelihoods was added to the common-pool resource governance framework. Within this study, the concept of "livelihoods" is understood as the satisfaction of subsistence needs and

20 Conceptual framework

generation of monetary income through different economic activities (agriculture, livestock keeping, collection of Non-Timber Forest Products, etc.). Incorporating this dimension yields a better understanding of the conflicts in Lobéké National Park and its buffer zone and the ensuing management challenges.

3.1.4 Conflicts

Conflicts associated with protected areas are pervasive and described as some of the key challenges conservation efforts are facing worldwide (Baynham-Herd et al., 2018; De Pourcq et al., 2015; Young et al., 2010; Lewis, 1996). Common visible effects of conflicts in protected areas are the loss of biodiversity, poaching activities, violent law enforcement, community tensions, polarization of ethnic groups, elite capture and loss of revenues (Sakah, 2013).

The understanding of the drivers and causes of conflicts concomitant with protected areas is far from unequivocal, as approaches towards conflict analysis vary greatly (Baynham-Herd et al., 2018; De Pourcq et al., 2015). Within common-pool resource governance, conflicts are understood as the result of competition over resource-use, and thus reveal different material and economic interests of stakeholders (Adams et al., 2003, Atieno et al., 2015). Accordingly, common-pool resource governance frameworks recommend the implementation of conflict-resolution mechanisms that clarify resource-use rights, and adjudicate disputes related to resource-use (Ostrom et al., 1994: 11, Mascia et al., 2017: 102).

However, this understanding may be too narrow and short-sighted as not all conflicts around protected areas are necessarily economic in nature. Competition over power, influence and values might also constitute important conflict causes and drivers (Jones et al., 2005; Young et al., 2010). The conceptualisation of conflicts within this study is based on Galtung's definitions of manifest (observable) and latent (invisible) dimensions of conflict (Galtung, 1991).

Following Young et al. (2010: 3979) and Jones et al. (2005:6-8), six broad categories of conflicts associated with conservation (often overlapping with one another) can be identified:

1. Conflicts over beliefs and values (e.g. conservation vs. socio-economic development)
2. Conflicts of interest (e.g. social needs vs. ecological needs)
3. Conflicts over processes (e.g. decision-making, conflict resolution)
4. Conflicts over information (e.g. lack of data, misunderstandings in communication)

5. Structural conflicts (referring to social, legal, economic or cultural arrangements)
6. Inter-personal conflicts (personal differences between individuals or groups, including issues of communication and mistrust)

Keeping these manifold dimensions of conflicts in mind, this study aims at elucidating potential causes and drivers of conflicts in Lobéké National Park and its buffer zone. To aid the examination of conflicts, the study team used analytical tools, i.e. the ABC-Triangle and the PIN-Tool (see Annex 5).

4 Methods and data collection

This research is grounded in a qualitative case-study approach to accommodate in-depth, exploratory research (Stake, 1995, George and Bennett, 2005). The case-study approach serves two purposes: first, to illuminate the challenges to an effective and equitable governance of LNP in depth, and second, to provide insights (if possible) into issues pertaining to protected area - governance in general.

Foregrounding lived experience and immersion into the field, the research team spent six weeks on site (see Annex 3). Living in the field supported a focus on everyday practices and lived realities - essential to account for the overarching research goal (*analysis of the current situation*). Furthermore, it enabled persistent contact with the team's various interlocutors, which was important to establish trust.

4.1 Methods

During fieldwork, the research team collected qualitative data using different methods for triangulation- purposes:

- **Semi-structured interviews (N= 40):** The research team conducted 40 interviews with members of the park management, employees of private companies and with civil society actors. The interviews were semi-structured, meaning that key topics and questions were identified beforehand, but used (or not) according to the exigencies of the situation. This allowed interviewees to come up with their own questions, remarks, and answers to questions that have not been posed (Kvale, 1996), thus allowing the emergence of information that structured interviews would hide (Fontana and Frey, 1994). Interviewees were selected based on four criteria: relevance for the study, ability to provide information, accessibility, and willingness to partake in an interview. The times and places of interviews were co-jointly scheduled with the interviewees. To avoid influences by third parties, interviews were held in non-open spaces, e.g. the interviewees' offices. With the consent of the interviewee, interviews were recorded.
- **Community Meetings (N= 10):** In total, 10 community meetings were convened in eight locations. Serving as entrance points into the communities, these meetings drew on a large pool of opinions and allowed

2.4 Methods and data collection

to capture the dominant 'majority think'. Furthermore, they helped to assess group dynamics and to uncover potential (dis-) agreements.

- **Focus group discussions (FGD, N= 21):** During the research, the team conducted eighteen FGD with community members and three FGD with eco- guards. FGD help to encourage participation from interlocutors that otherwise are reluctant to partake in a one-to-one interview (Kitzinger, 1995: 300). FGD were conducted in homogenous and heterogenous groups. Criteria of participant selection included gender, age, class, and ethnicity. While the dynamics within heterogenous groups allowed to assess group dynamics and levels of disagreement, homogenous composition allowed to foreground the voices of marginalized groups (i.e. women and Baka).
- **PhotoVoice interviews (N= 20):** Twenty PhotoVoice - interviews in five communities (Mambele, Salapoumbe, Libongo, Socambo, and Zega) were conducted. PhotoVoice is a participative, visual research method that utilizes photography as an interview tool. Participants were selected following five criteria: gender, age, ethnicity (see Figure 2), willingness, and availability. They were asked to "*document the important aspects of your life, with five positive photos, and five negative photos*", and given a digital camera for the duration of approximately two days, followed by individual in- depth interviews. Guided by the participant, PhotoVoice is a subjective method that illuminates aspects that the individual wishes to portray and discuss. It allows participants to document their life conditions as they perceive them, helping "to elicit rich data about the lived experience" (Plunkett, Leipert and Ray, 2013:157).




Figure 2: PhotoVoice Participants Characteristics

Source: own illustration

- **Field Walks (N= 8):** The research team went on eight field- walks, during which one to two members of a community were accompanied to their agricultural fields or community forests to assess land usage and quality, and incidentally engaged in informal conversations.
- **Geographic Information System (GIS):** Observations from field walks and data from the Cameroonian Forest Atlas by MINFOF and the World Resources Institute (WRI), the map service of the Central Africa Regional Program for the Environment (CARPE) by USAID, satellite data (e.g. Landsat), and information from OpenStreetmap have been fed into a GIS. The system was used to facilitate an understanding and overview of the project area, to check information from third sources, to choose the research sites and to generate the maps used in this report.
- **Theatre of the Oppressed (N= 10):** The research team conducted eight “Theatres of the Oppressed” and two day- long theatre workshops with members of four communities (Mambele, Nkoulou, Zega, and Dioula). The ‘Theater of the Oppressed’ is an interactive, creative method allowing people to act out conflict situations on stage, guided by a facilitator (Boal, 2001). These improvised theatres help to reveal the positions, attitudes, feelings, and motivations of conflict parties. They are an expression of typified experiences or feelings, often exaggerated or caricatured to make them comprehensible and evident to the audience.

The research team facilitated the theatres by introducing an opening situation, i.e. *“You are in the forest. Two eco-guards approach. What happens?”*. Actors were chosen from the audience and invited to freely and spontaneously act out the scene by taking on the roles of the conflict parties. The scenes were visually documented to be jointly discussed with the actors and the audience after the play. The research team employed the method to illuminate the conflict between the local population and the eco- guards (see Table 8 and Table 9), but also studied intra- community conflicts, i.e. between Baka and Bantu (see Table 10).

- **Stakeholder Workshops (N=2):** One workshop with local stakeholders in Mambélé (50 participants) and one workshop with national stakeholders in Yaoundé (20 participants) were conducted. The purpose of the workshops was twofold: first, to present research findings and to listen to the different stakeholders’ related concerns. Second, to jointly develop recommendations to tackle identified problems (Annex 13). Participants in Mambélé were chosen following three criteria: ethnic group, community,

26 Methods and data collection

and availability. Participants in Yaoundé were chosen following four criteria: relevance for LNP governance, influence, expertise, and availability.

The discussions among participants and developed recommendations serve as important data- sources for this study. In Mambélé, participants had to prioritize their five most preferred workshop- topics, which were discussed in randomly selected small- groups using the “Carusell”- method¹³. At the end of the workshop, the discussions of the different small groups were presented to the entire plenum by chosen representatives. Every participant received a copy of the workshop- results. In Yaoundé, participants were randomly allocated to different groups to develop recommendations for the topics chosen by the participants in Mambélé¹⁴. Time constraints inhibited the use of the Carusell- method; instead, one small group focused on one topic each, and presented their results to the plenum at the end of the workshop. Each participant received a copy of the workshop- results from Mambélé.

- **Participant Observation:** Participant observation helps to access “non-verbal knowledge” that cannot be conveyed by oral accounts (Kawulich, 2005). By observing people’s actions and listening to informal conversations, the study- team was able to orient research in the field. In addition, information obtained in interviews and FGDs were triangulated with accounts of participant observation. For example, the discrimination of Baka by Bantu was frequently observed by the study- team, but rarely directly mentioned in interviews.

To clarify meaning and to cross- verify interpretation, the empirical data obtained via these methods was additionally triangulated with 15 expert interviews conducted in Yaoundé as well as a review of policy reports and academic journal articles. All data gathered was listed and converted into code for citation within the text (see Annex 4).

¹³ The topics were discussed for thirty minutes each and moderated by two team- members. After thirty minutes, the small groups moved on to the next topic. As a result, every group had the opportunity to discuss all five topics

¹⁴ One of the topics could not be covered due to the small number of participants.

4.2 Data Analysis

To account for the explorative character of the study, the team employed an iterative strategy of content analysis to discover information gaps and to explore new themes while in the field. Practically, this meant that the collected data underwent a preliminary analysis while in LNP to guide further data collection processes. Data analysis involved the categorisation of the empirical data into certain topics or key questions, which were further explored to assess their congruence with the reality on the ground. In addition, the research team triangulated the data and exchanged information in regular team-meetings to explore possible contradictions or information overlaps.

4.3 Research Assistance

The research team employed two Cameroonian counterparts (one male and one female) for general research assistance and translation. They were chosen based on the following criteria: language skills (French and English), knowledge of conservation and protected areas, gender, soft skills (flexibility, adaptability, cultural sensitivity, communication skills), willingness to stay in a remote area, and availability. The two assistants supported the team in all employed methods (interviews, community meetings, FGDs, PhotoVoice-interviews, theatres and workshops).

As not all team-members were fluent in French, they additionally helped with direct translation. Direct translations are neither neutral nor complete, but always (selectively) interpreted by the translator (Temple, 2002). Therefore, the team worked closely with the assistants and discussed meanings, expressions, and concepts to ensure that there was no conflating of meanings or connotations. Nevertheless, parts of this report are as much product of the interpretations of the assistants as of the team.

In addition, the research team sought advice and support from a consultant with a background in social anthropology to implement the PhotoVoice-method. She helped the team with logistical organisation, participant selection, and general guidance in implementing the method with vulnerable groups.

4.4 Ethical Considerations

As Stake put it, "qualitative researchers are guests in the private spaces of the world" (Stake, 2003: 154). Therefore, it was an ethical duty to the team to respect

28 Methods and data collection

the private spaces of the interlocutors and to behave in manners that were considered adequate and sensitive in the given socio-cultural context. Furthermore, the team applied a strict code of ethics. Informed consent was always obtained before collecting data (see Annex 2).

To manage expectations, the team carefully explained that it is not attached to an NGO or any other development agency and has no mandate to change the reality on the ground. It was of great importance to the team to transparently convey its key findings to research participants and to carefully listen to their concerns regarding these findings. Therefore, two stakeholder workshops were organised, trying to involve as many representatives as possible. The team strictly maintains participant anonymity considering that "*[t]hose whose lives and expressions are portrayed risk exposure and embarrassment, as well as a loss of standing, employment, and self-esteem*" (Stake, 2003: 154), and only provides personal information if relevant for the study's intended purpose.

5 Results

5.1 Park management

Research Questions:

How does the LNP management work and what can be improved?

How are threats to biodiversity approached by the park management and in what way could these approaches be optimised?

This chapter sheds light on the park's management's capacity and conservation performance by looking at its administrative organisation and staffing, funding and budgeting, working conditions of staff, and potential to generate revenues through ecotourism. Furthermore, it closely examines currently employed anti-poaching and resource extraction strategies and briefly reviews the collaboration between the three Trinational de la Sangha (TNS) parks. Finally, it provides an analysis of latent conflicts and infighting in its current co-management set-up that hamper effective collaboration.

Identifying noticeable gaps in park management capacity (human and financial), the chapter supports recent findings that capacity gaps and weak ecological performance are likely related (Gill et al., 2017), but also highlights the importance of integrating local groups in conservation management, especially with regards to anti-poaching efforts. In addition, it underscores the necessity of clarifying managerial mandates and responsibilities to improve the current co-management set-up.

5.1.1 Administrative Organisation and Staffing

According to the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN), the term "co-management" describes a management where governmental and non-governmental actors share governance in a collaborative way. However, decision-making, authority and responsibility may rest with one agency only. The decision-making agency is obliged to inform or consult the other(s) (Dudley, 2008).

The three national parks forming the Trinational de la Sangha (TNS) have different forms of co-management. At present, LNP is managed by the Cameroonian Ministry of Forests and Fauna (MINFOF) and by the World Wide

30 Results

Fund for Nature (WWF). In this case, co-management becomes manifest in WWF giving financial and technical support to MINFOF, with the latter being the decision-making authority acting on behalf of the Cameroonian government. In the Dzanga-Sangha Protected Area (APDS), the ministry and WWF share governance and management. As opposed to LNP, every position from the Central African ministry has a counterpart position filled by a WWF employee. In contrast, in Nouabalé Ndoki National Park (NNNP), the Congolese State has delegated the management to a newly created foundation “Fondation Nouabalé Ndoki”, in which both the government and the NGO, the Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS) are represented.

The term “park management” in this study refers to the management structure present on site at the LNP Headquarter in Mambélé, the so called “Service de Conservation”. It includes five units: (1) the Administration and Finance Unit dealing with operational matters, (2) the Surveillance Unit coordinating patrols and tasks of eco-guards, (3) the Unit for Ecological Monitoring and Research monitoring wildlife and maintaining databases, (4) the Unit for Co-Management and Eco-development ensures the involvement of other stakeholders and (5) the Ecotourism Unit responsible for sustainable development through tourism. The last two share the Sub-Unit Participation, which works with local communities and does awareness raising (see Figure 3). The Units are all led by the Conservator (MINFOF 2014; l16). Conservator, Unit Heads, and eco-guards are all employed by MINFOF. WWF is represented by the Programme Manager, has an employee filling the position Head of the Sub-Unit Participation and is active in the research unit.




Figure 3: Organisation chart of LNP Management (units/positions with WWF staff in green)

Source: own illustration

Currently, only three other WWF staffs than the ones mentioned above are present on site, namely a person responsible for logistics (cars and housing) and two volunteers. Due to financial reasons this is a mere fraction of the positions stated in the Management Plan (MINFOF, 2014: 60): 6 seniors, 7 juniors and 10 maintenance and security staffs. It would be helpful if WWF had more experienced staff on site (aside from volunteers) to ensure sufficient consultation and technical support to MINFOF. Additionally, the decision-making system is based on a co-signature, but the management staff consists mainly of MINFOF employees. On the other hand, there is no MINFOF employee officially working on participative management in LNP (only one person from WWF). As participation is an important element, the support of this unit with ministry personnel would be expected.

While the Unit Head of Surveillance is filled by a professionally trained eco-guard suitable for the role, the other Unit Heads appear to lack expertise and work experience. According to the management plan (MINFOF, 2014: 97), the Unit Head for Ecological Monitoring and Research needs to be an engineer / technical engineer of water and forests ("IEF" Ingenieur des Eaux et Forêts / "ITEF" Ingenieur des Techniques des Eaux et Forêts) or a technician specialised in fauna.

32 Results

While this was the case, the experience in ecological monitoring and in scientific research appeared to be missing. The Unit Head stated that research is not very developed in LNP and that he wanted more researchers to come. He also requires a position for a veterinarian who monitors infectious diseases by sampling animal carcasses (I38). To make coordination of research and monitoring easier and to improve networking with research centres/universities and scientists interested in working in the park, a person with a background in biology in the position of Unit Head for Ecological Monitoring and Research is needed. Such a person would bring a more extensive research network and a better estimation of important research topics. The advantage of a more developed research team is, on the one hand, the possibility to monitor animal populations and infectious diseases - the latter can serve as an early warning system for example for Ebola outbreaks as it is done in APDS. On the other hand, it would bring guest researchers into the park who bring the same benefits as tourists (i.e. jobs for the local population, income). Furthermore, it would ameliorate the cooperation with researchers in the other TNS parks.

The management plan (MINFOF, 2014:97) also states that the Unit Head for Ecotourism is required to have a higher technician diploma in tourism ("Brevet de Technicien Supérieur en tourisme"). However, the person in this position at the time of the study and the person preceding him both had a background in water and forest engineering and appeared to have only little knowledge of tourism development (I38). Employing an expert in the work field could help promoting ecotourism in LNP since he or she would be able to assess realistic potentials of Lobéké, improve its weaknesses, promote its visibility online, coordinate touristic activities and serve as a contact person for tourism industry and the other TNS parks.

The Unit Head for Ecological Monitoring and Research and the Unit Head for Ecotourism exchanged positions in August 2018 just before the arrival of the research team. The reason remains unknown. This exchanging of positions indicates that the park management does not specifically ask for expertise in the different work fields. The new Unit Head for Ecotourism only stayed in his new position for several weeks and the position was vacant when the research team departed. In general, there is a constant fluctuation of staff within and outside LNP because employees get transferred to other national parks and are willing to leave as soon as another opportunity arises. Following eco- guards and experts, the premature transfer of people and constant exchange of staff leads to a loss of knowledge and hampers team- building efforts (I26; F16; E15).

The Conservator, being head of the park management, needs to give his agreement when decisions are made. He appoints an interim for each time he is absent i.e. when he leaves for meetings in distant cities. Even though someone represents him during that time, his absence hinders activities of the park management. Especially his WWF counterpart, the Programme Manager, is limited since decisions cannot be taken by WWF without the Conservator's consent (I21). His absence also creates an inability to act upon MINFOF Unit Heads, which delays even simple decision making. For example, the research team was not able to obtain monitoring reports from the surveillance unit or the last fauna inventory results during his absence. On the other hand, employees working in surveillance state that the absence of the Conservator does not pose a problem as long as he is contactable.

Finally, all Heads of Units are first and foremost eco-guards. They fulfil typical eco-guard's tasks like going on patrols. Since Heads of Units are often in the field, they perceive themselves more as eco-guards than as head of their specific unit (I15; P26). The park management clearly concentrates on patrols for anti-poaching. Consequently, work areas such as research and ecotourism play a minor role.

Infobox 5: Local Distinction between WWF and MINFOF

Communities do not distinguish between WWF, which is a civil society organisation and MINFOF, which is a governmental actor. For instance, if eco-guards as state representatives act inappropriately, WWF is blamed. Only few people, like village chiefs, know the difference: the majority of the population appears to be unaware that WWF is only an advisor to MINFOF. A WWF representative in LNP did not think that this mix up poses a problem and believes it did not make a difference to the communities (I21). Indeed, participants of a community meeting claimed that the distinction was irrelevant: "We do not know the difference because they work together" (C9). However, a clear and visible distinction between WWF and MINFOF may change addressees of recent complaints on human rights violations and enable more differentiated and targeted appeals.

5.1.2 Finance

Lobéké National Park is financed by the Sangha Tri-National Trust Fund (FTNS), several international donors (NGOs) and by MINFOF. The Trust Fund was

34 Results

established in 2007 with the aim to contribute to long-term financing of conservation and eco-development in the TNS area. The current endowment of the trust fund was mainly provided by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) via KfW, and the French Development Agency (AFD), and amounted to € 49.4 million at the end of 2018 (FTNS, 2017; 2018). The revenues of the endowment fund should contribute sustainably to the park management but are only used for LNP as of 2019. From 2009 to 2018, LNP received a total amount of 1.86 million EUR through project financing, 75% of it as of 2016 (KfW, personal communication, March 21, 2019).

This amount underscores LNP's extreme funding deficit – unfortunately, a usual problem of protected areas in developing countries (Bruner, Gullison and Balmford, 2004)¹⁵ and the Congo- Basin (Wilkie, Carpenter and Zhang, 2001). Both WWF and KfW experts in Germany consider the current funding of LNP too low; following a WWF expert, LNP requires at least one to two million euros/year (WWF, personal communication, December 11th, 2018).

Infobox 6: Activities to be financed by international donors in 2018 (e.g. WWF Germany, US Fish and Wildlife Service)

Daily patrols, provision of access to drinking water and electricity in the buffer zone, awareness raising, wildlife monitoring, census of medium sized and large mammals (“inventaire faunique”), monitoring of bushmeat consumption, gorilla semi-habituation programme (Parc National de Lobéké, 2017).

In addition to German financing, other projects have been financed via FTNS by institutions like the European Union via the Center for UNESCO World Heritage or the Congo Basin Forest Fund. As national financing is scarce, LNP relies – like almost all central African protected areas – on international donors such as KfW to cover its running costs (l23).

¹⁵ Following Bruner et al., the lower and upper bounds of recurrent management costs for all existing protected areas in developing countries are \$1.1 billion and \$2.5 billion, respectively. Even the higher estimate does not include the costs for development projects and compensation payments

Infobox 7: Elements planned to be financed via FTNS

Housing for eco-guards, field equipment, tourist viewing platforms, delimitation of the park borders, patrols and control posts, bonuses for staff, management of ZICGC, committee meetings (Parc National de Lobéké, 2017).

In 2017, only about 50% of planned activities were implemented (FTNS, 2017).

In the last years, FTNS provided the largest share of LNP's funding (KfW, personal communication, March 21, 2019). Still, the financing mechanism is perceived as being expensive and complicated with regards to its rather lengthy procedures to request funding (I32; I30; P67).

In Cameroon, LNP and therefore MINFOF as manager of the protected area, is the main beneficiary of subventions. These subventions are used together by MINFOF and WWF (double signature) in the way that WWF provides technical support and co-manages FTNS expenses to ensure good governance of financial flows (MoU MINFOF-FTNS-WWF).

Further donors of LNP are WWF Germany, US Fish and Wildlife Services (recently withdrew from further funding), Japan Monkey Centre and Africa Biodiversity Collaborative Group. Their funding is managed by WWF. Financing by international donors is used to finance a proportion of the protection programme, the participation and eco-development programme and the research and ecological monitoring programme. MINFOF solely covers the salaries of its own staff (eco-guards) and does not fund any programme activities (Parc National de Lobéké, 2017).




Figure 4: Shares of budget¹⁶ contribution to LNP by partners

Source: Parc National de Lobéké, 2017; own illustration




Figure 5: Proportions of planned FTNS budget for the five LNP programmes¹⁷ in 2018

Source: Parc National de Lobéké, 2017; own illustration

5.1.3 Working Conditions

Motivated and well-trained staff is a vital component of efficient park management (Gill et al., 2017). However, interviews and focus group discussions showed that LNP employees are evidently demotivated, likely influencing their

¹⁶ The LNP Budget Plan 2018 depicts not actual, but planned income and expenditures. Like LNP management plans, annual budget plans often vary substantially (up to 50%) from the amounts that are realised at the end of the year. Therefore, the actual FTNS financing is likely much smaller than the share displayed in Figure 3 (KfW, personal communication, March 21, 2019)

¹⁷ Five programmes: (1) programme for administration and infrastructure, (2) programme for protection, (2) programme for participation and eco-development, (4) programme for research and ecological monitoring, (5) programme for transboundary management

work performance and attitude towards the park, e.g. thoroughness of patrols and interaction with local resource users. The research revealed that current living and working conditions, e.g. poor housing, long separation from family members, and allegedly missing payments of bonuses, negatively affect their work attitude.



Image 1: Grey parrots (*Psittacus erithacus*) seized from wildlife traffickers during an eco-guard patrol

Photo: May Hokan

Eco-guards are recruited in the capital city Yaoundé and sent to work in Lobéké., Travel from the capital to Lobéké takes two to three days, and some employees even come from further away. No employee of the park management comes from Mambélé. The situation could be different as compared to APDS and Nouabalé-Ndoki National Park (NNNP). These two neighbouring parks have the possibility to hire eco-guards locally. Local eco-guards and other employees can thus live at home with their families (M4; I30). Opposed to that, employees in Lobéké have all moved to the area without having the option to bring along close family members. This is mainly due to the housing situation. Housing provided by the park to its employees is poor: the houses are small, there is no electricity, sanitary facilities are dilapidated. Employees complain that they cannot receive visiting family members under these conditions. One eco-guard expressed his discontent as such: “We live here like monkeys” (M3). Combined with limited communication possibilities (weak internet connection, almost no network coverage) and lack of public transport (F16), living conditions appear inadequate

for civil servants, and are an omnipresent subject. Evidently, they affect work motivation negatively, as one employee clearly expressed: "When people are sent to work there [LNP] it is perceived as a punishment" (I15). Improving the living situation of park employees is likely to encourage them and have a positive influence on efficiency. Currently, a reconstruction of the eco-guards' houses is under way.



Image 2: Latrines of Eco- Guards

Photo: PhotoVoice participant (Eco- Guard, Bantu, Male) (PV2)

He took the picture to show the latrines of eco-guards, a simple wooden construction. He is angry: "*State employees like us have to use them*". He says that the latrines are dirty, not well constructed, and that at least eight people have to share them. "*You understand now why I cannot bring my girlfriend here*"

The current handling of length of leaves is another aspect showing that working-conditions are not well adapted to the living situation in LNP. As civil servants, eco-guards can take leaves for up to three days for pressing occasions or emergencies in addition to vacation. However, these leaves are far too short for travelling to the capital (one way takes a minimum of two days) or to their hometowns. As a result, eco-guards are often absent longer than permitted, accepting potential sanctions (F20). This does not only affect motivation but can also have a negative impact on conservation work such as patrol planning.



Image 3: WWF Car

Photo: PhotoVoice participant (Eco-Guard, Bantu, Male) (PV1)

The picture shows a car of WWF. He took the picture to illustrate his difficulties to move around. He would like to visit friends and family or go to the village in the evening, but he does not own a car and cannot move around freely. It takes him at least two days, normally 3-4 days, to visit his family.

Furthermore, eco-guards claim that bonuses ("prime de saisi") for seized illegal objects, such as cable snares, weapons and endangered wildlife are not paid or not paid in time (F16). Bonuses have the purpose of rewarding eco-guards for their work, e.g. collecting a high number of cable snares in the forest and are a viable tool for increasing work motivation and, in turn, efficiency. Bonuses that are not paid regularly fail to do both and have the opposite effect.

It has to be kept in mind that bonuses could have negative side effects, such as the seizing of objects in a legal context: for example, if the prospect of a bonus leads to claims that hunting weapons or porcupines seized within the community were seized inside the national park. This can be avoided by limiting bonuses to objects that are illegal in every context (cable snares, war weapons, protected species). Additionally, it must be ensured that the bonus does not exceed the value of the confiscated object (difficult e.g. with cable snares) to avoid the incentive of fraud.



Image 4: Poste de Garde

Photo: PhotoVoice participant (Eco- Guard, Bantu, Male) (PV2)

The picture shows la "poste de garde" where eco-guards guard the entrance to the office: "The eco-guards have to work there the whole night". He says that the house is empty, there are not even any chairs inside: "The people who work there have nothing." When asked if he ever complained, he says: "You know the management plan, how it should be. It is not like this. But we are functionaries, a bit like the military. We do not complain".


5.1.4 Ecotourism

Ecotourism can provide economic resources that benefit both park management and local communities. The number of charismatic and partly endemic species (forest elephants, lowland gorillas, grey parrots) and the unique landscape (primary rainforest) in the Congo Basin harbour a high potential for ecotourism. At the same time, the region is the least developed tourism destination in Africa (Yunis, 2003). Political instability, low economic growth and the remoteness of the area have hindered the development of touristic activities.

The number of visitors in LNP started rising in 2008 but then remained relatively low with only 96 visitors in 2016 (Table 3). Most likely, the reasons for this low number are the political instability of the area as well as poor infrastructure and accessibility of the park. It is a long journey from Yaoundé to LNP, taking two to three days on a poor road with few hotels on the way. For tourists coming from one of the other two TNS parks, the journey is relatively easier (one day from Bangui to APDS by car and there is the possibility to take an aeroplane).

Djembe, a campsite on the riverside in the southern part of LNP, is accessible by motorboat from Bayanga (CAR) within about five hours and from Bomassa (Congo) within only 30 minutes. Unfortunately, tourists have to pass the Cameroonian border inspection post in Libongo (north of the Park) or Socambo (south of the Park) for Visa control (see Map 5) before being allowed to enter. Additionally, park visitors currently have to go to LNP's main office in Mambélé, which is a several hours car ride from both Socambo and Libongo. These administrative obstacles are unfortunate: Djembe has the best touristic potential of all sites in LNP due to its rich wildlife and its location in proximity to the Sangha River and NNNP. The swarms of grey parrots and green pigeons observable in one of the baïs are a great tourist attraction. Indeed, Djembe used to have a touristy infrastructure with five wooden huts and a restaurant, but the site was abandoned due to the presence of poachers and had to be "re-conquered" (I23). In the process, a bridge connecting it to LNPs Headquarter was burned down. As a consequence, Djembe is currently only accessible by boat (I23; I21; P7). The poor accessibility of LNP may lead to a loss of potential visitors.

Trans-boundary visas for visitors of the TNS landscape are planned (I23; E13). Tourists would only need one visa for all three countries if they enter and exit the tri-national area at the same point, facilitating their movement within the TNS landscape. Congo and CAR have already signed the agreement. If the third country, Cameroon, would sign it as well, it would potentially increase tourist numbers once Djembe is rebuilt and invested in.



Map 5: Touristic potential along Sangha river

Source: MINFOF Cameroon, WWF Cameroon, OpenStreetmaps and contributors (CC BY-SA), own data

Table 3: Numbers of visitors in LNP and APDS in the years 2008-2016

Protected area	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2015	2016
LNP	25	55	120	128	92	92	51	96
APDS	655	547	577	450	383	-	92	187

Source: MINFOF, 2014; P11

5.1.5 Anti-Poaching Strategy

The demand for food (bush meat, agricultural products), timber and Non-Timber-Forest-Products is challenging the management of common-pool resources (I21, I22). Poaching is one of the greatest threats to wildlife conservation world-wide (Moore et al., 2018). More precisely, threats derive from illegal subsistence hunting, opportunistic poaching as well as commercial and organised cross-border trophy harvesting often facilitated by corruption, patronage networks and weak judicial systems (Haenlein and Smith, 2016). Around LNP, bushmeat is considered a staple food for both Bantu and Baka alike due to an absence of other protein sources (Fa et al., 2016). Under certain conditions (see Infobox 8, Image 5 and Table 4) that shall support the management of common-pool-resources, subsistence hunting and the consumption of bushmeat is legal and commonly referred to under the term “usage rights”.

Infobox 8: Animal classes

In Cameroon, animals are categorised in classes A, B and C. Class A animals are forbidden to hunt. Class B animals can only be hunted with a permission (e.g. by safari companies). All other animals automatically belong to Class C and can be hunted for own consumption, but not for commercial purposes (Republic of Cameroon, 1994, Art. 78; 2006, Art. 2, 3).

The classifications and respectively the hunting quotas are changed regularly in line with the latest MINFOF inventories (I10). Flawed quotas however pose a threat to biodiversity as was the case for the NNNP area (I33).

The preferably hunted ungulates are however overharvested and hunting may soon not be able to meet the subsistence and economic needs of the local population. In combination with limited subsistence hunting zones, this likely causes hunting success to be less frequent, forcing people to shift to other species, to hunt with non-sustainable techniques (e.g. night hunting, where type of species and sex are not discernible) and illegal gear (cable snares, firearms) or to penetrate further into the forest (Fa et al. 2016; Bobo et al. 2015). Considering the above, a sustainable wildlife management including anti-poaching activities is justified and necessary both for conservation and to maintain bushmeat as a food source for the local population.



Image 5: Picture of animal classes

Photo: Julia Maria Bayer

Generally, the park management deals with two types of poaching: professional large-scale poaching and small-scale poaching. Large-scale poaching (locally referred to as "la grande chasse") usually targets bigger animals such as bongos, buffalos or elephants mostly to economise trophies (e.g. ivory). It is often carried out with heavy weapons, e.g. AK47. With regards to large-scale poaching, the border area constitutes a special challenge for conservation due to an influx of weapons from the formerly war-torn neighbouring countries CG and CAR. The latter is currently still considered to be in a state of civil war (I24, M3).

Three eco-guard missions involved shootings¹⁸ with heavily armed offenders since March 2015. Nevertheless, elephant carcasses are found more frequently (I23; Brigade de Tri-national de la Sangha 2016 I, II & 2017, I, II, III). Large-scale poaching is often carried out on behalf of professional sellers and middlemen pulling the strings in the background. Interviewees indicated that Baka (and Bayaka in CAR) also engage in big game hunting, although only as "stooges" and not as the driving force (I30). This may reason from their local knowledge of the forests and from their greater hunting success with firearms in comparison to

¹⁸ During those incidents one eco-guard was killed and one paralysed (I23)


their Bantu neighbours (Fa et al. 2016). In any case, identifying the real responsible remains a challenge (l2, l16).

Hunting type	Zone	Tool	Authorisation required	Animal Class	Season
Subsistence Hunting (own consumption)	Non-permanent forests (around the village a hunter lives in)	Traditional weapons made from natural materials ¹⁹	No	C	All year
Commercial Hunting ("permis de collecte")	Non-permanent forests	Firearms	Yes ²⁰	B, C	January to June
Sports/ Trophy Hunting (managed by touristic Safari companies)	ZIC, ZICGC	Firearms	Yes	B, C	January to June

Source: Republic of Cameroon, 1994, Art. 78; 1995b, Art.2 Nr. 21; 1995b, Section II, IV; l5, l15, l23; 2000a

¹⁹ According to Fa et al. (2016), only indigenous hunters occasionally use traditional hunting techniques and weapons; Bantu only use cable snares and firearms

²⁰ Several official documents are needed to obtain the authorisation at a cost of XAF~150.000 per season (l15). The bureaucratic burden and cost hinder most people from getting authorised.



Map 6: Trophy hunting - zones and research sites

Source: MINFOF Cameroon and WRI, own data

The vast majority of poaching incidents in LNP and its buffer zone falls into the category of small-scale poaching (mostly with cable snares), i.e. hunting of class C animals – for subsistence or commercial purposes – without respecting the regulations described in Table 4. Small-scale poachers are reported to be mainly villagers from the Lobéké buffer zone and include Baka and Bantu (I16, I23).

To combat both small- and large-scale poaching, the park management follows a common approach of firstly promoting restraints for harvest and consumption (“soft power”) and secondly safeguarding wild species (“hard power”) (Fa et al., 2016).



Image 6: Eco- Guards killed on duty

Photo: PhotoVoice participant (Eco- Guard, Bantu, Male) (PV2)

The participant took a picture of photographs of comrades that died while in service. He says that it is "not normal" that eco-guards are killed on duty: "We are not the army". Following the participant, these incidents show that being an eco-guard is a dangerous job: poachers shoot as soon as eco-guards approach. He says that they need better material, for example bullet-proof vests: "When we are in the forest, we are practically naked".

Promoting restraints ("soft power")

The park management is implementing an awareness raising program on the dangers of heavy war weapons, carried out by WWF staff in Mambélé. The project tries to encourage villagers to voluntarily hand in weapons and ammunition. In return, people are granted amnesty (I14, I19). The sub-prefects of Moloundou and Salapoumbé supported the propagation of this concept. To date, 22 weapons have been handed in (I39). For 2019 it is foreseen to elaborate the project further, e.g. to an exchange of weapons for nutrition (I19).

On a more abstract level, the park management campaigns against poaching and raises awareness about other illegal forest exploitation. For instance, MINFOF and WWF employees inform the residents of the buffer zone about the rules outlined in Table 4 (I17). In many villages, posters have been put up to educate

people about the animal classes and there are road signs demarcating the limits of the national park. Boundaries between the agroforestry zone and the logging concessions area said to be clearly visible (I15, P23). This could however not be verified.

Infobox 9: COVAREF and COVILAB

The Comité de Valorisation des Ressources Fauniques (COVAREF) is a community committee who manages the community hunting zones (ZICGC, see Chapter 5.2.6). COVAREFs are usually accompanied by a Comité Villageois Lutte Anti-Braconnage (COVILAB) that shall support the COVAREF and the park management with awareness raising activities and the provision of intelligence around poaching in their concession (I10).

Raising awareness and explaining why poaching is forbidden and what usage rights the local population has ideally helps to prevent poaching (I22). The park management's continuous awareness raising is crucial to create an understanding for conservation. However, the abundance²¹ of small-scale poaching around LNP proves that its effectiveness is limited. A logging company employee responsible for community work stated that despite educational efforts, people would not understand why they are allowed to hunt an animal in one area, but not in the other; or why they can hunt one species, but not a very similar one that is hard to distinguish from the other²² (I6). On top of that, the current awareness raising strategy follows a top-down approach with park management officials promoting law enforcement without incorporating the people's needs into the strategy and without engaging them in a dialogue on a par. So far, community involvement only takes place indirectly through the "Comités Villageois Lutte Anti-Braconnage" (COVILAB) (I10).

Another likely reason for the lack of success is that awareness raising measures are by nature not able to address the root causes of poaching, namely poverty and lack of formal employment. It can merely serve to educate on existing laws. Poaching however is sometimes the only means for the local population to earn a

²¹ A safari company operating in ZIC 9 and ZIC 30 found 2900 cable snares in August 2018 alone (I24)

²² For instance, the Peter's duiker is categorised Class B and illegal to be hunted for subsistence, whereas the similar looking blue duiker may be hunted for subsistence (Republic of Cameroon, 1998; 2006).

living or to provide for their family – despite the risk of getting arrested (F11, F17, I22). People will likely continue to engage in poaching or illegal logging and mining without formal jobs (I3, I6, I12, I22, I37). This leads to circumstances where the local population is often fully aware of the illegality of poaching but is simultaneously forced to continue with it due to a lack of alternatives. A man from Libongo spoke of the risky nature of illegal hunting that finally made him stop: "*I saw the consequences of poaching*". Now he is a fisherman but earns so little that he considers poaching as an option again (F12). LNP eco-guards are aware of the dilemma and some regret that they cannot provide the local population with any alternative to hunting (F16, F20).

Moreover, convincing people to stop poaching is considered especially challenging in an area where the consumption of bushmeat is deeply rooted in the culture and habits of locals. However, interviewees still believed that in the long term, eating habits could be changed if there is access to other food sources (I12, I27). The local population often expressed the desire to receive support for livestock keeping (PV18, PV19; see Image 7), but previous efforts promoting livestock breeding were not successful (F17). Still, it is advisable to support livelihood strategies in the park's buffer zone that are not based on bushmeat hunting. Without real alternatives, raising awareness is an inadequate and insufficient tool to combat poaching. In addition, current awareness raising efforts should be designed in a more participatory way. The success of such campaigns is demonstrably enhanced when local people from the community act as facilitators themselves (Gounden, n.d.).




Image 7: Goats

Photo: PhotoVoice Participant (Farmer, Baka, male, 45 years) (PV18)

According to the participant, animal husbandry is useful for consumption and income generation. *"Nowadays, the Muslims keep livestock, but we [the Baka] would like to do it as well. Conservation has to help us with that; otherwise we will look for meat in the forest."*

Protecting wildlife ("hard power")

The park management contains a Surveillance Unit carrying out missions to protect and safeguard wildlife. At the moment, 52 eco-guards employed by MINFOF are working in the Lobéké buffer zone and carry out three types of patrols: pedestrian, fluvial (on the Sangha, Boumba and Ngoko rivers) and motorised patrols on road axes (F16, F20, I16; Figure 6).



Patrols (usually a team of 5 eco-guards) take place in both the LNP core zone and the buffer zone, where eco-guards support private enterprises²³ and COVILABs in their anti-poaching missions (I13, I16, I22, I25). Generally, the park's core zone and especially the clearings (called "baïs") are prioritised in the park's anti-poaching strategy. The baïs have a particular high wildlife potential (large mammals) and are therefore a likely target for poachers. To protect biodiversity more efficiently, the Surveillance Unit uses the Spatial Monitoring and Reporting Tool (SMART) to collect data on wildlife, to monitor illegal activities and to manage and plan future patrol routes (I16, I38, SMART, 2017). In addition to patrols, eco-guards carry out road checkpoints and control strategic road crossings (in collaboration with the gendarmerie) in search of illegal wildlife traffickers (I16, P50).


Dynamic patrols based on spatiotemporal data – as employed by LNP – are crucial for wildlife protection. The tactic to increase patrols in high poaching areas while still maintaining a presence in low-disturbance areas corresponds with practices of other PAs (Critchlow et al., 2015). Eco-guards themselves assessed the impact of patrols as positive with regards to a successful wildlife protection. It was argued that only few heavily armed poachers are encountered, and the influx

²³ Armed poachers can be a threat to employees. Thus, the private sector engages in anti-poaching efforts (I3, I12, I25)

52 Results

of illegal hunting materials and weapons has been limited due to their work; poaching camps have been destroyed and poachers arrested. There are seizures of weapons and bush meat, and snares²⁴ are constantly dismantled (F16, F20, Parc National de Lobéké, 2018).

These achievements contribute to stable populations of great apes and bongos in LNP and its buffer zone. Nevertheless, 80 species and sub-species of mammals are already threatened by overharvesting in the Congo Basin and require strict conservation, above all the forest elephant (MINFOF, 2015; Bobo et al., 2015).



The latest inventory carried out in summer 2018 is yet to prove if the surveillance efforts could stop the number of elephants from plummeting in and around LNP²⁵ (see Figure 7; MINFOF, 2015). In view of the above, the park management's surveillance efforts should be improved where possible and some shortcomings, which are explained in the following, certainly hinder more effective anti-poaching missions.

During the research, it was often claimed that the number of 52 eco-guards was insufficient to protect wildlife in LNP and its buffer zone (M3, I16). According

²⁴ Snares are an unsustainable hunting tool and disastrous for wildlife as they trap many different species and kill animals of all ages and sex (Lion Aid, 2014).

²⁵ The elephants may have been poached or they may have migrated to other areas (I31)

to the IUCN standard of 1 ranger per 5000ha, the current number is sufficient to protect the LNP core zone including the community zone (MINFOF, 2014).

However, taking into account that eco-guards also work in a buffer zone that is more than twice the size of the park's core zone, the current number falls short by 82 eco-guards. Therefore, interventions in the buffer zone are currently only implemented if eco-guards can be spared on the baïs (I16). This may be a reason why a safari company in the north of LNP turns to the military for support in anti-poaching activities instead of MINFOF eco-guards (I24). The local population, too, experiences more frequent and stricter controls in the vicinity to LNP headquarters and less around remote villages, which is mirrored in the compliance of the people with the law: the stronger the presence of eco-guards in an area, the lower the incidents of poaching (P44). An expert from DSNP however argues that "*it is not a matter of quantity, but quality*", which is why he supports a reduction of patrolling days in DSNP to increase motivation and to enable a more thorough investigation of individual poaching cases (I30).

To formulate a recommendation, the question on the appropriate numbers of eco-guards must first be discussed with regards to another shortcoming: the participation of the local population in surveillance tasks. The park management's wildlife protection measures do not include the local population. Neither Bantu nor Baka participate in patrols or controls and there is no attempt to integrate them into the park's wildlife protection strategy in the future. This is especially noteworthy as patrols are at the core of the park management's work and as employment opportunities are scarce and sought by the local population (F13).

Elsewhere it is common to include the local population in anti-poaching activities to generate income from wildlife and to create buy-in for conservation efforts (Big Life Foundation, n.d.). In DSNP for instance, village rangers will be trained in the near future to secure the forests around their communities and in NNNP rangers are entirely recruited locally (I30, M4). A pilot anti-poaching project in Zimbabwe's Lower Zambezi involving marginalised women ("Akashinga") has shown great success in integrating the multiple goals of conservation, economic development and female empowerment (Goergen, 2018; Barbee, 2017; IAPF, 2019). Involving locals in enforcement and monitoring has also shown to be a significant factor in protecting vegetation density and forest cover (Ostrom and Hayer, 2005: 616).

The only minor community involvement around LNP however takes place through the COVILABs (I10, I16). For specific interventions and on demand, the COVILAB can be supported by LNP eco-guards. However, this collaboration is

54 Results

volatile and does not sustainably support the surveillance and conservation capacities of the COVILAB members (I5, I10, I23). Therefore, it is strongly recommended to assess possibilities how to include the local population into environmental protection as is already the case for other protected areas.

For instance, the local population could participate in current wildlife protection efforts in form of unarmed local village rangers²⁶ to (1) overcome the deficient numbers of eco-guards in the buffer zone (2) to increase the detection of illegal activities, (3) to provide an alternative income source for locals, and (4) to reduce incentives for poaching as has been the case in other protected areas (I24; Moore et al., 2018). International financial support will be needed to enable an NGO like WWF to hire and train such local village rangers. In any case, an employment of village rangers must be closely coordinated with MINFOF to not undermine its sovereignty and to guarantee a fruitful collaboration between MINFOF eco-guards and village rangers that eventually reduces conflict and serves the environment.

Infrastructure and anti-poaching measures

Shortcomings on infrastructure have adverse effects on anti-poaching measures in and around LNP, too. One example for an especially weak infrastructure is Djembe, a hotspot for wildlife and consequently, poaching (I23).



Image 8: Abandoned office building Djembe

Photo: Julia Maria Bayer

²⁶ For more information see the detailed recommendation 2.2 and 2.3 in Annex 14.

Generally, poor telephone, internet and radio networks are a challenge and delay communication between patrols and headquarters for hours. Therefore, it would be an advantage if eco-guards on duty could directly receive information from the NNNP airplane that is regularly patrolling the Sangha River (P75). The park management plans to revive Djembe for both tourism and surveillance measures (I23, P113). This plan is advisable as it may lead to improved living and working conditions for eco-guards and, through a higher presence of people may reduce poaching.

Litigation

The current LNP management plan of 2014 describes litigation as “irregular” and states that arrests and sanctions only have little deterrent effects (MINFOF, 2014). In Cameroon, the prosecution procedure of poaching depends on the class of animal killed and procedures range from being transferred to the district court to a simple commitment to respect the Forest Law through signing a form called “Engagement sur l'honneur²⁷”. Between January and August 2018, 13 people were arrested and brought to court, among them one Baka. Confiscated weapons and trophies of class A animals are generally sent to the district level and said to be destroyed there (I15, I16).

Litigation was not looked at specifically in the scope of this study. However, the research team found that one procedure of the park management is problematic: LNP staff auctions confiscated animals of class B and C in the villages, which is a cause for misunderstanding between the local population and the eco-guards. Although the money raised is said to be given to the state, the local population perceives the auction as a paradox or even affront, i.e. eco-guards selling bushmeat to the villagers after they took it from them in the first place (I16, C8, C9, C10). Therefore, it is recommended to reconsider the usefulness of bushmeat auctions. Annex 5

In conclusion, the anti-poaching strategy shows room for improvement. It could especially be optimised with regards to the inclusion of the local population in wildlife protection and awareness raising activities. At the moment, the strategy is not designed in a transparent and participatory way as it is required by international guidelines, e.g. by the BMZ (BMZ 2013). As long as socioeconomic causes of poaching are not addressed and the local population does not actively participate in conservation, efforts on anti-poaching will likely not be able to

²⁷ See Annex 5.

withstand anthropogenic pressures on wildlife in the long run (Haenlein and Smith, 2016).

Resource Extraction Strategy

Logging

LNP is surrounded by logging concessions. The current management plan makes explicit mention of illegal logging, which led the research team to expect it to be an issue for conservation. However, neither formal nor illegal logging was mentioned as a threat to biodiversity in any of the interviews with park management staff. Presumably, it plays only a minor role in their conservation efforts.

Nevertheless, incidents of illegal logging have been reported from the buffer zone, e.g. from a community forest (I6, P110). Further, commercial logging companies are said to harvest more timber within their concessions than allowed (P1). In addition, a logging company from Kika stated that only road entrances and bridges are closed after logging operations whereas the roads as such remain open (I6). This is problematic as it provides poachers and farmers with an easy access to the forests (I32). Moreover, forestry operations can disturb certain species. For instance, chimpanzees are negatively affected when logging does not follow certain practices that ensure a low impact on their territories (I33). For this reason, they may tend to avoid the concession areas and are more often found inside the LNP core zone as is shown in Map 7.


Lastly, staff of logging companies is often accused of poaching (I10). Logging companies themselves seem to share this suspicion and thus raise awareness for the issue amongst their staff (I12).



Image 9: Trees

Photo: PhotoVoice Participant (Eco- Guard, Bantu, Male) (Pv1)

The participant took the picture to underline the importance of conservation. He says that we should cherish these trees: "Without trees, there is no furniture, not even houses." It was important to fight against illegal logging. Logging is controlled by MINFOF, and he pays his respect to the Ministry for its work.



Map 7: Chimpanzees distribution

Source: MINFOF, 2015: 35

However, there are many unknowns around both illegal and legal logging. By the park management's own account, forestry operations are not closely monitored (MINFOF, 2014). Therefore, it is recommended to analyse its ecological and social impact in LNP's buffer zone. This should be done in cooperation with the local population whose natural resources may be affected from logging as well. Since 2006, UCL ExCiteS²⁸ carries out projects with communities in CG and CAR on this matter (Vitos, 2013; l40). These projects could serve as an impulse for future activities around LNP.

²⁸ University College London Extreme Citizen Science



Image 10: Working in the forest

Photo: PhotoVoice Participant (Eco- Guard, Bantu, male) (PV2)

The participant says that he took this picture to show the good and bad sides of working in the forest. “[The forest] is happiness. It is nice to breathe [fresh air], and you see animals. Some tourists even cry”. The forest helped to “understand life differently.” However, there are downsides: “The insects that bite you, and the snakes. Even the elephants are against you. And the trees- they lose branches that can hit you”.

Mining

Exploration and prospecting for minerals causes damage to flora and fauna and disrupts ecosystem processes (Turner, 2012). Both legal and illegal²⁹ mining exists in LNP’s buffer zone, the latter in form of artisanal mining. According to the WWF programme manager for LNP, the Cameroonian government is actively encouraging legal mining in the area. So far, three exploration permits³⁰ have been issued to Mongokele Mining, the only formal mining company operating in the park’s periphery (I21). Initially, Mongokele Mining attracted around 200 people to the mining sites around LNP, but only around 30 are currently still employed (I37).

Mongokele Mining used to operate in very close proximity to the park, stretching its operation closely to its boundary, and constructing roads almost

²⁹ “Illegal” means without having an official licence to extract resources in a specific concession area in line with the Cameroonian mining code and the forestry law

³⁰ Totalling a size of 1.200 km²

60 Results

reaching its limits. But following complaints by a timber company working in the same concession, it was ordered by the ministry to retreat to a distance of 15km from LNP (I21, I25, I37). This is an example for issues related to overlapping concessions, demonstrating incoherent concession policies and a lack of coordination amongst the respective authorities at national level (Chupezi et al., 2009). It is estimated that there are now about 300 illegal artisanal miners working in the abandoned mining sites close to the park's boundary (I37). The exact location of the abandoned mining site remains unknown to the research team.

While offering an income source, artisanal mining has adverse effects on habitats. Illegal artisanal miners use the open-pit technique, which requires deforestation and an exposition of potential mineral-yielding gravel deposits (see Image 11). The open pits often constitute traps for animals (I20, Chupezi et al., 2009). The park management however does not have a specific strategy in place that tackles threats to biodiversity induced by mining. Measures are rather isolated, e.g. disturbing the work of illegal miners through patrols (P80, I16).



Image 11: Illegal artisanal mining site

Photo: Julia Maria Bayer

Generally, mining is often connected to hunting as miners often work deep in the forests and rely on bushmeat as food source (Turner, 2012). This was confirmed by several interviewees; illegal artisanal miners interviewed in

Mbongoli³¹ stated that the entire village is engaged in bushmeat hunting (P80, l6, l12, l37).

With regards to the above, it is assumed that mining operations directly and indirectly pose a threat to biodiversity. The scale of this threat has yet to be determined. Chupezi et al. determined no significant environmental impacts ten years ago but highlighted that in future a combination of commercial and artisanal mining (which does exist today) could lead to adverse effects on biodiversity (Chupezi et al., 2009). Further, the linkage between poaching and mining has not been analysed by Chupezi et al. and should be addressed in future analysis.

Mining activities in the vicinity of the park thwart the ideas of UNESCO and may endanger the UNESCO World Heritage status of the TNS landscape, which might lead to a loss of donor support (E13, l21). Clearly, Cameroonian policies are not streamlined: on the one hand, Cameroon invests in the protection of LNP and its buffer zone as unique biodiversity hotspot. On the other hand, mining permits are granted for the same area (l21). The research team could not verify if the UNESCO is aware of the mining activities in LNP's buffer zone. In view of the above, it is recommended to engage in dialogues with UNESCO and Cameroonian policy makers on the national level to ensure that mining policies do not thwart conservation efforts and UNESCO standards around LNP.

5.1.6 Collaboration within the “Trinational de la Sangha”

A trans-boundary cooperation between the three TNS Parks is laid down in the “Accord de cooperation TNS” of 2000. Regarding the objectives set in this agreement, the collaboration between the parks on research, ecotourism and anti-poaching activities seem insufficient. Attempts to establish a closer cooperation were reportedly unsuccessful (l27). Despite the existence of three committees, CTPE³², CTS³³ and CTSA³⁴, which meet regularly to plan and evaluate

³¹ This new settlement is situated right next to the Mongokele Mining office. About 130 people, mainly miners (both illegal and formal), currently live there (P68)

³² CTPE: Comité Tri-national de Planification et d'Exécution. Reunites Park Management (Conservators, NGO employees (WWF and WCS). Meetings are twice per year. Plans patrols, BLAB, eco-touristic circuits and research (l21, l23, MINFOF, 2014)


³³ CTS: Comité Tri-national de Suivi. Reunites regional prefects. Meetings are once per year (l21, l23, MINFOF, 2014)

³⁴ CTSA: Comité Tri-national de Supervision et d'Arbitrage. Reunites ministries of the three countries. Meetings are every 2 years (l21, l23, MINFOF, 2014)

activities in the TNS landscape, there is only little information flow (I32; I33; P67). The head of research unit in LNP, for instance, does not know who her current Congolese counterpart is and vice versa. NNNP has a monthly newsletter to inform its donors and interested parties about newly filled positions, tourist numbers etc , but there is no further regular information exchange. Every TNS park follows its own work plan and strategies are not shared (I38, I30).

5.1.7 Managerial Conflicts: The Management Triangle

Looking at the management actors of LNP, there are clear signs of a conflict within the park management. This conflict has local dimensions, evident as disrupted collaboration between MINFOF and WWF Cameroon in the park management, and national dimensions when taking into consideration the role of FTNS as a financing partner. Subsequently, these dimensions will be explored before discussing the idea of a new national level agency for protected area management (referred to as the “super-structure” or “national agency” by stakeholders) as a possible way forward.



MINFOF and WWF Cameroon: Power imbalances in the park management

When asked about the working relationship between MINFOF and WWF in the park management, staff from both sides assured the research team that the collaboration was working well. Contentious issues were described as “misunderstandings” (I19; I39). Nonetheless, more thorough interviews and investigations during the research team’s stay in Mambélé revealed that there is in fact a strong latent conflict between MINFOF and WWF.

On the one hand, the Conservator of LNP emphasized the sovereignty and authority of the Cameroonian state (I39). On the other hand, WWF representatives in Yaoundé lamented an absence of the state in the area around LNP. WWF is expected to take over responsibilities that are beyond its mandate and its area of expertise as a conservation NGO. The national director of WWF asserted they were “expected to act as the government” around Lobéké, i.e. providing health-care and education, building basic infrastructure and furthering socio-economic development (EI12). WWF employees of the park management underlined that WWF’s role was that of a technical advisor with limited decision-making power (I17; I19; I21).

These dynamics have created power imbalances in the relationship between MINFOF and WWF. MINFOF as the proxy of the Cameroonian state has the authority in decision-making, yet WWF controls funding and equipment: in terms of implementing projects or carrying out field activities neither side can act without the other. In other words, MINFOF theoretically has more power, but *de facto* power lays mostly with WWF. Both sides are frustrated with each other but are forced to co-exist in a relationship of mutual dependency. They exploit the resources at their disposal (MINFOF authority, WWF finances) to create leverage over the other side. MINFOF representatives interpret this as WWF overstepping its boundaries and in turn, assert their power by limiting WWF’s scope of action. WWF, conversely, blames MINFOF for making the park management inefficient and feels unjustly blamed for the shortcomings of the Cameroonian state as described above. These power imbalances have hardened into a latent conflict that does not allow for an effective and results-oriented management of LNP.

FTNS: From financier to implementing partner

The unclear role of FTNS in the management triangle with MINFOF and WWF has been found to cause confusion and potentially even exacerbates the conflict between the two actors. Initially intended as a mechanism for sustainable financing and oversight, FTNS is increasingly venturing into management activities. FTNS representatives mentioned that to them, poor management is the core issue of LNP and the main driver for most problems and conflicts around the national park. They complained that neither MINFOF nor WWF complied with FTNS procedures, that reporting was untimely and that contracts for suppliers were handled improperly (EI9). FTNS is frustrated with the poor results of the park management of LNP (particularly when comparing these to the other TNS parks).

FTNS has used the ineffectiveness of the partnership MINFOF-WWF as a legitimization for a stronger and more active involvement in the management of

64 Results

LNP. Besides implementing its own projects (such as the Carbon Project), FTNS frequently hires consultants that are tasked to work on specific topics (for example construction of infrastructure) or to reinforce the insufficient capacities of the park management. The Executive Director of FTNS commented on this development: "If we don't do it, nobody will" (E113).

Both MINFOF and WWF are aware of this change in roles of FTNS, and the WWF Program Manager and the Conservator made mention of FTNS taking on a more active role in LNP and its management. Whereas the former did not seem to mind the involvement, the latter expressed his disapproval: "FTNS should refrain from executing projects in the area" (I39). The Conservator appeared to feel increasingly left out of operational activities and sidelined in decision-making. During an interview he recounted several examples of FTNS (sometimes in collaboration with WWF) taking decisions without consulting him, e.g. cancelling the contract to expand the tourist accommodation Camp Kombo or administering an NGO-project without involving the park management. The Conservator is clearly frustrated and feels his expertise is not appreciated: "People in Yaoundé have made mistakes" (I39). The decision of FTNS to take things into its own hand and cooperate more closely only with WWF because of MINFOF's alleged ineffectiveness thus reinforces his feeling of losing power to partner organizations. Essentially, the most powerful actor by design (MINFOF as the state representative) becomes the least powerful one in practice. This creates tensions between the management parties.

Towards a new super-structure?

Evidently, the difficulties of current management set-up go beyond the operational level. The MOUs between FTNS, MINFOF and WWF constitute a complicated system of financial flows with unclear responsibilities and mandates for each of the parties. The research team was informed that there are currently plans to optimize these arrangements through the creation of a new "super-structure" (I39). These plans are not being developed as a direct response to management issues in LNP but they were mentioned as a possible solution to the current conflict.

The idea of such a super-structure refers to a national level agency for the management of protected areas. This agency would be independent of MINFOF and staffed with experts from different working fields related to conservation (conservation, socio-economic development, tourism, etc.). It would directly collaborate with international, national and local stakeholders. In terms of organizational structure each national park would be headed by a *chef de service*,

who answers directly to the agency in Yaoundé. Financial flows from donor countries and other actors would be channelled directly to the agency (139).

The establishment of a super-structure is likely to have several advantages. First, it could allow for a better cooperation and coordination between different interest groups. Including experts from different fields would ensure that the perspective on protected area management would be broadened. Aspects such as social issues, tourism or economic development would be featured more dominantly alongside conservation. Second, the mandate of FTNS would be clearer. As national staff told the research team, working with a new super-structure would allow FTNS to take a step back from management and limit itself to financing the agency, since it expects the new agency to bundle more competences and capacities than the current park management relies on. Third, the organisational structure of the new agency could enable better and more transparent communication between stakeholders. Currently, FTNS and other actors complain that the park management is often unavailable. The Conservator, who is often hard to reach, is the first point of contact for FTNS. MINFOF Yaoundé has no person in charge of LNP, who is informed enough and mandated to make decisions. With a new agency more decision-making and planning could increasingly happen on a national level.

Notwithstanding these potential improvements, the creation of a super-structure is also linked to disadvantages. The delegation of more responsibilities to the state in the management of LNP and protected areas in Cameroon at large might be laudable from a perspective of good governance. Practically however, experiences with MINFOF in the current set-up raise doubts about the efficiency of government institutions, supporting arguments for assigning more power to non-state actors such as NGOs or private companies. Besides, the coordination between the super-structure and other relevant ministries could complicate bureaucratic procedures instead of simplifying them. On top of that, the process of establishing a new agency would require large amounts of resources and years of political debate (all ministries concerned would lose power to the new agency). Lastly, one of the possible advantages, increased decision-making on a national level, could easily turn into a disadvantage of the super-structure: as more power is delegated away from the park management, there is a stronger likelihood of technocrats in Yaoundé losing touch with the local conditions and realities in LNP.

5.2 Participation

Research Question:

How does the local population currently participate in the LNP management and what are the existing problems and constraints?

This chapter examines the on-the-ground implementation of participatory mechanisms promoted by LNP's management plan and Cameroonian forest law.

First, it looks at the main rationales for local participation in conservation and examines the underlying legal frameworks and discourse in LNP. Second, it briefly reviews the consultation process on LNP's establishment and examines the integration of customary rights in zoning processes and land use allocation. While both are a formal requirement, there is evidence that the local population was neither sufficiently consulted about the establishment of the park nor adequately involved in related land-use planning. As a result, legal uncertainty of traditional use rights prevails. Third, the chapter examines participatory mechanisms that seek to strengthen the financial, economic and political integration of local stakeholders in natural resource management.

While these mechanisms are officially promoted for instrumental and normative reasons, the research indicates that the bulk of them is not or only partially functional: the local population is not adequately integrated in the park's management and does not benefit from its community zone. The delegation of power to local communities via community-based resource management is found to be largely inefficient, ineffective and inequitable. This is mainly due to weak capacities, lack of transparency and control, elite capture, social stratification within "communities", and neglect of local needs. As a result, the local population has little opportunity and ability to control and influence the governance of LNP and its buffer zone.

Finally, the chapter provides an overview of stakeholders that can potentially help to foster participation.

5.2.1 Why Participation?

The discourse on participatory management of protected areas is largely informed by two different rationales either emphasizing instrumental or normative goals.

Following Common Pool Resource Governance- theory (CPRG), participation of local stakeholders is instrumental for rules implementation, reduces conflicts, and decreases monitoring and enforcement costs (Ostrom, 1990). Indeed, there is evidence that the integration of local resource users in rule making and monitoring is significantly and positively related with biodiversity and forest cover (Hayes and Ostrom, 2005). "Participation" in CPRG is understood as a multi- level concept involving consultation and information, integration in rules- making and decision-making processes, revenue- sharing, and consideration of local institutions (including the integration of customary use rights).

Demands for active participation are also based on a normative rationale stressing that participation supported the evolution and deepening of democratic values. This perspective involves citizenship obligations and responsibilities (Baker and Chapin, 2018:1), and is related to human- rights based approaches to participation. Rights to participation are supported by several international legal instruments, notably Human Rights conventions, that include the rights to peaceful assembly, freedom of expression, information, and direct or indirect participation in public affairs. Furthermore, conventions on collective and minority rights promote the full and effective participation of e.g. indigenous people (e.g. UNDRIP 2007, see Infobox 10).

Infobox 10: Selected articles of UNDRIPArticle 18:

Indigenous peoples have the right to participate in decision-making in matters which would affect their rights, through representatives chosen by themselves in accordance with their own procedures, as well as to maintain and develop their own indigenous decision-making institutions.

Article 20:

1. Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and develop their political, economic and social systems or institutions, to be secure in the enjoyment of their own means of subsistence and development, and to engage freely in all their traditional and other economic activities.
2. Indigenous peoples deprived of their means of subsistence and development are entitled to just and fair redress

Article 26:

2. Indigenous peoples have the right to own, use, develop and control the lands, territories and resources that they possess by reason of traditional ownership or other traditional occupation or use, as well as those which they have otherwise acquired.
3. States shall give legal recognition and protection to these lands, territories and resources. Such recognition shall be conducted with due respect to the customs, traditions and land tenure systems of the indigenous peoples concerned.

Article 28:

1. Indigenous peoples have the right to redress, by means that can include restitution or, when this is not possible, just, fair and equitable compensation, for the lands, territories and resources which they have traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or used, and which have been confiscated, taken, occupied, used or damaged without their free, prior and informed consent.

Source: UN 2007

Discourse on participation in LNP

Participation of local stakeholders in LNP is required by commitments of Cameroon, UNESCO, WWF and donors to international human rights, including

commitments to collective rights of indigenous people (see Infobox 1 and Infobox 3). Both UNESCO³⁵, and WWF³⁶ recognise local and indigenous peoples' rights and highlight the imperative to include the local population in the management of LNP and its buffer zone. Furthermore, Cameroon, as a member of the Central African Forest Commission (COMIFAC) and signatory of the 2005 Convergence Plan, pledged to involve its rural population in the planning and sustainable management of its forests (MINFOF, 2014:7).

The current LNP management plan emphasizes both instrumental and normative motives for local participation, and has the stated goal of „reinforcing the participatory protection system of the park and its surrounding zone, in a context of integrated area management, in order to maintain its biodiversity, its natural habitats and to contribute to the local development [...]“ (MINFOF, 2014:i). 'Eco-development and participatory management' represent one of the five pillars the plan is concentrating on, and 24% of the scheduled expenditure (third after infrastructure/administration and protection) is reserved for it (ibidem). Further underscoring the weight attributed to participation, the management (WWF) is employing one member of staff and two volunteers concentrating on participation of local communities.

Participation is also desired by the local population in LNP's buffer zone. During interviews and focus group discussions, participants regularly demanded more active involvement in the management of "their" forest by referring to normative and instrumental rationales and argued that: (1) they are the forest's primary inhabitants, (2) their traditional way of life guaranteed the continued existence of the ecosystem, (3) their customary usage rights (as autochthonous or indigenous people) ought to be respected, and (4) they have the right to participate in local decision- making processes as they are citizens of Cameroon in contrast to animals that "never go to vote" (C8).

³⁵ UNESCO, in its decision to declare TNS a world heritage site, requires member states to "[i]ncrease further the involvement and representation of local and indigenous communities in the future conservation and management of the TNS landscape in recognition of the rich cultural heritage of the region, the legitimacy of their rights to maintain traditional resource use and their rich local knowledge, including through providing effective and enhanced mechanisms for consultation and collaboration" (UNESCO 2012)

³⁶ In a statement on 'Indigenous People and Conservation', WWF recognises „that indigenous peoples have the right to determine priorities and strategies for the development or use of their lands, territories, and other resources" and „supports the rights of indigenous peoples to improve the quality of their lives, and to benefit directly and equitably from the conservation and sustainable use of natural resources within their territories" (WWF, 2008:3). Even if WWF does not directly use the term "participation", both aspects are not realisable without it.

5.2.2 Information and Consultation Process

While the park and the zoning of its buffer- zone constitute a manifest reality, there is evidence that the local population was not appropriately informed about their establishment nor involved in related land- use planning.

While the majority of the population appears to have been informed about the setting up of LNP in 2001 (I15, I29; Njounan Tegomo et al., 2001:48), interviews led by the research team suggest that women and remote settlements were not consulted (F6, F10, F15, C6, C7, C8, F10, F15, E17). Furthermore, it is likely that the process of consulting local people in LNP's buffer zone was not carried out in an appropriate manner. Following a study by Neubauer, the management- plan of LNP was created without integration of local Baka communities (2014:204). Local NGOs like CEFAID cast doubt on proper FPIC beyond awareness campaigns, stressing the fact that there was no full consent and no possibility to reject the installation of the park (CEFAID, 2012; E12).

This is a common experience of local communities elsewhere in Cameroon (and of indigenous people around the world.³⁷ A case study on Boumba Bek, the national park next to LNP created just four years later, cites a local Baka: *"We didn't know anything about it; but we learned that the government had set boundaries. We didn't agree with this because from the start they had not told us anything and when setting these boundaries, they did not inform us, as they should have done"*.

The head of CEFAID equally criticizes the consultation methodologies employed by WWF to inform about the inclusion of the Sangha Trinational on the UNESCO World Heritage List in 2012 (E12). Following a report by the NGO, "the consultation process did not make it possible for the communities to gain sufficient information to provide their opinion on the nomination of their forest landscape as a World Heritage Site. Not only did the process fail to facilitate their understanding of the impacts of a concept which was completely new to them, but it also gave them no time to digest the information about the purpose of the consultation" (CEFAID, 2012:2). Furthermore, only a small number of communities were consulted (ibidem).

³⁷ A comprehensive study on FPIC consultations of indigenous people around the world by Forest Peoples Programme noted that "[t]he gap between what is increasingly accepted to be a requirement of international law and actual practice is still very wide" (Colchester and Ferrari, 2007:2), and conclude that the "denial of land rights, coerced decisions, manipulations of indigenous leadership, bribery, corruption, the creation of false organisations and fake leaders, and the falsification of documents " (ibid.:20) are widespread problems hampering proper FPIC consultations

5.2.3 Integration of Customary Rights in Forest Zoning

The Cameroonian forest law (Loi N°94/01)³⁸ was adopted in 1994 and divided Cameroonian forest estate into “permanent” and “non- permanent” domains (see 1.1.3). The law guarantees customary usage rights of local communities to exploit forest, wildlife and fish products in the permanent domain as long as protected species are not affected and exploitation is non- commercial. The law was considered innovative, as it “restor[ed] some of the rights that colonial and postcolonial rule had taken from forest people” (Topa et al., 2009:99). In practice, however, the forest law and its related zoning and gazetting process have become controversial.

First, the involvement of Baka in the zoning process is considered unsatisfactory. Despite efforts to include Baka, “[i]t was difficult for the zoning operation to take into account the specificities of the Baka who hardly understand French, rarely frequent public places, and are less inclined to frankly express their points of view in the presence of their Bantu brethren” (Njounan Tegemo et al., 2012: 50).

Second, the zoning largely ignored „the Baka’s view of the forest as a continuous entity and their flexible use of land and resources“, as it only relied upon clear indicators of human occupation such as settlements, farming fields and fallows (ibidem: 48f)³⁹. As a result, the forest zoning allocated “a significant area” of indigenous community land to permanent forest domain (see Map 9) that is primarily assigned to private concessions (Topa et al., 2009: 99). However, “the current regulatory framework for these areas does not sufficiently specify local inhabitants’ rights to hunt, gather, or fish” (ibidem). In absence of clear terms for exercise of these rights, “interpretation [...] differs from one forest stakeholder to another” (Forest Legality Initiative, 2013).

For example, the concessionaries of UFA around LNP appear to neglect customary usage and access rights. Participatory mapping done with support by CEFAID and GTZ in the early 2000’s shows that many zones inside the UFAs (see Map 8 and Map 9) were used by the local population and contained fields and even settlements. Yet, no single management plan that is attached to the zones in the Cameroonian Forest Atlas (MINFOF and WRI 2019) contains any agricultural

³⁸ Law on Forests, Wildlife, and Fisheries, Republic of Cameroon, January 20th 1994


³⁹ This shortcoming raises questions on the feasibility of zoning in “an area like southeaster Cameroon, where people live in the forest that is a continuum consisting of farmlands, and hunting, fishing and gathering fields connected by a network of trails” (Njounan Tegemo et al., 2012:49).

72 Results

zone (see Infobox 11). The management plan for UFA 10-063 states that "notwithstanding the presence of crops along the road Kika-Nguilili and some cacao plantations at Ngombi, this does not allow for the delimitation of a specific zone" (SIBA, 2003:31). Local accounts confirm the difficulties to exercise customary use rights in LNP's buffer zone (see Chapter 5.3.5).


Infobox 11: UFA Management Plans

Each UFA has to develop an inventory, a schedule and a five- year management plan within the first three years of exploitation. To a great part, the management plans concern conservation issues, such as defining differing quota for each tree species, etc. They also entail a description of the social and economic conditions of adjacent villages and include a division of the UFA into three zones: one, where conventional logging can take place (timber production zone), one where logging is not or only restrictively allowed (conservation areas, e.g. a 5km zone along the national park's border, or around a cave hosting certain bat species in a UFA in the south of the park); and a third "agroforestry zone", where logging is not allowed, as it has been used for agriculture by the local population prior to the establishment of the UFA (agroforestry zones).



Map 8: Subsistence activities of villagers from Libongo - participatory mapping

Source: Centre pour l'Éducation, la Formation et l'Appui aux Initiatives de Développement au Cameroun (CEFAID), MINFOF Cameroon and WRI, own data – satellite data: Sentinel2 scene from 2018-02-05 (ESA) – CRS: WGS84 UTM zone 33N



5.2.4 Overview Participatory Elements

LNP's management plan and Cameroonian law provide several participatory elements to negotiate and integrate the different stakeholders' positions, interests and needs. These elements not only address local communities, but also private economic actors. Table 5 provides an overview of all these participatory elements (those further explored in bold):

Table 5: Participation in Lobéké National Park and buffer zone		
Participatory element	Target Group	Description
People		
Traditional usage rights	Local population	National legislation on traditional use rights
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)	Baka population/ ASBABUK	Consultation for Baka using core zone (gathering NTFP)
Community zone (inside LNP)	Local population, esp. Baka	NTFP and fishing inside a certain part of the park
Community hunting zone (ZICGC)	Local population/COVAREF	Subsistence hunting and income
Management plans for ZICGC	Local population/COVAREF	Sustainable quotas, divided usage zones, anti-poaching, self-organisation
Territoires de Chasse Communautaire	Communities	No explanation available
System for exploitation of raphia-palm	Local population	Sustainability control
Community forests	Communities	Independent land usage, income from logging
Community projects	Communities	Alternative incomes, basic infrastructure
Common interest groups (GIC)	Local population	Associations promoting economic activities
Ecotourism and research	Local population	Not further specified
Private economic actors		
« Convention de Lutte Anti-Braconnage »	Private sector	Anti-poaching obligations
"Cahiers de charge"	Safari companies	Anti-poaching obligations
Management plans/ five-year plans	Logging companies	Sustainable logging, anti- poaching, designation of agroforestry zones, customary usage rights
Annual Forestry Fee	Logging companies, communities	Distribution of annual forestry fees to state and communities
Mambélé Convention	Safari companies, local population	Dispute settlement between safari companies/ local population
"Comité Paysan-Foret"	Logging companies, local population	Represent popular interest to logging companies
Multi-stakeholder platforms		
Various Platforms	State actors, Private sector	Alignment of strategies
Source: own illustration based on MINFOF, 2014		

5.2.5 Participatory Mechanisms controlled by Park Management

Several participatory mechanisms are mainly controlled by the park management and, in theory, provide spaces for dialogue and joint management of natural resources: multi-stakeholder platforms, employment opportunities for locals, a community zone inside the park and a recently passed Memorandum of Understanding between TNS park authorities and local Baka groups. While information on these mechanisms and their implementation is scarce and little information could be obtained in the field, this sub- chapter seeks to provide a short description and assessment of these mechanisms.

Multi-stakeholder platforms

The management plan foresees three administrative multi-stakeholder platforms (MINFOF, 2014:149): the 'Comité de gestion', which brings together different ministries to align actions, the 'Comité consultatif local', which rallies local ministry representatives (COVAREF and certain local office holders participate), and the 'Comité scientifique et technique', which aims at providing external expertise.⁴⁰

Despite these laudable efforts to increase dialogue and collaboration of different stakeholders, the platforms only meet irregularly or have never met. Furthermore, some stakeholders are excluded from these platforms. For example, while the first two platforms involve several ministries, they do not include the Ministry of Social Affairs (MINAS), which represents indigenous peoples and other vulnerable groups. Its inclusion could strengthen the voice of indigenous people and provide required expertise on projects addressing them. In addition, no platform gives local village leaders the opportunity to gather and meet with the park management – even though they appear to be very interested in dialogue. During this research, for example, representatives of villages, community forests, COVAREF, and others were invited to Mambélé to discuss the study's results in a joint stakeholder workshop. No monetary or other economic incentive for participation was provided (apart from the provision of transport and accommodation costs), yet every invited person took great efforts to participate, and most of them did so actively. The successful implementation of this workshop hints at the different stakeholders' interest in dialogue and proves the feasibility of organising such meetings. This potential should be further developed (see recommendation Nr. 4.4 in Table 18 in Annex 14 for more details).

⁴⁰ The research was also informed about a 'plateforme de concertation' (coordination platform) allegedly bringing together local mayors and the private sector, but no further information could be obtained

Employment by park management

Few local employees are engaged in the maintenance of park facilities, and sporadically, locals are employed as guides and porters for inventories, ecotourism or anti-poaching patrols. Apart from these rather scarce employment opportunities, however, the local population is not involved in the park's monitoring, surveillance or awareness raising activities. Plans of the park management to increase employments opportunities through ecotourism have not been actualised. As a result, epistemic participation remains low: a committed and sustained integration of local and indigenous workforce and knowledge has not been realised (Mwenge and Mukumo, 2015) (also see Chapter 5.1.5 and Chapter 5.3.4).

Community zone inside LNP

An early attempt to increase participation was the establishment of a user-organized community zone inside the national park (see Map 4), where adjacent communities are allowed to fish, harvest and collect plants as long as they do not threaten conservation goals (MINFOF, 2014:57).

While laudable in theory, the community zone has failed to provide notable benefits to local communities. The major reason for its inefficacy is its lack of access.

First, local villagers must request authorisation to access the zone, and they can only do so at the park's headquarter near Mambélé. Many villagers, however, live far away from Mambélé and lack means of transport. It is difficult if not impossible for them to request authorisation. Second, the authorisation is only valid for two weeks, while some families need to spend several weeks in the forest. Third, the authorisation can only be obtained against a fee of XAF 5.000-10.000, different for Baka and Bantu (C₄; F₁₈; F₁₈). This fee is not foreseen in the management plan, and villagers deem it unfair and unjustifiably high (C₃; F₆). Fourth, the community zone is situated in the far west of the park. However, participatory mapping (see Map 13) has shown that settlements in the north, south and east of the park also depend on resources available inside the community zone. The current siting of the zone is too far away from them, and they do not benefit from its existence. Fifth, access to the zone is denied for a long period of time for conservation reasons (March – September), while some non-timber forest products are only available in specific periods of the year (see Table 13). Furthermore, the zone is supposed to be self-organised by its users (MINFOF, 2014:103), but this is not the case. In total, these points make the community zone non-functional. It is thus rarely (officially) used by villagers (I₁₄, C₁₂, C₂), and

many interviewed villagers do not even know that there is a community zone in LNP (C8; C7; F14; F15).

Memorandum of Understanding

The research team had the opportunity to participate in a meeting on a Memorandum of Understanding (“MoU”) between TNS- park authorities and local Baka groups specifying local access rights to the protected areas of the TNS (M1). After 13 years of discussion, the aim was once more to seek a MoU that both sides were willing to sign. The discussions were particularly enlightening, as they demonstrated the multitude of interests and complexity of debate. On the Baka side, for example, different speakers underlined that unlimited access to “their forest”, including the right to hunt, was of high cultural, spiritual and economic value. The park authorities emphasized the fundamental legal difficulties to allow hunting inside protected areas and expressed concerns about a potential increase of poaching activities (a concern shared by some Baka representatives, I14).

Other mayor points during the discussions illustrate the complexity of debate. For example, both MINAS and WWF representatives pointed out that every local community needed a detailed MoU, including maps of usage zones, to adequately protect different customary use. WWF further emphasized that additional MoUs between the private sector and local communities were required. The LNP conservator stated that autochthonous Bantu also needed access to forest resources and that a MoU exclusively for Baka risked exacerbating ethnic conflict.

Despite these contentions, the MoU has eventually been signed in February 2019, “granting [Baka] greater access rights and joint management of the national parks” (WWF, 2019). Unfortunately, at time of writing, the written MoU for LNP is not available to the public and it remains unclear which rights have been granted and how they will be implemented. Notwithstanding, the lengthy continuous discussions around the MoU demonstrate the commitment of both sides to reach compromise, and the founder of the Baka NGO OKANI underlined that verbal dialogue was extremely important for local Baka groups, not least because most of them were illiterate (I1).

5.2.6 Participatory Mechanisms in Management of Buffer Zone

There are several participatory mechanisms provided by the management plan and the Cameroonian forest law that seek to strengthen the financial, economic and political integration of local stakeholders in natural resource management in the park’s buffer zone. These include the redistribution of annual forestry fees

from logging companies, a collaborative convention between local communities and private companies (“Mambélé Convention”), and the direct management of forest resources and revenues by local communities through community hunting zones, community forests, and carbon zones.

Redistribution of Annual Forestry Fees

According to the Cameroonian forest law, revenues from the forestry sector (annual forest fees) should be distributed amongst the state and local communities (see Infobox 12).

Following the limited information obtainable on site, the taxes from the timber companies are paid from their headquarters in Douala to the state in Yaoundé. The part dedicated to local communities is then channelled to local councils in Lobéké (I6; I12; I22; I25). Following a senior forest officer of WWF Cameroon, the revenue sharing mechanism is overly complicated and does not work well in practice (P5). This might explain why none of the park officials nor company representatives were able to explain how it works in practice (I6; I12; I 22; I25). Clear answers to questions on revenue shares were avoided and the research team was referred to the ministries in Yaoundé or the forest companies’ headquarters in Douala (I6; I12; I25). The mechanism appears to not only lack transparency but also local legitimacy, as illustrated by discussions during a community meeting: participants called the distribution-committee of forestry revenues ('comité des redevances forestières') a „bureau phantom“ (C6).

Infobox 12: Revenue sharing in the Cameroonian Forest Sector

Circulaire n°001/C/MINFI determines that the annual forestry revenues are equally distributed between the State (50%) and the beneficiary communities (50%). The community’s share is then re-distributed between fiscal administration (for administration costs), FEICOM (Special Council Support Fund for Mutual Assistance) and the local communities. One quarter of the share attributed to local communities (6.75 %) is exclusively allocated to development projects carried out by residents.

One reason for this negative assessment by locals is given by a 2015 study on forest revenue redistribution mechanisms in Yokadouma council: local communities are sidelined by a “complex and long administrative transfer

process” that is “entirely opaque” (Assembe Mvondo et al., 2015: 16ff).⁴¹ As a result, villagers have “no access to information about the true amounts due to them, the disbursement dates or the future use of the revenue” (ibidem).

Mambélé Convention

Another mechanism to increase local economic involvement via benefit-sharing is “The convention de collaboration pour la gestion durable de la faune sauvage” (“Mambélé convention”) signed by local communities, safari hunting companies and the forest administration in 2007. It defines a basic understanding on a participatory management of fauna resources in the south-east of Cameroon. More specifically, it tries to negotiate conflicts of interest between safari and logging companies and the local population on the exploitation of wildlife (MINFOF 2015: 200; Yanggen, 2010: 57). The convention includes the agreement on joint financing of anti-poaching operations, the sharing of game meat by safari companies, and the provision of waste wood to local communities by logging companies.

Research participants recall the agreement in a positive manner but claim that it did not work well anymore (F12, I5, I12). Representatives of MINFOF and WWF in Yaoundé also raised concerns about its proper functioning (E112; E13). This was mainly due to two reasons: first, actors present today (e.g. Mayo Oldiri and Pepe Safari companies) were not signatories of the agreement, as concessionaires changed with time. Second, the spirit of cooperation seems to have diminished. Participants claimed that private companies only partly honour the convention’s commitments. Following local accounts, not all safari companies shared the meat of game with communities and the provision of timber for charcoal production has reportedly ceased (C5; C7; C8; F12, P56).

Community hunting zones and COVAREF

Following conflicts between local communities and safari companies during the late nineties (Neubauer, 2014:221), the park management, assisted by WWF, GTZ and MINFOF, established five community hunting zones (Zones d’intérêt

⁴¹ The study explains the workings of the transfer of annual forestry fees to local communities as such: “[T]he administrative services responsible for its management [...] are at the central level in the Nation’s capital city, Yaoundé. Checks bearing the various amounts earmarked for councils and local communities are sent to the paymasters of each regional capital. The Yokadouma Council have to collect their checks at the regional capital of Bertoua 300 km away,[...]. The specified amount is then transferred to the council accounts, which are managed by the mayor and the council treasurer, with assistance from a council Forest Revenue Management Committee” (Assembe Mvondo et al., 2015: 16ff).

cynégétique à gestion communautaire, ZICGC) that are under direct management of local communities (see Map 6). The experimental and new approach of community managed hunting zones seeks to include locals in the sustainable management of faunal resources. Local communities are allowed to use the ZICGC for subsistence hunting and to generate revenues e.g. through income from lease (I9, I5, I10, P96). Since 2008, three community wildlife resource valorisation committees, known as COVAREF (“Comités de Valorisation des Ressources Fauniques”), serve as local management structures of these community hunting zones. They decide on their utilization and control revenues (MINFOF, 2014:5; E13). Furthermore, the COVAREF are supposed to support community development projects and engage in conflict resolution and anti-poaching activities through COVILAB (see Infobox 9). In LNP’s buffer zone, all ZICGC are leased to professional safari companies.

Administrative Organisation

Within the COVAREF, decisions are taken by a general assembly of volunteers whose members are proposed by traditional chiefs and subsequently elected by the communities (I10). The chiefs and some other authorities are entitled to participate (I5). All villages are represented proportional to their size (1000 inhabitants - 2 delegates, 5000 inhabitants - 4 delegates). There is a 15 % quota for women and Baka (I10). However, a primary education level is required to partake in the COVAREF. A representative of each COVAREF is a member of multi-stakeholder platforms foreseen in the management plan (MINFOF, 2014:159).

The research team spoke to representatives of all three COVAREF that manage four ZICGC (Nr. 1,2,8 and 9) around LNP. They are centred around the villages of their respective presidents in Koumela (N°1), Mbateka Ndyong (N°2) and Kika (N°3) and not around their officially registered office, which might be due to the influence of their presidents (I5, I10, C5).

In total, all three COVAREFs around the park generated annual revenues from lease tax (“taxe d’affermage”) of XAF 29.088.220 (€~44.000) in 2015 (MINFOF, 2015: 159), excluding their 10% share of felling tax (“taxe d’abatage”).

Name	Official base	General assembly	Population	ZICGC with safari
N°1 (Salokomo)	Salapoumbé	24 (9 Baka, 5 women)	(?)	1 Mayo Oldiri
N°2 (Boumba- Ndjombi)	Moloundou	52 (10 women, 2 Baka)	13 villages 12.000 people	2 Mayo Oldiri
N°3 (Ndjombo-Bolo)	Kika	24 (9 Baka, 5 women)	(?)	3 Pepe Safari

Source: MINFOF, 2014:49; own data


Problems

The local population's access to the community hunting zones (ZICGC) is restricted. Reportedly, safari companies renting these zones hinder the local villagers from subsistence hunting, even though this was the primary goal of the zones, as a former Chef de Mission of WWF at LNP criticized (Pg6). Following another WWF- employee, the sport- hunters, mostly operating around the forest "bais" where hunting success is greater, defend their interest against local hunters as they feel they paid for it (I19).

According to the Management Plan, it is foreseen to delimit micro-zones (one for safaris and one for subsistence hunting) inside the ZICGCs (see Map 10) and to set up a participative management system for subsistence hunting that includes a code of conduct, and hunters' interest groups (MINFOF, 2014:128). Additionally, the COVAREF should authorize the hunting of a big mammal for Baka cultural rites every 2-3 years and take this into account in their quota management. At this point in time, none of these steps have been taken (COVAREF N°1 and N°3). The president of COVAREF N°3 said that it was up to MINFOF to start the process (I5).

Restricted access is not the only problem reported by villagers. A frequent complaint was that there were no hunttable animals in the vicinity of the villages anymore (C7, F10). Stakeholders are aware of the problem, but the exact reason for this development is unknown: it might be that the pressure from hunting drives the animals into the hinterland or that the animals are reducing in numbers despite conservation efforts (C2, I19). The consequence of this development is that villagers must go far to find game, and often penetrate further into the

concessions behind their agroforestry zone (UFA and ZIC). They overhunt species (hunting pregnant and small animals), which affects quotas for the safari companies, and increases potential for conflict.



Another problem haunting COVAREFs is non- transparency and lack of control. Reportedly, the feeling tax ('taxe d'abbatage') is not always paid and revenues do not reach local communities.

As far as this research is informed, the COVAREF do not publicly account for their activities. A WWF volunteer of the park management's participation unit reports that local communities frequently complain about quality and quantity of revenues they receive from the ZICGC (P27). During some focus group discussions and interviews, the COVAREF delegates were accused of misbehaviour (C2, F8). Representatives of the COVAREF N°2 stated that their revenues were used for

84 Results

hydraulic energy projects, classrooms and teachers' wages, two birth centers, a pharmacy, a hospital for Baka, the reconstruction of a church, the acquisition of tools such as chainsaws, machetes, and generators, and support for handicapped people, orphans and Baka children (15). The research team, however, was only able to detect one school building financed by the COVAREF N°2. This observation seems to confirm complaints that financial means of the COVAREFs are not invested in community development (see Image 12) and have gone astray.



Image 12: School classroom in Zenga

Photo: PhotoVoice participant (Bantu, farmer, female) (PV 16)

The picture was taken in Zenga. The photo voice participant describes that the village school building is in a bad state, as water leaks into the classroom through the roof. The leaks have existed for three years already. *"The COVAREF is aware of the problem but does not provide any money for repairs"*.

Some communities are situated very far from the ZICGCs. Libongo, for example, has no own ZICGC and is part of the COVAREF N°1 in Salapoumbé whose president lives in Koumela. The distance (~75km road) combined with the lack of network coverage make it difficult to influence and control decisions taken by their COVAREF. Another complaint is that all COVAREF- meetings are held at the park's headquarter in Mambélé, which makes it difficult for most members of the general assemblies to participate and to exert control (15).

Furthermore, there are only few Baka representatives in the COVAREF, and some Baka complained that only Bantu profited from the revenues controlled by the COVAREF (F17, Image 13 and Image 14). The lack of support by the COVAREF for Baka communities was also criticized by a study of Neubeuer: "[The] projects of Baka are barely considered. Here again, the main problem is the refusal of the Government of Cameroon to recognize the settlements of the Baka as villages. [Baka settlements] are considered part of the Bantu villages and are thus subordinate to the respective Bantu chiefs, who "represent" them. Consequently, the Baka communities get nothing from the revenues derived" (2014:223f; own translation).




Image 13: COVAREF project budget

Photo: PhotoVoice participant (Baka, farmer, male) (PV17)

The participant took the picture at a COVAREF meeting in Mambélé. It shows a project budget that does not include the "Baka project" in Dioula: a water pump, livestock and farming equipment. In September 2017, the three presidents of the COVAREF met with representatives of the Baka-NGO OKANI and promised to implement the project, yet nothing happened. The participant says that there is only one Baka in the administration of the COVAREF and their interests are too often disregarded.

The park management is aware of the dysfunctionality of the COVAREF (I19). However, it seems that all responsibility is shifted upon the communities. Following the WWF Community Coordination Officer, the park management wanted the communities to find their own solution to their problems (I19). The conservator said that it was the COVAREF's decision to renew the contracts with

the safari companies, and it was their decision whether to open a zone for subsistence hunting or not (I39). Similar statements were made by the Unit Head of Finance and Administration (P25). Simultaneously, he stressed the fact that it was the park management that started the whole process, that it constituted an exemplary participatory process, and that the management collaborated with the COVAREF almost daily (P25). However, some voices inside the park management doubt that the communities can respond to the problems (I17, I39).

Community forests

Certain areas of the non-permanent forest zone (ca. 5.000 ha) have recently been declared 'community forests' (see Map 3), covered by a management agreement between local communities and forest administration. Locally promoted by WWF and FTNS (I3, I11, I34, P14, C4), the establishment of community forest is in line with promising policy reforms of Cameroon's forest sector aimed at increasing local participation and sustainable forest management (for an assessment of forest management in Cameroon see Buttoud and Nguinguiri, 2016). The main goal of community forests is to enable local communities to generate income by exploiting timber (I19). Evaluating ASDEBYM, a community forest for the Baka communities of Mambélé and Yenga, a WWF Participation staff said: "They have their problems, but at least they have their responsibility. We assist them, as they are beginners" (I19).

Organisation

Following first consultations and subsequent approval by the sub-prefect, the community has to develop a 'simple management plan' which includes regulations on agriculture, cutting of timber for domestic use and subsistence-hunting (P96). A steering board is in charge of the management of the community forests. All members are volunteers and appointed by a local assembly (I11). Once revenues from logging are generated, the steering board decides on projects that will be funded (I34, P47; for a more detailed description of the economic operations inside the community forests and their limitations, see Chapter 5.3.2)

As far as the research team was able to observe, women and Baka are represented in the community forest's steering boards but are mostly staying on the sideline. To counter exclusion and marginalisation, some community forests have been designated for Baka only (e.g. ASDEBYM, and one community forest is said to be currently being created in Mboli (I3)). Women from the NGO WHCS told the research team that WWF proposed to create their own community forest and trains them on timber extraction (F19).

Problems

The three community forests visited left an overall positive impression. The people involved appear to feel empowered and motivated. Other community forests, however, face severe management problems (C₄). Besides limited control of decisions and spending (F₄) and a dominant role of the presidents, Baka in Mambélé reported to be denied free access to their own community forest by neighbouring villages (C₃).

Baka communities appear to have more (economic) problems with their community forests (I₁). One reason might be that many “aspects of community forests are inconsistent with livelihoods and resources of indigenous people, such as the emphasis on small-scale timber production or administrative structures that conflict with traditional forms of land use” (Topa et al., 2009:99). A study by Neubeuer emphasizes that the current size of community forests of maximum 50 km² are too small for Baka, who, as acknowledged by official guidelines by Cameroon, require at least 1 km² per inhabitant to contribute to the sustainable management of the forest (Neubauer, 2014: 206 ff).

Many communities do not have their own community forest yet, but this is a consequence of the novelty of the ongoing reform process. Some will face difficulties, as they have no (Zega) or only a restricted agroforestry zone (Bela and Libongo, see Map 15 in Annex 10)⁴².

The limited availability of high- quality agroforestry land has already led to problems in Socambo where the community forest is swampy, has no valuable wood and is difficult to exploit (I₃₄, P₈₂, P₈₃). In general, the siting of the forests is reportedly done in Yaoundé (P₄₇) and does not appear to be well communicated with the respective communities (F₄). For example, most community forests are close to main roads, have agricultural fields inside and were exploited in colonial or early postcolonial times, decreasing their value (P₄₇).

The whole community forest programme is mainly directed from Yokadouma (I₃). While LNP’s management plan mentions community forests as outstanding example of the participatory national forest governance (MINFOF, 2014: 21), the information given is outdated, and no strategy towards assistance or collaboration is pronounced. This is remarkable, especially as the national forest

⁴² Between Nguilili and Ngatongo, there is a community forest (Tola SWE) established inside the permanent forest zone (UFA 10-066). It is unclear if the UFA has been reduced or another solution was found. The proceeding could serve as an example for other villages on the fringes of the agroforestry zone.

code determines that MINFOF must provide community forests with technical advice free of charge.

Carbon zones

There are four 'carbon zones' within four community forests around LNP. This is a recent development: the carbon zone of To'okpwassi was measured while the research group visited the forest. The carbon zones are funded and initiated by FTNS and carried out with a local NGO (I19, P1, P47). In these areas, logging, agriculture and hunting are prohibited, and NTFP collection requires authorization. Reportedly, even footpaths must be rearranged to circumvent the zone (P46). The objective of these carbon zones is to encourage communities to reduce deforestation of their community forests by rewarding associated emissions-reductions via the REDD+ programme.

The steering board of the community forest in Socambo expressed high expectations of REDD+: "(...) people are discouraged to join the community forest, because they don't benefit. Maybe now with the carbon zone, they can profit, and more people will join" (I34). Furthermore, he stated that the remuneration for not cutting the forest constituted a fair conservation strategy. However, he also appeared to be dubious about the "foreign" payment promises and said that some villagers were not willing to accept the prohibition to expand their agricultural fields (I34).

From a perspective of participation and land rights, the carbon zone - project appear to be a double-edged sword. On the one hand, local communities need stable income sources and the conservation of forest resources is in their interest. On the other hand, it was not clear if the delimitations of the zones were specified through thorough and informed consultation. The carbon zones lie within the non-permanent forest zone that is designated for community forests, agriculture and other uses. However, neither agriculture nor timber extraction are allowed within the carbon zones. Hunting is reportedly banned as well, even though it is highly doubtful that subsistence-hunting has a significant impact on the carbon content of biomass. Most importantly, it is far from certain if the REDD+ payments will ever arrive in the respective communities (TAB, 2015). As a result, villagers lose yet another usage zone to conservation without receiving any benefits (P82, P83).



Image 14: Logging truck

Photo: PhotoVoice participant (Baka, Farmer, Male) (PV17)

Following the participant, the depicted truck carries wood from the COVAREF. The participant states that it is only the Bantu community that profits from the COVAREF, as the president of the COVAREF was Bantu. According to him, the Baka should be more involved in management and benefit-sharing.

It appears that neither the redistribution of the annual forestry fee, the Mambélé convention nor the management of forest resources by communities work well in practice.

First, they are not effective: while aiming at contributing to local development and poverty alleviation, there was only little evidence of funded development projects on site. Assessing the impact of revenue-sharing mechanisms on local development in Yokadouma Council, Assembe-Mvondo et al. come to a similar conclusion and remark: “[O]ur results indicate that forest and wildlife revenue redistribution mechanisms are not effective because the objectives of promoting local development, reducing rural poverty and promoting sustainable management of forest resources have not been achieved. Admittedly, some social facilities [...] are positive realizations. But a closer look shows that this is a marginal performance compared to the total revenue generated by the various revenue-sharing mechanisms” (Assembe-Mvondo et al., 2015: 15f).

Second, they are not efficient nor equitable: redistributions are directed to councils or COVAREF and not to the villagers directly, who receive little information about the amounts transferred (Topa et al., 2009: 100f). Many villagers do not even know their delegates at COVAREF or community forest

boards (F₄, F₈). Most of these office holders are part of the local elite, politically well-connected to the ruling political party of Cameroon (RDPC) and local economic actors (P₂₁, I₃₆, P₇₃; see Robillard, 2010: 404ff for a thorough analysis of 'elite capture' around LNP).

Furthermore, it appears that the revenues are not equally shared among Baka and Bantu groups. First, most Baka villages in the area are not officially acknowledged as such and thus do not receive any redistribution (Glory Lueong, personal communication; November 20, 2018; also see Neubauer 2014:223ff). Second, Baka groups claimed to receive less revenues than their Bantu neighbours (PV₁₄, C₁₂, F₄; see Image 13 and Image 14). Third, no important function in village councils, COVAREF and steering boards of community forests is held by a Baka and very few by women. Baka and women rarely finish primary school, and therefore do not satisfy the requirements to partake in the COVAREFs. As a result, the deficient mechanisms "contribute to and reinforce the political and socioeconomic marginalisation of forest minorities such as Pygmies [...] and women" (Assembe-Mvondo et al., 2015: vii).

These two latter points not only underscore the social stratification within villages. They also question popular assumptions about "village communities". Most villages in Cameroon's rainforest zone are made up by different families that were coalesced to villages during colonial times. Hence, Cameroon's "communities" are neither homogenous social entities nor "the kind of resilient social institution that is so often visualized by outsiders as the backbone of community forestry" (Topa et al., 2009: 104). In general, the romantic concept of "community" in the development discourse tends to blind out disparities in views, capacities, influence, cultures, and aspirations (McShane and Wells, 2004: 405), and risks at supporting unequal power relations and social privilege (e.g. patriarchy).

5.2.7 Stakeholders

As the challenges of the participatory mechanisms provided by management plan and Cameroonian plan illustrate, participation of local people requires capacity development, awareness- raising, and integration of a much wider and complex set of stakeholders. The table below gives an overview of different stakeholders that could serve as intermediaries and starting-points for the implementation of the participatory measures by the park management.

Stakeholder	Description	Motivation	Potential
Ministries	MINAS, MINMIDT, MINADER, MINEP, MINEPIA, MINADT	Besides MINFOF, other ministries are not present in LNP's buffer zone. However, MINAS appears to be interested in promoting own activities in the area, if international support, capacity building and financial means were available	MINAS is officially responsible for the assistance to IP in Cameroon, but not well funded. MINADT's assistance is responsible for any change of zoning and the creation of new (Baka) chieftaincies. MINADER would be the prime partner for promotion of alternative livelihoods.
Prefects	Upholding state authority in Salapoumbé and Moloundou	Fight against armed poachers; secure border zones	Can request local military to abide by human rights; can support anti-poaching measures in the area and inside their own ranks
Mayors	Salapoumbé and Moloundou; elected by population; receive the forestry and hunting redistributions of national concessions; decide on investments	Want to be re-elected; would like to receive the full share of forestry and hunting revenues for their communities	They are well connected to local power elites and fully understand relations on the ground; starting point of any initiative on better redistribution policy
Village chiefs	Represent the traditional ethnic identity groups (autochthonous Bantu); however, their power on their population is limited; officially, they are present in many decision bodies	Improving living conditions of 'their' villages would meet villager's expectations and strengthen their authority and local legitimacy	The village-chiefs are the representatives with most knowledge on specific village- and household-needs; they are important partners for community projects; they only partly represent Baka and immigrants though and tend to disregard them
Private actors	Logging, trophy hunting and mining enterprises. Economically the strongest actors in LNP's buffer zone	Are by law obliged to pay a certain share of their taxes and to provide assistance to community projects; also have to contribute to conservation efforts	If put under international attention, adherence to social and ecological laws and standards could be improved; the participatory renewal of management plans and internal zoning is very important to secure local usage rights
International development cooperation	For quite some time mostly German, French and US-American	The willingness to support conservation efforts in the region is manifest as they	As WWF, Cameroonian ministries and private enterprises seem unable,

92 Results

	development cooperation has been present in the area (see Robillard, 2010: 229ff). At present, there is no international involvement in local development apart from WWF and FTNS	helped set up national parks in southeast Cameroon. The willingness to accompany these efforts with development activities seems to have decreased	unwilling and/or overstrained with the task to provide basic infrastructure and socio-economic support to local communities, international development cooperation could help with integrating development and conservation efforts
International IP NGOs	Rainforest Foundation, Forest Peoples Programme, Survival International	Want to provide assistance and secure rights of the Baka as part of international lobbying for IPs	Provide an external actor for Baka to assert their positions; may provide funding for national and local IP organisations; could serve as counterweight but ideally also as partner for WWF
National indigenous people NGO's	CEFAID, CED	Fight for land tenure and usage rights of different IPs in Cameroon	Know the Cameroonian context and are actively engaged in national campaigns for law reforms, memorandums of understanding, etc..; served as incubators for the local Baka associations and provide assistance. Lack capacity and do not always meet the expectations
Local Baka organisations	ASBABUK (Association Sanguia baka Buma'a Kpode), OKANI	Foster the formation of local Baka associations; Try to provide platforms for the discussion and formulation of Baka positions and needs; serve as partners in agreements with the park management representing the local Baka; act as partners for international or national development (e.g. usage zone mapping) and cooperate with national or international organisations to spread awareness about the local (indigenous) population's conditions and challenges	In absence of any official political representation of the Baka, these organisations are important as advocates of Baka rights; most members and founders are Baka themselves; also engage in attempts to maintain Baka culture
Common Initiative	Associations exist for fishermen, cacao	They are a part of a Cameroonian strategy to	They lack any external funding and are in need of

groups (French: GIC)	farmers, charcoal producers, etc. ⁴³	enable, empower and organize small-scale producers.	technical training and other support; they could serve as starting points for the support of alternative livelihoods
Religious groups	Catholic church, protestant churches, Muslim communities	The catholic church is quite present in the area and maintains a hospital in Salapoumbé- Every village has small churches of different denominations and many bigger settlements have small mosques.	The catholic church was one of the first and most important actor in attempts to settle the Baka; many Baka are going to church regularly; pastors of all denominations are respected by villagers; most immigrants are Muslims from northern areas of the country or Central Africa, and local mosques might be a good partner for integration efforts
Source: own illustration based on insights drawn from literature and own data			

⁴³ see Robillard, 2010: 287ff for an extensive examination of the diverse associations active around LNP

5.3 Livelihoods

Research Questions

What are the current livelihood strategies of the local population and how are alternatives promoted by the park management (and other stakeholders)?

The integration of local livelihood needs is central to Common Pool Resource Governance. On the one hand, livelihood needs drive unauthorised resource use – on the other, conservation often harms local livelihoods and induces suffering. Understanding the socio- economic context and impact of conservation is not only a moral prerequisite, but also instrumental for designing policy responses that increase the potential of local cooperation.

The aim of the chapter is to provide the reader with an overview of the current livelihood strategies of residents of Lobéké National Park, to display existing challenges and to point out possible areas of further involvement. The chapter starts with a description of the different livelihood activities of local communities and examines their main and minor income sources. Hereafter, it explores potential alternative livelihood strategies, formal employment opportunities and related impediments. It examines restrictions on resource access and use in the park's buffer zone and looks at the provision of basic infrastructure by both the park management and private companies.

This study's findings are in line with previous studies that highlight the dependency of the local population from forest resources to satisfy basic livelihood needs (Tieguhong and Nkamgnia, 2012; Sayer et al. 2016). Alarmingly, local communities adjacent to the park face severe restrictions in access and use of forest resources, especially in its buffer zone. As alternative livelihood strategies are barely provided, local poverty is exacerbated. Basic infrastructure (roads, water, hospitals) is not developed, worsening the living conditions of the local population.

5.3.1 Livelihood Activities of the Local Population

Following official accounts, 23.245⁴⁴ inhabitants, belonging to two main ethnic groups (Baka and Bantu), were living in Lobéké's buffer zone in 2012 (MINFOF, 2014). The local population ekes out a living through subsistence farming, fishing, hunting, and, to varying degrees, small-scale commerce.

Following a study by Tieguhong and Nkamgnia in 2012, the average per capita annual income of in total 111 households in five villages⁴⁵ located in LNP's buffer zone is USD 147/year. This figure is far below the national per capita income of USD 803/year (FAO, 2005), illustrating the population's severe poverty.

Main livelihood activities of Baka and Bantu groups

Traditionally, Baka people are hunter and gatherers and rely on the consumption of bushmeat and the collection of Non-Timber-Forest-Products (NTFPs). However, agricultural activities appear to play an increasingly prominent role. Following local accounts and observations, Baka are mainly cultivating annual crops, such as cassava, taro/yam, corn, plantain, but also perennial crops such as cacao, the main cash crop in the area (F3; F9; C7). Local Bantu populations appear to be predominantly engaged in agriculture and husbandry (goats, sheep, and poultry; to a lesser extent, pigs and cattle) (F11; F21). Fishing appears to constitute an important food and income source for both Baka and Bantu, too, especially for communities close to the Sangha and Ngoko rivers (Libongo, Socambo, Kika, Moloundou) (C7; C9; C10) but also for communities fishing in smaller rivers within the forest (F7; C11; F3).

⁴⁴ This figure might be incorrect, as the last official census was done 2005: http://www.ceped.org/ireda/inventaire/ressources/cmr-2005-rec_v4.7_repertoire_actualise_villages_cameroun.pdf

Since then, all data is based on projections of population growth, that do not account for the influx of war refugees from neighbouring countries.

⁴⁵ The five communities were Zenga (PK 14), Socambo, Mambélé, Koumela, Libongo. The study team collected data in all these villages, too.



Image 15: Forest

Photo: PhotoVoice Participant (Farmer, Baka, female, 20 years old) (PV20)

The participant took a picture of the forest. She says that she likes the forest because here they can find everything they need: NTFPs like koko, honey, plantains, njangsa, yams, and also bushmeat. " *We eat some and we sell some as well*"



Image 16: Farming Plot

Photo: PhotoVoice participant (Farmer, Bantu, Female, 38 years old) (PV16)

The participant likes this picture, because farming is a way to generate income. She plants several crops on her field: manioc, papaya and banana. Some of the harvest she keeps for consumption, the other part she sells to people in the village or people passing by. If she could invest money, she would plant macabo, cacao, sugar cane and pineapple and extend the size of the plot.



Image 17: Cassava plantation in Libongo

Source: Tobias Beyer

These findings are in line with a study conducted by FTNS in 2018 that investigated the socio-economic situation of the population in seven villages around LNP (FTNS, 2018)⁴⁶. The study's results relating to the main sources of income for Baka and Bantu are shown in Figure 9 and Figure 10.

⁴⁶ A study by Tieguhong and Nkamgnia in 2012 on livelihood portfolios of over 100 households in LNP's buffer zone provides similar numbers. Following their analysis, forest products (timber, bushmeat, and NTFPs) contribute largely to the annual household income (44,4%), followed by agriculture (18,3%) and livestock (10,2%). Fishing contributes only little to the household's income (3,3%), and artisanal mining is almost negligible (0,5%). Of more relevance are small-scale businesses (8,4%), wages from employment (7,1%), and other income sources such as remittances, gifts and support by the government or NGOs (7,8%) (Tieguhong and Nkamgnia, 2012).




Figure 9: Main income sources for Baka in the Lobéké National Park periphery

Source: FTNS, 2018




Figure 10: Main income sources for Bantu in the Lobéké National Park periphery

Source: FTNS, 2018

As shown in the figures, the income from hunting, or in other words from bushmeat trade, plays an important role, especially for Baka groups (30%). The data gathered in the present study supports this evaluation (F9; PV7; PV20). Looking at the presented figure, however, the presented share of 9% of revenues from hunting for local Bantu groups strikes to be too low⁴⁷. Following discussion with Baka groups in Mambélé and Ndongo, Bantu groups make use of the Baka’s

⁴⁷ This impression was also supported by Dr. Glory Lueong (Glory Lueong, personal communication, November 20, 2018)

knowledge of forest animals by hiring them for (illegal) hunting activities (F₂, F₉). The same has been stated by several experts (E1₁₄; E1₁; E1₃; E1₄; E1₈).

Despite its significance for local people's livelihoods, the sale of bushmeat is illegal without a licence (see Infobox 8 and Table 4). According to a Cameroonian GIZ employee with years of experience in the study area, it was illusionary to keep people from hunting and to prevent them from selling bushmeat (E1₁). While partial legalization by offering sales permits was the right response, the administrative process to obtain a license should be designed more practically and equitably (E1₁). However, possible impacts on wildlife need to be considered carefully, i.e. legalization should be restricted to common, fast-breeding species to adhere to conservation goals.



Image 18: Selling Bushmeat

Photo: PhotoVoice Participant (Student, Baka, Female) (PV7)

This picture shows a woman selling game that she hunted. The participant likes the picture because it shows how meat can be sold to earn money for soaps, books, pens, etc. People along the street buy it from them. When people do not buy it, they will eat it themselves.

Other livelihood activities

Other, minor income sources of the local population are charcoal production, working as harvest hand, small-scale commerce, and artisanal mining.

Charcoal is produced in Libongo, where villagers are organized in a cooperative called COLIDESA. They used to have free access to leftovers of the forest company, SEFAC-group. Since the new SEFAC management started charging for

100 Results

leftovers, it has become more difficult for COLIDESA members to produce charcoal (F12). To ensure the continuation of this reasonable utilization of residuals, the forest companies should be obliged to share their left-overs with the local population for free. This was initially agreed upon in the Mambélé convention, which needs to be renegotiated.



Image 19: Hired Baka during Cocoa harvest

Photo: Tobias Beyer

Many Baka are working on the fields of Bantu, helping with cleaning and harvesting or watching over the farm to keep wild animals away. They earn between XAF 500 and 1.000 per day, which is the equivalent of € 0,76 and € 1,53 or USD 0,86 and USD 1,73⁴⁸. It was also reported that farmers do not collaborate with Baka long-term, but exchange employees on a daily basis (P45; F14).

⁴⁸ This is below the World Bank's definition of extreme poverty of USD 1,90 per day <https://www.worldbank.org/en/understanding-poverty>

Additionally, people own small shops and act as middlemen in the region by buying agricultural products from farmers. Most of these traders are Muslim immigrants from Cameroon's northern regions, and few are local Bantu, while Baka are not involved in these activities (PV5; PV17; P99; P100; F19).



Image 20: Local Shop

Photo: PhotoVoice Participant (Farmer, Baka, Male, 34 years) (PV17)

The participant took a picture of a local shop. He likes it, because shops have a lot of products that he and other Baka can buy, for example pens and notebooks. All shops in Dioula are owned by Muslims from the North. He says that he can do good business with them.

Furthermore, artisanal mining is practiced by around 300 people around Mongokélé (I37). It is illegal and does not constitute a reliable and established income source. Notwithstanding, it is likely that more people will engage in artisanal and small-scale mining in the future, as alternative livelihood activities are rare. The continuous criminalisation and marginalisation of small-scale mining entails uncontrolled mining practices that are harmful to the environment, e.g. the utilization of chemicals, as well as a lack of legal protection of miners. Therefore, an additional study should investigate the consequences of a potential

102 Results

legalisation of artisanal mining, putting a special focus on the impact on ecosystem services and biodiversity. Following WWF guidelines within the ASM-PACE programme⁴⁹, the introduction of responsible mining techniques might minimize harmful environmental impacts (WWF, 2012; also see Africa Mining Vision 2009 on how best to integrate artisanal mining in local development plans (African Union, 2009).

5.3.2 Potential Alternative Income opportunities

Timber Extraction in Community Forests

Community forests are managed by local communities and constitute an attempt to increase local participation in forest governance (see Chapter 5.2.6) and to provide additional income. Income can either be generated by (1) the sale of timber or (2) the establishment of a carbon zone. The latter is a relatively new project linked to REDD+, and participating communities have not received payments for their carbon zones yet (P83; I34) (see Chapter 5.2.6). This alternative approach of valorisation of forest resources can be a powerful instrument to support conservation efforts while simultaneously providing an additional income source for local people, and should be pursued further. However, the sharing of those revenues must be organized equitably, so that all villagers can benefit.

The sale of timber is a more established and direct way of income generation. To ensure sustainable timber extraction, a management plan of the forest area must regulate the harvest of trees. In Socambo, it was reported that FTNS supported the development of a “simple management plan” (I34), while in other community forests such plans were not known (e.g. Dioula) (P107). This is problematic, as a lack of knowledge and control might result in overexploitation of forest resources.

In terms of income generation, the main problem of community forests in LNP’s buffer zone is the timber extraction itself. Heavy machinery, such as chain saws, skidders, trucks or sawmills, is often lacking. As a result, income cannot be generated on a bigger scale. In addition, timber does not have the required quality for commercialization and is normally only used for house constructions in the village.

In light of these difficulties, the community forest of Dioula has started to collaborate with a company based in Yaoundé, which provides a portable sawmill

⁴⁹ Artisanal and Small-scale Mining (ASM) in and around Protected Areas and Critical Ecosystems (PACE)

that cuts trees on the spot. It remained unclear how much influence the company exerts upon the management of the community forest, and how much revenue eventually stays within the village (P107).

Other community forests hope to collaborate with logging companies to improve timber extraction and to gain revenues through profit-sharing (P83). While profit-sharing might not be fairly negotiated, a small communal logging enterprise could create a much-needed employment opportunity for the local population. However, forest companies are not necessarily interested in such a joint venture, as many community forests are on terrain that was either already exploited or is difficult to access (P83).

To unlock the income potential of timber extraction and to decrease the communities' dependency on external partners, community forests should be supported with the development of sustainable management plans and access to harvest machinery.

Commercialization of Cacao

Cacao is the main cash crop in the area and has the potential to provide a significant (alternative) income source for the population⁵⁰. In addition, a cacao plantation is an agroforestry system that integrates big shade trees and is more biodiverse than any other agricultural cultivation (Schroth & Harvey, 2007). Hence, an increase in cacao plantations can potentially support conservation efforts.

However, many locals cannot afford to establish a cacao farm (F21; P44; P88). Cacao plantations require high initial investment (e.g. land) and costly maintenance⁵¹. Required inputs like fungicides, seedlings, and fertiliser are relatively expensive, and rates of return are quite low, as it takes three to five years to yield the first harvest. Lack of knowledge and skills are other factors that discourage local farmers from engaging in cacao cultivation. In general, it is easier for Bantu to engage in cacao production than for Baka, since the former usually have better access to capital and land.

In order to increase the potential of cacao farms, it is advisable to provide micro-funding mechanisms to help poorer farmers with the initial investment, and to

⁵⁰ XAF 500-1.000 per kg (€ 0,76-1,52 per kg) with a harvest of 1.000-2.000 kg/ha depending on the variety (F21; P44; P88)

⁵¹ To buy pesticides and to clear ground vegetation, costing around XAF 35.000 ha/year, depending on the level of grass (F21)

104 Results

provide more trainings on sustainable agroforestry practices such as the ones by the World Agroforestry Centre (ICRAF, financed by FTNS)⁵². An ICRAF- expert emphasized that these trainings require long-term commitment in order to be successful (EI10).



Image 21: Cacao Harvest

Photo: PhotoVoice Participant (Farmer, Bantu, Female, 38 years) (PV 16)

The participant took a picture of her cacao harvest. She likes this picture because by selling the harvest she can earn enough money to send her children to school. She harvests the cacao fruits four times per year. Buyers come to the village from Kika and/or Moloundou and pay around 550 XAF per kg. The cacao plot she cultivates belongs to her parents.

⁵² "Promoting sustainable agriculture in the perspective of a REDD+ project around Lobéké and Dzanga Ndoki national parks" (Jan 2017- Sept 2018)



Image 22: Cacao Field

Photo: PhotoVoice Participant (Farmer, Baka, Male, 45 years) (PV18)

The participant took a picture of a cacao field. He says that the cacao is ready to be harvested. "It helps us to send our children to school, to build houses". The people who buy the cacao come directly to the producers; there is no fix timing. One kilo of cacao costs 600 XFA. He explains: "The price is low because roads are bad. That reduces the price".

Commercialization of Non-Timber-Forest-Products

As numerous experts remarked, the commercialization of Non-Timber-Forest-Products (NTFPs) has potential to constitute another relevant, alternative income source for local communities (E19; E11; E10). The majority of local people collects them (I34; F19; F9; C10; C11). The most commonly gathered NTFPs are koko (*Gnetum spp.*), bush mango (*Irvingia gabonensis*), djansang (*Ricinodendron heudelotii*), wild pepper (*Piper guineensis*), pepe (*Monodora myristica*, common name: calabash nutmeg), mbalaka (*Pentaclethra macrophylla*, common name: African Oil bean tree), tondo (*Aframomum spp.*), rondelle, kanda, and ebaye. Most important for personal use are koko and bush mango, and the latter and djansang are the most commercialized NTFPs. During a workshop on the collection and utilization of NTFPs with the women's association Or-Vert in Mambélé the

research team developed a seasonal calendar displaying collection periods for the respective NTFPs (see Table 12 and Table 12 in Annex 12).



Image 23: Women collecting Non-Timber-Forest-Products near Dioula

Photo: PhotoVoice participant (Farmer, Baka, female, 20 years old) (PV20)

This picture was taken by a Baka woman. The women are harvesting Djansang, which they use to make soup and to earn money by selling some. They go to the farm together to harvest the NTFP and sell it to Bantu. Following the participant, it was very difficult to harvest Djansang, and the Bantu did not buy at a reasonable price: a bucket is sold for 500frs and when the Bantu take it to town, they make a profit of XAF 4.000.

The NTFPs are in high demand in countries of West Africa, and Cameroon is already involved in their export (Awono et al., 2016). However, profitable value chains, including processing and reliable commercialisation systems, need to be investigated and established further, so that people in LNP's buffer zone can be integrated (El9; El10). The local NGO AFEBEN, based in Yokadouma, is involved in the promotion of NTFPs and should be supported in its activities.

NTFPs might not only provide income, but also decrease the vulnerability of local people to Human-Wildlife-Conflicts (see Chapter 5.4.2), as most of them are not attractive to elephants or gorillas.

A problem, however, is that people need to enter the forest and LNP's community zone for the collection of NTFPs, while the access to the latter is complicated and expensive (see 5.2.5). In addition, an overexploitation of NTFPs can threaten natural stocks. Considering these problems, the incorporation of

NTFPs via agroforestry systems on people's farms represents a favourable solution to ensure both sustainable harvest rates and better availability. This integration requires know-how and training that could be facilitated by the World Agroforestry Centre (ICRAF) (EI10).

Impediments to commercialization

The access to markets is crucial for the creation of revenues from agricultural and forest products. However, market access is limited in the entire buffer-zone of LNP, hampering both product sale and the purchase of agricultural inputs, such as seedlings, pesticides, and fertilizers (P88; P44; M6; C10; C11; F9).

This is due to three main reasons. First, there are only few local markets in bigger towns such as Libongo, Moloundou and Salapoumbé. The former vibrant border commerce of Libongo with neighbouring CAR and CG has stopped in 2014 due to civil war in CAR (F11).

Second, transport is time- consuming and costly, and most farmers lack means of transport. Occasionally, farmers transport their products, e.g. plantain, on the top of logging trucks of forest companies (P35). Most local farmers, however, sell their products directly at the street and wait for buyers. The sale of cacao, for example, entirely depends on the arrival of external buyers either coming from Douala, Yaoundé, Bertoua or Yokadouma, and prices are mainly controlled by them (F21; P44, Image 22).



Image 24: Border to the Republic of Congo at the Ngoko River close to Socambo

Photo: Tobias Beyer

Third, check points along the road require payments for the transport of commercialised goods. Depending on the amount being transported, the fee reportedly lies between XAF 2.000 and 5.000⁵³ (Fg). Participants also mentioned that they have to buy an authorisation for transportation from the “chef du post” (M6). These opaque fees present a big obstacle and burden for small-scale producers and should be suspended.

The limited access to markets greatly reduces the incentives to engage in agricultural commerce. It is vital to support the establishment of a transportation system that enables local farmers to sell their products to markets in Douala and Yaoundé *independently* from external buyers and middlemen. A possible solution is to facilitate and further encourage collective sales of products from small producers, as already done by some associations in the area.



Image 25: Motorbike

Photo: PhotoVoice Participant (Farmer, Bantu, Female, 38 years) (PV 16)

The participant took a picture of a motorbike. She says that motorbikes are the only means for transport in the area. There are no safety measures and they carry too many people. Going to Kika costs around 2,5000 XAF, to Moloundou 15,000 XAF.

⁵³ It remained unclear who controls the check points and receives the fees.

The study team met with three local associations either established by the park management or the government. These associations can help mitigate limited market access, lack of knowledge and assets, and promote alternative livelihood strategies. However, they lack support and consequently cannot unlock their full potential.

GIC and CLG

GIC/MOLISSO is a farmers' association from Mambélé established in 2012 and has ten members. The association organizes product sales to negotiate a better price for increased quantity. The members jointly purchase agricultural inputs, exchange working tools and invest in group savings (XAF 60.000 year) (F21). There are GICs in other villages as well, and the GICs support each other financially, e.g. by granting credit. On initiative of the "chef de poste" for agriculture in Mambélé, a network of the different GICs between Dioula and Mambélé, called CLG, was founded in 2017. CLG is used as platform to discuss current challenges the farmers face and to develop joint solutions.

"Women-Health-and-Conservation-Society" (WHCS)

WHCS was initiated by the wife of a WWF employee in 2008. Its main objective is to increase the involvement of women in conservation efforts, and to reduce women's dependency on forest resources. Currently, WHCS has around 19 female members who all come from Mambélé (both Baka and Bantu). In the past, the women received trainings by WWF, FTNS and committed individuals on soap and rattan mat production, bee keeping, husbandry (keeping porcupines), fishing, creation of vegetable gardens, and the cultivation of mushrooms, pineapples and plantains. Furthermore, they were trained on mosquito prevention and control methods. The women organised mosquito awareness campaigns in other villages, and their efforts were compensated with XAF 5.000 (€ 7,63) per day by the park management. Since 2012, however, the women have not received support and consequently ceased most of their activities. They occasionally produce rattan mats for sale, and the park management at times hires them to weed the premises of the headquarters and the park's tourist camp, Camp Kombo, (F19).

Or-Vert women association for the collection of NTFPs

This organization was founded by FTNS and the director of the NGO AFE BEN in Mambélé in 2014. The association has 34 members, who collect NTFPs and sell them collectively. They mainly collect their products in community forests or UFAs, which is tolerated by the logging companies. The community zone of LNP is only used occasionally to collect wild mango as access is expensive and difficult (M6).

110 Results

Support required

GIC/MOLISSO: The members of GIC/MOLISSO stated that a microfinance system would be of great help to them. They also require a nursery for cacao seedlings in Mambélé, . So far, there are only two seedling nurseries in Lokomo and Moloundou (F21).

WHCS: The members of WHCS received a lot of trainings on health-related issues and alternative livelihood activities. With some refreshment courses and financial compensation, the women could act as multipliers and train other villagers or pupils in schools. Similar associations should be established in other communities. Women from other villages expressed their keen interest in joining WHCS, however could not be involved hitherto due to lack of transportation (F19).

Or-Vert: The association's main problem is the marketing of their products. They require reliable buyers and a partner trading NTFPs. Additionally, their access to the community zone should be facilitated (M6).

It should be noted that there are no associations representing hunters and artisanal miners, excluding these livelihood aspects from being politically pronounced and included in negotiations with private actors, park management and state representatives. Consequently, the absence of these associations hampers the sustained and effective inclusion of the respective groups into governance efforts. Improving mining livelihoods "by helping miners organise" (Tieguhong et al. ,2009:61) is recommended. Once formally established (e.g. as a GIC), this association could be a partner in conservation efforts (keeping them out of the core zone, avoiding introduction of chemical procedures), serving as an anchor for community projects (e.g. providing alternatives to bushmeat to miners to avoid poaching) and contribute to a general feeling of the population to get a share of the resources of their environment (Villegas et al., 2012).

5.3.3 Formal Job Opportunities

– offered by park management

As usual for civil servants in Cameroon, most of the park management staff was appointed by the government and comes from outside the region. Hence, locals do not work in higher and/or permanent management positions. Occasionally, they are employed for inventories (every five years) on a short-term basis (I15; I23). They also work as tourist guides and carriers. However, these opportunities are rare due to the low number of visitors (I23).

The lack of job opportunities within the park management was criticised by many villagers. They claimed that the park management hired the same people for monitoring and touristic purposes despite an official rotation system (C3) and complained that only people from Mambélé were employed while other villages were disregarded (F13; F19; C7; C9). Villagers expressed the desire to be more involved in conservation, for example by being employed as eco-guards (F2).

To improve the perception of LNP and to offer more stable income opportunities for the local population, it would be beneficial to increase efforts to integrate locals in the management of LNP on a long-term basis, especially those from outside of Mambélé.

– offered by private sector

The three logging companies are the most powerful economic actors in the park's buffer zone, and its biggest formal employers. CTSC in Kika employs around 120 people (25% Baka) (I6), SEFAC in Libongo employs around 550 workers (just 1% Baka) (F12). The Vicwood-Thany Group in Lokomo used to employ 400 people⁵⁴ but due to the company's economic problems and the presence of poachers within their UFA 10-007 bordering CAR, only 100 workers are still on the payroll (I12). As a result, Lokomo was almost abandoned, demonstrating the town's dependence on the company.



Image 26: CTSC sawmill in Kika

Photo: Tobias Beyer

⁵⁴ No information on the share of Baka available

112 Results

While there is no binding quota or regulation for the recruitment of local people, SEFAC claims to hire 50% "locals" but defines "local" broadly as the vast East region of Cameroon. Vicwood-Thany Group even has an extra position for the recruitment of locals. However, both SEFAC and Vicwood-Thany Group mainly recruit workers from bigger cities such as Yaoundé or Bertoua. Only CTSC asserts to hire 90% of local people from LNP's buffer zone, a number confirmed by villagers (I5; I6; I12; I25). While working conditions in CTSC in Kika were criticised (P84), working conditions in the SEFAC company were reportedly good (F12). Both SEFAC and Vicwood-Thany Group are OLB⁵⁵ certified (I12).

It should be a priority for the three logging companies to provide vocational training for local people, thereby increasing their chances of being hired. In addition, it is advisable to establish a quota for hiring workers from adjacent communities. MINFOF could support such a quota by conditioning the awarding of concessions on the integration of local employees.

Other formal employers in the LNP landscape are four hunting safaris and a mining company. However, the number of people employed is comparably low (31 locals in mining, 30-40 in hunting safaris), and jobs are seasonal and often short-term (I37; I24).

⁵⁵ Origine et Légalité des Bois: <https://www.bureauveritas.com/home/about-us/our-business/certification/sector-specific-solutions/forest-wood-products/olb>



Image 27: Baka housing in Ndongo

Photo: PhotoVoice participant: (Farmer, Baka, female, 25 years old,) (PV6)

The picture was taken in Ndongo by a Baka farmer. It shows the house of her uncle. She describes it as: "*Déjà gatée*" ("already destroyed") and says: "*Many people live in that house. It is difficult to live there.*"

5.3.4 Restrictions on Livelihood Activities

The main livelihood activities of the local population require land for the cultivation of crops and access to the forest for hunting and gathering, underscoring the spatial dimension of local livelihoods. Due to the creation of the park and the strict protection of its core zone, a substantial area (2.179 km²) cannot be used as before. The efforts by the park management to grant access to the protected area in form of a community zone are not effective (see Chapter 5.2.5).

Most livelihood restrictions, however, appear to occur in the concessions of private companies (logging, safari, and mining) in LNP's buffer zone. These concessions are six times bigger than the park's core zone (12.638,5 km²) and often overlap with villages and farms (see Map 3 and Map 4). The economic actors are legally obliged to restrict certain usages in their zones (e.g. hunting protected species or clearing forest for agriculture in UFAs) and have a self-interest to impede local resource use (safari companies, for example, require high game

114 Results

density). While legally required to guarantee customary use (see Chapter 5.2.3), there is evidence that private actors severely restrict local communities' traditional hunting and gathering rights.

Local access to bushmeat is restricted in both safari and logging concessions. Safari companies are patrolling within their concessions, and timber company SEFAC in Libongo is collaborating with a safari company to prosecute any form of hunting, including subsistence hunting (I25). Following accounts in Bela, safari companies "beat and kill people, and have colonized the UFA", and even patrolled in villagers' non-permanent agroforestry zone (C8). Baka in Libongo made similar claims, stating that safari employees are active near their houses, and beat them up: "Safari [companies] have taken the forest" (C7). In general, villagers had great difficulties to comprehend hunting restrictions enforced by safari companies and deemed it unfair that safari companies were allowed to hunt, while "the villagers who need to hunt to survive are sent to prison" (F6). Reportedly, patrols of hunting safaris also destroy makeshift camps used for the collection of NTFPs (F11; F12; F14; C7).

Similar restrictions are reported with regards to UFAs. In interviews, participants reported that they were chased away from UFAs, and that their huts were burnt (I4, I14, P35, C12, C2, C5). Villagers of Zega claimed that the logging company active in proximity to their village had already cut down all trees in the forest and was trying to chase them away to "destroy" their village (C11). As most villagers lack official land titles to their farms within UFAs, they have difficulties to prove that their farm existed before the UFA was established, and consequently fear that their farm will be destroyed once the company decides to start timber extraction on their farm's territory (P88, P100). Other communities complained that commercial timber exploitation often leaves the forest in a degraded stage, and that they cannot find certain NTFPs any longer (C3). These complaints not only raise doubts about the protection of customary use rights of local communities but also about the environmental sustainability of current timber exploitation practices.



Image 28: Signpost of the UFA 10-012

Photo: Tobias Beyer

While mining concessions appear to be extensive according to the TNS landscape map, only one company, Mongokele Mining, is currently actively extracting resources. As the company is rather small (137), it currently does not restrict local livelihood activities. However, if the sector is expanded in the future and more companies are present, limitations on livelihood activities will likely increase.

5.3.5 Mitigation of Livelihood Challenges

Several measures can help mitigate the livelihood restrictions described above.

First, access to forest resources should be facilitated to ensure the continuation of current livelihood strategies (hunting and NTFP collection). Second, MINFOF should adapt and enforce a more dynamic and equitable land-use planning of LNP's buffer zone to better integrate local livelihood needs. These measures are crucial for people that are highly depend on forest resources (especially Baka) and therefore of high priority.

In the long-term, alternative livelihood activities must be provided. On the one hand, alternative livelihood strategies decrease local dependency on forest resources and thus improve conservation effectiveness. On the other, they potentially alleviate poverty through the generation of decent income. Alternative livelihood activities should be established through projects and vocational trainings by park management, private actors and an institution experienced in

the implementation of development projects (ICRAF, international agencies like GIZ or local NGOs). Instead of using a top- down approach, the introduction of alternative livelihood strategies should consider suggestions by the local population and be organised bottom- up.

Potential alternative livelihood strategies proposed by the villagers are e.g. bee- keeping ((F21; P25; also see Degrande et al., 2018), support with the cultivation of fruit trees (P88), and the promotion of husbandry (F19). As some Baka appear not to be used to eat other meat than bushmeat (P14, P25), the latter might require awareness campaigns, and behavioural change. It is also advisable to build upon existing knowledge of local associations to determine potential alternatives.

In addition, it is advisable to promote sustainable agricultural practices for cacao farms and to provide seedlings. This would increase productivity, potentially decreasing demand for new farm land and better compensate harvest losses. The processing of cocoa beans to more valuable products, such as cacao butter, was also considered a potential new income source (P88, P45).

Any promotion of agriculture must be combined with measures to reduce local vulnerability to Human-Wildlife-Conflict (see Chapter 5.4.2). Intensification through use of synthetic fertilizer and pesticides should be avoided. Instead, ecological intensification measures should be introduced through agricultural extension services, paying special attention to Baka's living conditions and skills.

In order to make (perennial and annual) agriculture more attractive and to encourage investments, the question of land tenure needs to be further investigated.

Finally, the park management should increase its presence in buffer zone and interact with the local population to monitor their needs and desires.

5.3.6 Provision of Basic Infrastructure and Community Development

The park management has the legal responsibility to support local communities by offering alternative livelihood activities and/or by compensating people's losses resulting from limited access to natural resources. This is required by national law (Art. 26 and Art. 27, Loi N°94/01)⁵⁶ and by international and donor guidelines (BMZ 2013). Furthermore, the different private companies operating in

⁵⁶ Law on Forests, Wildlife, and Fisheries, Republic of Cameroon, January 20th 1994

LNPs buffer zone are legally required to provide basic infrastructure and engage in development activities (Art. 61 and Art. 66, Loi N°94/01)⁵⁷. This responsibility has already been recognized by both park authorities and private actors and was expressed in the Mambélé convention.

During fieldwork, the park management emphasized its responsibility to provide alternative livelihood strategies and basic infrastructure. The park's budget plan allocates financial means to several initiatives, e.g. 224,232,841 XAF to micro-projects on alternative livelihoods (Parc National de Lobéké, 2017).



Image 29: Hospital in Socambo

Photo: PhotoVoice participant (Restaurant owner, Bantu, female) (PV12)

The participant appreciates that there is a local hospital. However, she took this picture to show a negative aspect of her life: the hospital has no drugs and materials. There is no electricity. One nurse and one lab technician are responsible for more 2000 people, and there is no doctor. *"This makes life difficult and the hospital building is useless"*. When there are complicated health cases, people are sent to Moloundou or Salapoumbe but the roads are bad.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

WWF Cameroon repeatedly highlighted the crucial importance of community development to ensure effective conservation for and with the people and emphasized being actively involved in community development around LNP, e.g. by paying schoolteachers and school fees. When asked about approaches and concrete projects to support the local population, WWF Cameroon pointed out that schools, teachers and wells were badly needed in many villages, and reported that they planned to build poultry farms in the future (I21; P18). However, while development of basic infrastructure was described as a vital necessity, few development projects could be observed on site. According to most villagers, the park management is neither present nor active in villages other than Mambélé (F13; C7; C9). Despite several requests, the study team was not able to obtain a list with implemented or planned community development projects by the WWF Community Coordination Officer to verify this claim.

MINFOF also acknowledged its responsibility to engage in community development (I18; I39). Following the conservator, the Cameroonian state had the obligation to create favourable living conditions for its citizens. As the state was represented by the park in this region, the park supported local communities through various measures: the park helped establish community forests and ZIGCs and had successfully implemented local development projects: "It is here out of all places in Cameroon that we have a lot of community projects" (I39).

However, while the state was responsible for supporting the improvement of people's living conditions, the communities were partly responsible for their own development: "People have to be able to fish on their own and should not be given fish" (I39). A lack of education combined with widespread alcoholism and corruption by village elites kept local communities from development. In addition, most villages lacked capacities to design and submit community development projects. The WWF- Programme Manager equally shared the concern that the communities were not well equipped to manage the community forests and COVAREF in a way that benefitted the local population at large (I21).

Other MINFOF representatives of the park management stated that development projects should be financed by other actors such as KfW, FTNS or the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, as the primary objective of the park was biodiversity conservation (I18). On state level, the Governor acknowledged the state's responsibility to invest in community development. He reported ambitions to invest in large infrastructure projects such as hydroelectric dams and roads but the planning is still on-going (I2), and a prospective development strategy compatible with conservation efforts appears to be largely absent.

The degree of involvement of the private companies in community development differed.

Forest companies are required by law to engage in community development activities. Two of the three timber companies (VICWOOD-THANRY GROUP and SEFAC) acknowledge their special role for community development and their commitment exceeds legal obligations (I12; I25). Both companies mainly focus on medical support and the prevention of contagious diseases, education, provision of electricity and construction of community buildings (F11; I25). While VICWOOD-THANRY GROUP has an own development plan, SEFAC supports one development project each year proposed by a community (I25). However, their involvement is selective and limited to the proximate surroundings of the sawmills in Libongo (SEFAC) and Lokomo (VICWOOD-THANRY GROUP). For the third logging company, CTSC, community development appears to be of less interest as an employee pointed out: *"A forest Company is not a social project"* (I6). Though operating in the area for four years, no community projects have been initiated yet, except for football matches and an internship programme with a nearby school (I6).

The safari companies and the mining company are not engaged in community development but intend to get involved soon. However, no concrete ideas or areas of involvement were further described (I13; I37). It was often stated that the state bore the primary responsibility for the development of basic infrastructure and not the companies (I25).

As a result of the insufficient provision of basic infrastructure, the majority of local people feels abandoned and neglected. These feelings of neglect are projected upon the park and inhibit local buy-in for conservation efforts. During field research, villagers often described conservation as quasi-synonym to restrictions, and it appeared that the lack of basic infrastructure is a cause of resentment over conservation, causing friction and conflicts (see Chapter 5.4.1).



Image 30: Boy drinking water out of the Sangha river

Photo: PhotoVoice participant (Bantu, Farmer, male) (PV 11)

The picture was taken by a Bantu farmer in Socambo. He says that the boy is fetching water from a river, while some meters upstream people are washing themselves and defecate into the water. He wishes for clean drinking water and a pump. Following the farmer, water is the basis of health and drinking water from a river was "*a serious issue*", not only as it causes illnesses like typhoid, but also because it makes the brain sick: "*People get mentally ill if they are always feeling sick*".



Image 31: Pupils in classroom

Photo: PhotoVoice participant (Farmer, Baka, male, 34 years) (PV 17)

The picture was taken by a Baka farmer in Dioula. He values education a lot: "*Our children go to school and they can become anything, even president*". At home, the children can even teach their parents what they have learnt. School fees are XAF 3.000 annually, which he thinks is ok. Schools are mixed with Baka and Bantu children, and he thinks that helps to reduce discrimination and stereotypes.

5.4 Conflicts

Conflicts between park management and local communities (so-called park-people conflicts) are some of the most pervasive problems troubling PAs around the globe and can be extremely destructive (De Pourq et al., 2015). This study identified four main conflicts in LNP. These conflicts are not only a result of a competition over scarce resources, but involve differences in values, antagonistic attitudes, negative perceptions and feelings of mistrust and fear.

The overarching conflict concerns the local population's understanding of conservation as an antidote to pro-people development (Conflict 1: Conservation and Development). This perceived conflict of interest impedes local support for conservation efforts. The conflict is strongly related to a high-risk perception for Human Wildlife- conflicts, which thwart local endorsement of wildlife protection (Conflict 2: Humans and wildlife).

A key conflict that has received prominent media coverage concerns the relationship of eco-guards and local population (Conflict 3: Law enforcement and

122 Results

Local Population). Accounts of direct violence and insecure usage rights have resulted into a toxic atmosphere of fear and mistrust, thwarting effective and just law enforcement.

A conflict that is highly relevant for understanding the needs and problems of the local population, yet often kept out of the spotlights, concerns the relationship of Baka and Bantu groups (Conflict 4: 'Forest people' and 'Villagers'). While not a park- people conflict as such, this latent inner- community conflict affects the needs and aspirations of indigenous people and threatens equitable participation and revenue- sharing.




Figure 11: Conflict Map of actors involved in the governance of Lobéké National Park and its buffer zone

Source: own illustration⁵⁸

5.4.1 Conflict 1: Conservation and Development

A striking finding of the research is the shared negative perception of conservation, cutting across all controlled social categories (gender, ethnicity, and age). This is worrisome, as a negative perception of conservation by the local population has adverse effects on the success of conservation projects, and fuels

⁵⁸ The depicted conflict within the park management has been described in Chapter 5.1.7

conflicts (Bennett 2016). Perceptions determine compliance with rules, support by local constituents, levels of participation, and volunteer engagement. Therefore, it is important to understand the main drivers behind the negative perception of LNP's conservation efforts.

While the local population appears to acknowledge that conservation efforts preserve the forest for future generations, it simultaneously assumes an antagonist relationship between "conservation" and "the people", as clearly expressed by statements such as "*conservation does not like the people*" (C1). During interviews and focus group discussions, conservation was frequently linked to a restriction of freedom and the impairment of living conditions. Consequently, words often associated with conservation were "*repression*", "*fear*", and "*sufferance*".

The negative rating of conservation appears to be influenced by two dynamics:

(1) Well-being and identity needs⁵⁹ not addressed:

The local population appears to understand and value the advantages of conservation (protection of the forest and wildlife). This is reflected in statements such as "*The park, it is good, it conserves for tomorrow*" (F17) or "*It helps to preserve the forest and the animals for our children*" (F15). However, research participants fault the lack of concrete social benefits and care. They criticize that animals destroy their farm (see Conflict 2: Humans and Wildlife) and appear to be of more value than humans - even though "*elephants never go to vote*" (C8).

The expression of feelings of neglect go along with demands for coverage of people's basic needs. The local population expects conservation to provide basic infrastructure and alternative income strategies. The participants often referred to DSNP and NNNP as best- practice examples, where rice and manioc are allegedly shared with the people, and where the park management provided schools, hospitals, and work opportunities for the local population. They are heavily disappointed by the failure of the park management to keep its alleged development promises: "*They said they would help us, with micro-projects, livestock keeping and aquaculture... there are many who died in prison because there is no work... where are the accompanying measures?*" (TWS1). As socio-economic development is lacking, the local population confronts conservation with well-

⁵⁹ Galtung (1990) identifies four universal basic human needs: 1. Survival needs (i.e. protection from violence); 2. Well- being needs (i.e. food, nutrition, movement), 3. Identity needs (i.e. belonging, include. political activity); 4. Freedom needs (i.e. freedom to choose)

124 Results

being needs, threatening to destroy the forest if not taken care of: *"We will destroy the environment because there are no alternatives [to hunting]"* (C8).

The demands for coverage of basic needs are not only based on well-being needs, but also informed by participants' self-identification as Cameroonian citizens. As one participant put it: *"The state, that is us. If humans do not have value anymore, the forest has no value either"* (TWS1). One female participant succinctly made clear that the lack of socio-economic support made her feel alienated: *"I do not know in which Republic we are living; if we are living in Cameroon? We are always put aside... What happens?"* (C9). This reference to state belongingness occurred frequently, hinting at the assertion of citizenship-rights and identity needs.

(2) Lack of involvement of the local population:

Participants' criticism often included demands for active participation and benefit-sharing. This started with participants' complaints about not being informed a priori about the establishment of the park and cumulated into demands for active involvement:

- *"We want conservation, but we need benefits, we must be integrated in the management"* (C9)
- *"We want that the population is in charge, [we want] to earn money from conservation"* (C2)

These political demands are coupled with feelings of exclusion and estrangement. Correspondingly, conservation is often portrayed as a project of outsiders, thwarting economic development:

"The climate convention wants Africa to reduce CO₂, to protect its forest. You impose that, but what is our benefit? In America, in Brazil, forests are cut down to give room to industries, you have work and you are rich. But in Africa, people must protect the forest. However, they do not benefit from protection. We stay under the tree ("nous restons sous l'arbre")" (C9).

Support for LNP on the brink?

While the park management advocates that conservation can support people's socio-economic development and was not its antidote, the lack of socio-economic development and participation leads to resentment on behalf of the local population. Ultimately, it fuels a negative perception of conservation-efforts, understood as a "foreign" project imposed by outsiders. Alarmingly, this negative perception of conservation is not only impeding local support for

conservation, but also fuels other park- people conflicts. While the park is not primarily responsible for the socio-economic development of the local population, it is clear that conservation efforts can only be effective if their basic needs are met.




Figure 12: PIN – Tool_ Conflict Conservation and Development

Description: The position of the local population is that conservation has a negative social impact and halts socio-economic development. Their interests are to secure income generation and the improvement of their living conditions. In addition, the local population has an interest in being implied in the management and in benefitting from conservation at large. They base their interests in well-being and identity needs.

Source: own illustration

5.4.2 Conflict 2: Humans and wildlife

Human-Wildlife Conflicts (following: HWC) are commonly understood as actions by humans or wildlife that have an adverse effect on the other. Following Nyhus, HWC can also be based on the *perception* that wildlife threatens human safety, health, food, and property (Nyhus, 2016:145).

HWC pose a serious challenge to conservation efforts: first, perceived threats by wildlife can hamper local support for conservation efforts (Lamarque et al.,2009). Second, crop raiding can fuel retaliatory killings of animals (ibidem). HWC also compromises poverty alleviation: its 'visible' impacts threaten

agricultural output and local food security. Furthermore, its 'hidden' impacts, such as high opportunity and transaction costs as well as the transmission of infectious diseases ('zoonosis'), have adverse effects on the well-being of the rural poor (Barua et al., 2013).

High risk perception of HWC

The risk perception for HWC in communities around LNP is very high. Correspondingly, HWC is the predominant concern of the local population, and has been brought to the study team's attention in every village visited. Participants stated that their crops were damaged by elephants (F7; C7), chimpanzees and gorillas (C11; F11; PV16), or smaller monkeys such as gueneons or mangabeys (C2). But not only crops are concerned: fishermen in Libongo said caimans were eating their bait (F11).

The research team was presented with evidence of crop-raiding by primates on numerous cacao farms but was not able to verify the claims systematically (i.e. by matching the risk perception with the actual risk). Notwithstanding, the many references to HWC and the shared high-risk perception underline the significance of HWC for the local population in LNP's buffer zone.




Image 32: A cacao- farm destroyed by monkeys

Photo: PhotoVoice participant (Farmer, Bantu, female) (PV3)

The participant took this picture to show the destruction of a cocoa farm caused by monkeys.

"We are sick of animals destroying our fields"

Reported incidents of wildlife impact have fuelled anxiety and anger among the local population. Following one participant, people were "sick of [...] animals

destroying [the] fields" (SW₁). It takes up to nine months to regrow damaged crops. As most people depend on a single livelihood strategy and lack alternative assets, they are highly vulnerable to resource destruction, and perceive wildlife impact as an existential threat. Especially elephants are feared for their destructive potential (C₁₀).

In addition, participants reported to feel helpless and left alone in dealing with wildlife impact, aggravating the perceived menace. As a result, the protection of forest animals is not fully understood and supported: *"Elephants are more protected than humans; when a person is killed by an elephant, nothing happens"* (F₁₁). This quote further underlines that HWC is not only a concern related to crop damage, but also involves feelings of neglect and underlying tensions from human- human conflicts over conservation at large (Dickman, 2010; Nyhus, 2016).




Figure 13: ABC triangle Human-Wildlife-Conflict

Source: own illustration based on Galtung 1990

Following Galtung, a conflict consists of three basic interrelated elements: [A] the attitudes of the conflict parties, [B] their conflict behaviour (violent or non-violent), and [C] the contradiction (often also referred to as "context") central to the conflict, i.e. seemingly incompatible goals. The triangle draws attention not only to "spectacular" evidence of conflict (i.e. persecution of animals) but also to the attitudes and structural inequalities that lie underneath - the "catalysators" of evident conflict (i.e. feelings of neglect and competing resource use). Without addressing all three angles of conflict, it cannot be transformed (Galtung 1990)

The conflict is aggravated by the following factors:

- a) **Little knowledge on nonlethal prevention methods:** Participants reported to have limited means (e.g. sling shots) and techniques to protect their crops without harming wildlife (PV₄, F₆). While some participants stated to use drums and loud noise to chase away animals (PV₃), the shooting and killing of animals were perceived the most effective prevention methods (F₁₁). However, both are forbidden under the Forestry Law if not used in direct self-defence (Art. 83, Loi N°94/01)⁶⁰. MINFOF can

⁶⁰ Law on Forests, Wildlife, and Fisheries, Republic of Cameroon, January 20th 1994

give the permission to kill an animal if found in the fields. Following participants' accounts, however, the villagers' requests for permission are seldomly responded to (SW1). Furthermore, it was difficult to surprise animals in the fields, as they ran off into the forest as soon as humans approach (F9). Consequently, participants expressed feelings of powerlessness to prevent HWC: *"When [elephants] arrive, we are not allowed to kill them. So how do we defend us against them?"* (C10).



Image 33: Hut by the fields

Photo: PhotoVoice participant (Farmer, Bantu, female, 60 years) (PV3)

The participant says that she stays in the hut to chase away wild animals. She uses the drum: *"I hit it so hard that it scares the animals away. When we are sick, we don't have strength to do that because it is very stressful"*

- b) **Compensation Mechanism is inapt and ineffective:** Despite its existence, many participants are not aware of a compensation mechanism. This might be due to its cumbersome procedure that involves three different ministries⁶¹. Working the files is a long process, increasing the transaction costs for the local population, as one villager explains: *"Until you are*

⁶¹ Following the account of a WWF- officer, the determination of compensation is under the aegis of the Ministry of Agriculture (MINADER) ("parrain de compensation"); MINFOF is supporting the compensation process in evaluating the destruction on the fields, i.e. by determining the animal that has caused it (responsible is the respective *Chef de Poste*), and the Ministry for Territorial Administration (MINATD), represented via the Sous-Prefect, has a fund for natural disasters ("fond catastrophe"), which finally provides the compensation (SW1)

through your field is destroyed, sometimes it takes 9 months until there is help" (SW₁). Furthermore, participants fault the lack of response by the ministries, stating that the damages on their fields are not evaluated when lodging a complaint (SW₁; F₁₄; C₁). Following participants in Bela, villagers' requests for compensation are not taken seriously: the local government official ("chef de poste") always inquired the names of the animals that destroyed their fields (C₈). Another farmer reported that he was asked by WWF- staff of LNP to directly complain to the gorilla when he sought help (P₄₄).

- c) **More animals coming to villages:** Following participants, elephants and gorillas approach villages more frequently than in the past. Local employees of a safari company close to Koumela also report that elephants are seen more often in the village than a couple of years ago (I₁₃) – even though elephant numbers are declining (see Figure 7). According to one participant, a possible explanation for higher elephant numbers in certain areas was the use of salt by safari companies trying to attract them (F₁₁). An eco-guard assumes that the animals come closer to the villages as *"they are secure, they are not threatened and can do what they want"* (PV₁). A reason for increased violent disruption by elephants might be that old, socially experienced long- tuskers have all been shot, so that hyper aggressive and hostile behaviour of young elephants is uncontrolled for (Breuer, 2016). Additional reasons for increased animal encroachment might be that (1) there are more fields than 20 years ago, and that (2) fields are now closer to the LNP core zone and on animal migration routes.



Image 34: Monkey in kitchen

Photo: PhotoVoice participant (Farmer, Bantu, male, 26 years) (PV4)

According to the participant, monkeys often enter the houses of people in the village: they go into the kitchens, steal food, destroy things, defecate. This happens about once a week. People chase them away, but they come back. Through conservation, monkeys have become less afraid of humans - it is forbidden to kill or shoot at them. His grandparents used bow and arrow to chase them away. NGOs should find ways to keep them from the village as there are currently no measures in place.

d) Lack of appropriate measures by the park management: The park management is only starting to work on the issue of HWC, and no holistic response strategy is in place yet. In interviews, however, park employees appeared to be highly aware of the extent and seriousness of HWC. Some eco-guards are themselves victims of crop damage by animals (PV1). Following a senior eco-guard, a student will be engaged next year to generate data on HWC and to test different prevention methods (SW1). The conservator stated that a colleague from the park management was currently based in Kenya to study elephant behaviour (I38). In addition, MINFOF was planning to address the economic costs of HWC through the development of an insurance mechanism and the creation of a national compensation fund (ibidem). However, these ideas are not concrete yet, and the budget specifically earmarked for HWC in the annual plan 2018 is negligible (SW1; Parc National de Lobéké, 2017).



Image 35: Fields of Eco- Guards

Photo: PhotoVoice- Participant (Eco- Guard, Bantu, male) (PV2)

The picture shows the fields of the eco- guards: *"Everyone plants plantains. But the animals that we protect destroy them"*. He says that reparations should be paid. *"The animals come to the village because they are secure, they are not threatened, they can do what they want. One should start threatening them with firearms. The people also have to eat"*

Towards co-existence?

The vast literature on HWC suggests that a peaceful coexistence of humans and wildlife is possible – provided that appropriate management tools, public policies and societal support are present (Nyhus, 2016). Appropriate responses to HWC might include lethal (i.e. traps, shootings, pesticides) and non-lethal control (i.e. monitoring, deterrents, fertility control, barriers, buffer crops), as well as economic (i.e. compensation, insurance, alternative income, revenue sharing) and social interventions (i.e. education, training) (ibidem).

Before appropriate prevention methods and mitigation tools can be identified, HWC in LNP must be studied in more depth. There is much evidence of mismatch between risk perception and actual risk of HWC around the globe – in many cases, rodents and invertebrates cause more damage than protected species (Dickman 2010: 461). It is often social factors that determine antagonistic attitudes towards wild animals. Consequently, persecution will continue even if wildlife damage is entirely mitigated (ibidem).

To design appropriate responses for LNP's buffer zone, it is necessary to determine whether the high-risk perception of HWC is politically linked to a negative attitude towards wild animals and/or conservation, or whether there is

an actual risk. This also involves the evaluation of the extent of wildlife impact on local food security and farming, providing details on animal species, frequency, locality, and people's vulnerability.

In a second step, HWC- approaches should be co-jointly developed with the local population. Evidence suggests that decentralised strategies involving affected communities are more successful (Hockings and Humle, 2009:8).

5.4.3 Conflict 3: Law enforcement and Local Population

A conflict prominently discussed in international media is that between eco-guards and the local population. It first received international attention in 2016, when Survival International submitted a formal complaint to the OECD, in which it accused WWF of having failed to adhere to the principle of Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) and reproached LNP's eco-guards with Human Rights abuses against Baka (Survival International, 2016). To substantiate their claims, Survival International forwarded several English letters signed by local Baka.

While neither Baka nor Bantu participants spoke about Survival International directly or appeared to know the exact content of the letters⁶² (F2, C7), the conflict-laden relationship to law enforcement agents was regularly discussed in community meetings and focus group discussions. Essentially, the conflict revolves around the interpretation and application of usage rights and is fuelled by feelings of mistrust, the lack of an accessible, effective and equitable complaint mechanism, and violent law enforcement by private companies.

Position of Conflict Parties

The research revealed the positions of the two conflict parties. On the one hand, the local population claims their usage rights are drastically curtailed by conservation forces and lives in fear of the eco-guards. During interviews and focus group discussions, people stated that eco-guards routinely confiscate their hunting and fishing equipment, NTFPs they have collected or animals they have hunted (C3; C8; F3; F10; F15). Makeshift camps, which people use to overnight in the forest for several days, are destroyed and burned down (F14). Furthermore, members of the local communities complained about physical abuse at the hands

⁶² : While local Baka NGOs like OKANI appreciate Survival International's involvement for drawing international attention to problems related to conservation (I1), a representative of CEFAID criticized its involvement for its single-handed approach without collaboration with local NGOs (EI2). FTNS suspects that SI made locals to sign the letters by giving false promises (EI9). Indeed, representatives of the Human Rights in Bayanga (CAR) doubt that Baka were able to read the letters; a concern that is equally shared by a representative of CEFAID and WWF (EI2; EI7).

134 Results

of the law enforcement agents: beatings and other acts of humiliation (e.g. a woman forced to undress) (F2; F3; F13). According to focus group participants and interviewees, eco-guards are unreasonable during encounters and do not respect their usage rights: even when people comply with the regulations of subsistence hunting, eco-guards deter them from entering the forest altogether (F14; C12). While these accounts were consistent, with minor variations, in all communities adjacent to LNP irrespective of their ethnic compositions, the theatres enacted by Baka participants displayed a more violent behaviour.

On the other hand, eco-guards and other staff of the park management paint a different picture: their primary task is to apply Cameroonian law (M3). Given the high levels of poaching in the area and the increased militarisation of actors, eco-guards need to be armed for protection (F20). When eco-guards encounter individuals who are in breach of the law and do not comply with the regulations of subsistence hunting, it is their duty to confiscate any meat or hunting equipment. In more severe cases, those suspected of poaching need to be brought to the headquarters for questioning and detention (I39). Top-level representatives of FTNS, WWF and MINFOF assured the research team that Human Rights violations and physical abuses are a thing of the past (E17; E19; I39): eco-guards underwent trainings on Human Rights and there was a WWF manual on Human Rights as well as a code of ethics issued by the park management. In an interview the Conservator of LNP stated that: *"In three years I have not had a single complaint about Human Rights abuses"* (I39).

The claims of either side are impossible to verify within the scope of this study. Nonetheless, the research identified four factors influencing the conflict's dynamics. It should be noted that these considerations are based on the research team's interpretations and hence do not claim to establish an unequivocal truth:

(1) The experience of direct violence creates an atmosphere of mistrust that hinders potential reconciliation between the two sides

The issue of physical violence is central to this conflict. Not all interviewees, who claimed that eco-guards beat or physically abuse villagers, had experienced such abuse themselves. Some Baka community members in Dioula even stated that interactions with the eco-guards are becoming friendlier (TWS1). What is striking, however, is that the vast majority of interviewees in villages perceived the eco-guards as violent and reported to be afraid of them. When asked to act out a typical encounter between villagers and eco-guards in the Theater of the Oppressed, most actors chose to portray eco-guards as unreasonable and violent (T1; T4; T7). This goes to show that even though incidents of direct violence might

have occurred in the past⁶³ or to a person other than oneself, they have a strong impact on the collective perception held by communities in LNP's buffer zone (see Table 8).

There also have been cases of violence against eco-guards: in 2016, an eco-guard was killed by a local Baka man who had been hired as a poacher. Eco-guards reported feeling insecure when interacting with the local population on patrols (M3). They expressed their concerns about the life-threatening nature of their job, describing encounters with large-scale poachers as a potential matter of life and death (PV1; PV2). As one eco-guard phrased it when talking about seizing illegal weapons: *"If I have taken a weapon today, it is not the weapon that will kill me tomorrow"* (F16).



Image 36: Burial ceremony of an eco-guard

Photo: PhotoVoice Participant (Eco-Guard, Bantu, male) (PV1)

The person in the coffin is his former colleague, who died on a mission in 2016, when he was shot by a local Baka man. This photo represents the dangers that eco-guards face during their work: *"We die like this for the world heritage."*

These experiences on both sides have created an atmosphere of fear and mistrust. In the current climate, cooperation between eco-guards and the local

⁶³ From 2008-2010, the Cameroonian Army was present in LNP to fight rebels from CAR hiding in the forest. Following a WWF employee in Yaoundé, the Baka attribute many abuses conducted by the Cameroonian army to eco-guards, as both troops are uniformed and not easily distinguishable (E17)

population remains elusive. The lack of cooperation hinders the effective implementation and monitoring of usage rights. Yet, the research also uncovered some degree of empathy between the two sides, signalling potential for reconciliation.

The Theater of the Oppressed in Dioula revealed the desire of people to enter into a dialogue with eco-guards and the park management, giving them the opportunity to explain their concerns and needs (TWS₁; TWS₂; see Table 9). A participant of the stakeholder workshop in Mambélé remarked that a dialogue with eco-guards could help them understand that most poaching is done out of the local population's necessity to feed their families (SW₁). Indeed, some eco-guards seem to be well aware of the underlying reasons for poaching: *"If you want to keep them from hunting, you have to give them another road"* (F16). At the same time, women from the village of Koumela explained that eco-guards were simply doing their job in the area, which could not be a reason for them to hold a grudge against them (F6).

These are encouraging signs of reconciliation that should be capitalized on. Given the experiences of both local communities and eco-guards with direct violence, efforts should be made to further "humanize" the other side. Following the "contact-hypothesis" by Allport, interpersonal contact between two conflict parties allows for communication and interaction, which reduces prejudice by developing empathy for the other side's position (Allport, 1954). If eco-guards and people from local communities interact and cooperate more frequently, they may develop an even better understanding of the other side's interests and needs that do not fundamentally differ from their own. In this scenario, the potential for conflict and violence is likely to decrease significantly.



Image 37: Baka Woman

Photo: PhotoVoice Participant (Farmer, Baka, male, 58 years) (PV5)

The participant took a picture of a Baka woman. She told a story about eco- guards. She once came back from the forest with wild mangoes. The eco- guards took [the wild mangoes] by force. They only took the mangoes, but they did not hit her "*because she is old*". She has not returned to the forest ever since..

In practical terms, forums for dialogue should be created to allow for more open exchange between eco-guards and the local population. These forums should be moderated by licensed mediators to address contentious issues that arise from everyday interactions and instances from the past. The park management and an organization trusted by local people (e.g. CEFAID and/or CED) should jointly initiate the dialogue and create additional incentives for participation of both groups. Moreover, people from the local communities should be integrated into the daily activities of conservation services to increase contact points between them and the eco-guards, e.g. on anti-poaching efforts (also see Chapter 5). Additionally, local recruitment of eco-guards would create a stronger link to the local communities and change the perception of eco-guards as "foreigners".

Table 8: Theatre - Workshop Dioula 1		
Scene instruction: "You are in the forest. Then two eco-guards arrive. What happens?"		
Theatre-Workshop	Baka Participants (TWS1) Language: Baka	Bantu Participants (TWS2) Language: French
Description of Play	Two Baka women and one Baka man act out collecting items from the forest. Two Baka men act as Eco Guards and sneak up on the Baka in the forest. The eco guards beat the Baka and destroy their possessions. The Baka are arrested, threatened, beaten more.	The three men in the forest take some time to set up their props on the stage. One of the props used by the men in the forest (the drum on stage) seemed to be some sort of a machine. They then go about their activities. At some point two "eco-guards" enter the scene and sneak up on the men. They jump onto the stage and start shouting. The men try to flee, but the eco-guards catch them and hit them on the head. The actors portray the eco-guards as violent and unreasonable (they arrest them without questioning them first). The eco-guards sit the men on the floor, put their hands together behind their back and finally lead them off the stage.
Reflection Interviews	Having watched the scene, participants say "that is not good", shake their heads. When asked if that happens often, N. [an outspoken "representative" of the group] replies: "Before, it was like this. Now, it has changed. We have already eaten together. There is a little change. Only when Baka do things that are not allowed, they will be attacked". Another participant agrees: "Today, they do not disturb us. But when we do things that are not allowed, what will happen?". N. adds: « The MoU has to be signed. If the eco-guards threaten us, they will have problems because they have signed [it]". He also says that the Baka should have more benefits from conservation, "something that the	Having watched the scene, the participants tell us that GTZ used to work closely with them until some years ago. They view the collaboration positively. GTZ mapped the forest and the different zones with them. When WWF took over, things changed. Simultaneously, Pepe Safari arrived in the forest with B.I.R. forces. Since then, people could not do anything in the forest anymore; they experience violence and repression when they are found in the forest: "The military has come to torture the people". The camps in which they stay when collecting NTFPs are often burned by security forces. They claim that WWF was "dominated" by the interests of Safari companies. When asked about possible solutions to these problems,

	<p><i>Baka like</i>". When asked what that would be, a woman replies: "<i>One has to support the children to go to school</i>". Another woman adds: "<i>One has to do something like livestock keeping so that [we] do not go too much into the forest</i>".</p>	<p>participants say that they want to enter into a dialogue with the conservation service. The state has apparently promised them livestock and farming support, but not yet delivered. If those programs were implemented, it could help them become less dependent on the forest and thus minimize the tensions with eco-guards.</p> <p>Quotes:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - "<i>Why don't they use the money they spend on guns to change the lives of people?</i>"; - "<i>The military has come to torture the people</i>" - "<i>They said they would help us, with micro-projects, livestock keeping and aquaculture... there are many who died in prison because there is no work... where are the accompanying measures?</i>"; - <i>The state, that is us. If humans do not have value anymore, the forest has no value either</i>"
<p>Interpretation by Conflict Team</p>	<p>While the theatre depicts direct violence used by the eco- guards, during reflection Baka participants emphasize that they have noticed a positive change in the behaviour of eco-guards, and even state that they have shared a meal with them.</p>	<p>During the reflection, people make clear that they expect the park management to offer them alternative livelihood strategies (livestock, farming inputs). Quotes such as "<i>the military has come to torture the people</i>" and "<i>The state, that is us. If humans do not have value anymore, the forest has no value either</i>" reveal a certain level of mistrust against state forces and express a feeling of state- neglect. They also reveal that people feel violated and abused by the executive forces of "their" state.</p>
<p>Source: own data</p>		

Table 9: Theatre - Workshop Dioula 2		
Scene instruction: "You are in the forest and Eco Guards come, what would you like to happen?"		
Theatre-Workshop	Baka Participants (TWS ₁) Language: Baka	Bantu Participants (TWS ₂) Language: French
Description of Play	All Baka reset scene from beginning. When approached by Eco Guards, they share food and the Eco Guards leave them unharmed. As soon as the eco-guards are gone, one Baka woman starts gathering their things, and shouts at the man. They then leave quickly, look around in fear.	Two men are in the forest preparing meat over a fire. After about a minute, two eco-guards arrive. They ask them what they are doing. The men explain that they are in the process of a mourning ritual that takes two days and they are currently preparing a meal for their family. The eco-guard asks what they are cooking and one of the men responds. The second eco-guard continues to tell them that they are in the zone of the forest which they are not allowed to access ("zone interdite"). The men tell him that they were not aware of that. The eco-guard tells them to continue with their ritual but to leave the zone immediately after and clean up their camp. The men agree and thank him passionately for allowing them to stay. They offer the eco-guards some food before they leave.
Reflection Interviews	The Baka are asked to describe what happens in this scene. One woman says that the eco-guards came and questioned them about their whereabouts, then they sat down to eat together: " <i>The feeling is good</i> ". Another man adds: " <i>That happened this year in Dioula, we ate fish together</i> ". When asked what happened at the end of the scene and why they left so quickly, one man says: " <i>They are afraid that the eco-guards will come back and threaten them</i> ". They confirm that they still do not trust the eco-guards; one man states: " <i>There is not trust</i> ".	People state that they would like to enter into dialogue with the park management, at eye level; they want the management to know what the people do: " <i>One has to know what the people do</i> ". They are not interested in conflict and feel a lot of pressure; they do not feel at peace with the current situation. One woman says: « <i>We have to have a dialogue...between brothers and brothers. We want peace</i> ". Participants also say that the current entrance fee of 2500 CFA (valid for one week) to enter the park was too high.

Interpretation by Conflict Team	<p>In this ideal situation, the guards sit down with the Baka and share their food. They are portrayed as equals and treat the Baka as equals (by sitting down, sharing their food). Perhaps this is what the Baka would like to express: the desire to be treated as equals. However, quite telling that the Baka quickly leave at the end of the scene: they do not yet trust the guards' apparent indulgent intentions and said so themselves ("there is no trust").</p>	<p>In this ideal vision of how villagers would like the eco-guards to treat them, the eco-guards are portrayed as very understanding of the population and their cultural needs (mourning ritual). They give them an opportunity to explain what they are doing and find a pragmatic solution to the problem. From this scene it can be inferred that it is two elements in the current interaction that participants would like to change: the violent treatment and the lack of understanding/empathy for the needs of the local population.</p>
<p>Source: own data</p>		

142 Results

(2) The current complaint mechanism is not working effectively

In talks with WWF staff and CEFAID in Yaoundé the research team was informed about a complaint mechanism for Human Rights abuses in Lobéké National Park (EI2; EI7; EI8). The WWF-financed mechanism was created in cooperation with the NGO CEFAID in 2014. It is supposed to work as follows: in case of abuse, people can file a complaint at CEFAID's main office, which documents and investigates the cases and decides to take further action if required, e.g. reports incidents to the police (EI12).

In practice, however, the mechanism does not function as envisioned. To begin with, none of the interviewees from the villages was aware of its existence. Furthermore, the WWF country manager Dr. Njiforti acknowledged that the main issue of the complaint mechanism is its accessibility: the office, where complaints can be made, is located in Yokadouma, which is a day's journey away from Lobéké National Park. Theoretically, CEFAID focal points should be available in several locations in the park's buffer zone, but neither WWF nor CEFAID have the resources to maintain a constant presence in the villages (EI12).

The idea behind a complaint mechanism is laudable and worth pursuing further. The research showed that people from the localities around Lobéké National Park feel helpless as they have nowhere to turn to with their complaints and grievances (C9).

Accessing the Cameroonian justice system to file a complaint is not an option for most villagers: they are scarcely spread in the area and hard to reach. In addition, many interviewees claimed that police officers only agree to work on cases in exchange for bribes (TWS1; TWS2). On top of that, villagers told the research team that they are afraid of repercussions from the park management if they report any incident to local authorities (F14).

For the complaint mechanism to be effective it needs to assure that people can access it without difficulties and fear. The lead organization ought to drastically increase its presence and visibility in the periphery of LNP: focal points should be established in major towns around the park (e.g. Mambélé, Salapoumbé, Libongo, Socambo, Moloundou) and outreach teams should make regular visits to smaller and more remote localities.

Procedures for filing a complaint should be manageable even for individuals who are illiterate, and anonymity should be guaranteed. Furthermore, it is essential for the responsible organization to inform people about the existence and procedures of the complaint mechanism – something that CEFAID and WWF

have clearly failed to do hitherto. Inspiration for technical and operational details of a complaint mechanism could be drawn from the Human Rights Center in Bayanga (*Centre Droits de l'Homme de Bayanga*) that has been established by WWF in the TNS-park DSNN in the Central African Republic.



Image 38: Informational poster about Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) by the Human Rights Center in Bayanga

Source: Ndima Kali – Association de Jeunes BaAka et Sangha-Sangha

Finally, it is advisable to increase efforts to set up a more neutral complaint mechanism. If WWF continues being co-responsible for handling complaints, local people might raise doubts about its neutrality (E17). A more neutral mechanism could be supported by NGOs such as Centre pour le Développement et l'Environnement, CED, or Rainforest Foundation UK, or by a Cameroonian state institution. In an interview, a representative of MINAS expressed the desire for increased and more meaningful involvement in conservation around LNP that is currently not possible due to a lack of financing (E111). This would help to provide a more people-focused perspective on conservation and a counterweight to MINFOF as the only dominant ministry present in the area.

(3) The frustration of eco-guards is a driver for conflict

Eco-guards are one of the conflict parties, yet their needs and interests are too often disregarded. Local, national and international NGOs have continuously advocated for the rights of the local population, in particular the Baka. However, from a conflict resolution perspective, it is essential to give importance to the interests and needs of both parties. Chapter 5.1.3 describes the dire working and living conditions of eco-guards in Lobéké National Park. Eco-guards stated they feel unappreciated for their work and are demotivated by these conditions (F1; F16, F20).

Experiences from law enforcement agencies globally have shown that a betterment of the working and living conditions of law enforcement agents tends to lead to improved professional performance (Jonyo, 2015; Tengpongsthorn, 2017). Vice-versa it is plausible to assume that the eco-guards' frustration and lack of motivation may be a cause for inefficient work (e.g. not applying usage rights) and even violent behaviour (Breuer and Elson, 2017). Satisfying their needs for better living and working conditions will thus have a mitigating effect on the conflict.

Current plans by FTNS for reconstructing the park headquarters in Mambélé include a new base camp for eco-guards. The new base camp offers the eco-guards improved infrastructure (single housing units, electricity, laundry rooms, work spaces) and space for leisure activities (gym, football pitch, community hall). The research team strongly encourages the KfW to provide the necessary funding for these building plans so that they can be implemented within the envisioned time-frame (2019-2021).



Image 39: Eco-guard housing

Photo: PhotoVoice Participant (Eco- Guard, Bantu, male) (PV2)

This picture shows the accommodation of the park's eco-guards. There is hardly any privacy. The houses are too small to host their families during visits: "*We should be able to live and sleep well.*"

(4) Safari companies increasingly take over the role of law enforcement

Eco-guards are the primary law enforcement agents in Lobéké National Park and its buffer zone. They have the mandate to enforce Cameroonian wildlife- and conservation law and are experts on the matter. However, the research team learnt that Faro Lobeke, a company which offers hunting safaris, has begun to patrol their concessions close to Libongo without the support of eco-guards and acts as quasi law enforcement. Faro Lobeke has made arrangements with MINDEF and MINFOF to circumvent regular anti-poaching mechanisms and to carry out joint patrols with the military. The local MINFOF authorities expressed regret about this situation claiming that in the absence of eco-guards, military personnel are not aware of usage rights of the local population and poaching regulations, e.g. what animal belongs to which class and whether it is allowed to be hunted (I22).

Indeed, community members have described the behaviour of the patrols headed by safari company staff as aggressive. In interviews people claimed that there had been instances of physical abuse and that the patrols kept people from entering the forest and doing subsistence hunting (F11; C8). One Baka man

remarked: *"The safari company has taken over the forest"* (C7). Interviewees complained that they could not even enter the agro-forestry zones close to their homesteads anymore (C8). This can possibly be explained by the fact that the hunting concession and the agro-forestry zone geographically overlap, creating legal uncertainty about which zoning rights take precedence. In this scenario, the existing power relations clearly favour the safari companies. The feeling of antagonism is intensified by the circumstance that Faro Lobeke does not share the meat of shot animals with the local community as agreed upon in the Mambélé convention.

It seems that in the absence of efficient anti-poaching patrols and fast response mechanisms by eco-guards, safari companies have begun to take law enforcement into their own hands in order to protect their commercial interests – often with low tolerance for the usage rights of the local population. This holds true foremost for Faro Lobeke in Libongo, but similar claims, though less severe, were made about the company "Pepe Safari" in Zega and Dioula (F14; TWS2).

The Cameroonian state holds monopoly on the use of force, including any form of law enforcement. Therefore, MINFOF should review these activities and ensure that safari companies act within Cameroonian law. Increasing the accountability of safari companies for their anti-poaching efforts is crucial for effectively safeguarding the usage rights and Human Rights of the local population and guaranteeing a uniform standard of law enforcement around the national park.

5.4.4 Conflict 4: 'Forest people' and 'Villagers'

The villages surrounding LNP are made up by both Baka and Bantu groups, with the former often being described as "indigenous", and the latter as "agriculturalist" or "villagers" (for a critique see Lueong, 2017; Rupp, 2011). The Baka appear to be significantly poorer than their Bantu neighbours, and many NGOs have ascribed to their cause (i.e. OKANI, CEFAID, Survival International). Following the conservator, the relationship of the two groups is defined by a historically developed "master-servant"- dynamic and characterised by both domination and subordination (I39).

Without understanding the nature of the relationship between Baka and Bantu, as well as their respective needs, many problems of conservation governance of LNP cannot be recognised or are wrongly addressed. First, the conflict is central to understand the local population's needs and problems. Following a WWF- employee, the most severe Human Rights violations happened

within the villages (SW₁), and CEFAID reported that most Human Rights complaints concern relations among Baka and Bantu (EI₂). Second, the relationship adversely affects the implementation of participatory processes and equitable benefit-sharing. Third, it is often claimed that the dynamics of the relationship influenced illegal poaching activities, as the subordinate Baka are easily exploited for their intimate knowledge of the forest (I3₁). Finally, the relationship harbours considerable conflict potential that can potentially jeopardise peaceful conservation efforts.

Perceptions by Baka and Bantu participants on the nature of their relationship⁶⁴

(1) Baka participants

The Baka describe a paradoxical relationship to Bantu: on the one hand, they label Bantu their “*protectors*” and “*guardians*” and appear to hold admiration for them. On the other hand, they criticize their treatment by Bantu, who were threatening them: “*Baka among Bantu cannot talk*” (F17).

Baka participants depicted a picture of everyday discrimination, stating that they were other villagers’ scapegoats, and i.e. blamed for village thefts. At times, other villagers and local authorities forced them to hunt “big animals” and put all the blame on the Baka when caught by conservation forces: “*By giving the Baka weapons. When the Baka go to the forest, one arrests them. The Bantu put the Baka into prison*” (F17). The relation to the Bantu was primarily predicated on exchange of Baka labour for money and goods: the Baka frequently work for the more affluent Bantu villagers doing day-wage jobs (i.e. washing clothes, clearing fields). However, they are paid only little, and reported to be beaten up if failing to fulfil the work as required (TWS₁, see Table 10). Unfair working conditions have cultivated anger and sadness among the Baka.

⁶⁴ A thorough ethnographic analysis of what the conflict and frictions between the two groups entail is not in the scope of this study. The analysis is limited by the time spent in the villages as well as by the selection of the research participants.



Image 40: Finding Work in the village


Photo: PhotoVoice Participant (Student, Baka, female, 15 years) (PV10)

The participant says that she finds work in the village, i.e. washing dishes or clothes for Bantu, to earn money to buy food. *"I do not like working for Bantu, it is hard. We earn little money."*

Furthermore, Baka participants raised concerns regarding their treatment by local Bantu authorities. Following Baka, Bantu village chiefs occasionally forced them off their fields and disallowed them to do farming. Disputes between Baka and Bantu were often decided in favour of Bantu by the local gendarmerie, as *«the Bantu use wine or money to corrupt authorities so that they decide in their favour»* (TWS1). Baka also claim that doctors in public hospitals would favour Bantu patients, which was why they preferred Baka-only- hospitals. The lack of a Baka chief was felt to be especially problematic, as the Baka *“are not considered people like everyone else”* (C12). Most Baka lack birth certificates and identity cards and have tremendous difficulties to access official institutions and formal employment. When blamed by a Bantu to “hide in the forest” and being “difficult to integrate”, a Baka participant responded that the Baka did not hide, but that the lack of official documents and difficulties in obtaining them prevented Baka from sending their children to school or getting employment (SW1).

The discrimination of Baka has led to feelings of inferiority and resentment. For example, when Baka participants expressed their concern about unequal living conditions, they stated that the Bantu wanted them to “stay back” and “in the forest”: *“The Bantu do not want that the Baka become like them; they want the*

Baka to stay behind, that they stay in the forest" (C7). The self-portrayal as "staying behind" indicate ingrained feelings of inferiority. However, the Baka do not express feelings of a "cultural cringe": they often said they were proud of their cultural traditions, were highly attached to the forest and expressed regret about younger generations' perceived loss of Baka- knowledge. "Staying backwards" appears not to be related to a cultural inferiority complex, but rather to a socio-economic one. Correspondingly, one participant described the difference between Baka and Bantu as such: "He has money and you don't" (TWS1).



(2) Bantu participants

When asked about their relationship to the Baka, Bantu participants painted a picture of both togetherness and difference. They frequently referred to the Baka as their "brothers", stating that they were "together". There was a "culture- mix" between Baka and Bantu, as the number of inter-ethnic marriages had increased, and the two groups shared their daily lives and problems: "[...] today, the Baka live in harmony with the Bantu." (TWS2). The difference between the two ethnic groups was above all a matter of appearance: "If an individual identifies as Baka or

150 Results

Bantu, it is not discrimination but a manner of matching the individual's appearance to an ethnic group » (ibidem).



Image 41: Joint celebration of Baka and Bantu

Photo: PhotoVoice participant (Farmer, Bantu, male, 42 years) (PV11)

The participant took a picture of a celebration in his village. *"Celebrations are always good to forget problems, to laugh and talk and exchange. Baka and Bantu celebrate together"*

Simultaneously, however, they described the Baka as guardians of the forest who did not truly belong to the village: *« The forest, that's them [...] When the Baka is in the village, he is not feeling comfortable, he is not like us*" (F10). It was the Bantu that brought the Baka "out of the forest", and the Baka were not fully adapted to "modern" village life yet. Following Bantu participants, the Baka were not "modern" for the following reasons: they preferred traditional medicine over hospital examinations; they did not change their clothes after working in the fields and lacked normal hygiene standards, and they were not able to plan ahead, living in the present moment instead (F15; TWS2). However, the "modernisation" of the Baka was only a matter of time, since they were already interested in Western education and clothing (TWS2).

The assumed cultural superiority leads the Bantu to position themselves as spokesmen of the Baka. Bantu would frequently speak for Baka during community meetings and mixed focus groups discussions– often with apparently benevolent intentions, but at times in derogatory manner by belittling the Baka's alleged lack of knowledge, i.e. *"He [a Baka man] cannot even write his own name"* (C11).

In general, the Bantu argued that the Baka's apparent socio-economic disadvantages and behavioural inferiority was a result of the Baka's own attitudes and specifics: the Baka always sat behind them during discussions as this was their "nature" (F15). The economic « backlog » ("rétard") of the Baka was mainly due to their « laziness »: « *The Baka are very lazy, which makes it difficult to improve their living conditions* » (TWS2). Furthermore, the Bakas' "nomadic" way of life did not allow them to sustain income generating activities over a longer period. In sum, the Bantu ascribe the Baka's marginalisation to their lack of assimilation: "We do not marginalise the Baka, but it is their way of life that marginalises them" (ibidem).




Table 10: Theatre - Workshop Dioula 3		
Scene instructions: "Two Baka meet two Bantu. What happens?"		
Theatre-Workshop	Baka Participants (TWS₁) Language: Baka	Bantu Participants (TWS₂) Language: French
Description of Play	Two Baka men act as Bantu who from the beginning belittle the Baka actors. The Bantu actors tell the Baka actors to sit somewhere else and take their seats. The Baka then sit on the ground. The Bantu tell the Baka that they will give them XAF 1.000 if they carried out some work for them. The Bantu leave, and the Baka start working. A woman arrives, selling food. The Baka go to her and sit down. Suddenly, the Bantu return. Realising that the Baka are not working, they start shouting and threaten them with wooden sticks. They force the Baka to work hard labour and don't allow them to stop even when hot, thirsty, and tired. They beat and scream at them.	Two Bantu men are sitting together in a bar drinking and smoking. Two Baka men enter the scene and are immediately offered seats. The two Bantu move away a few meters and discuss among themselves. When they come back they offer the Baka drinks. They drink together, dance and joyfully hug each other. One of the Baka gets very drunk and bumps into one of the Bantu. The others sustain him and seem to be walking him home.
Reflection Interviews	One male participant tears up while watching the scene. When inquired how they feel watching the scene, another participant says "it is not good". A young man describes the scene as follows: two young Baka men had to work for Bantu but stopped when it started raining. The Bantu then forced them to continue working. Many participants start discussing and say: "That happens all the time". When asked how to improve the situation, one participant replies: "We Baka have to get along with each other; we have to do our own work, and not work for the Bantu". Another participant says that there are problems with Bantu: "He has money, and you don't". When asked if their relation to the Bantu has always been like this, one	According to the participants the difference between Baka and Bantu has mostly withered away: "Before they used to work for us, but now we are together". Baka and Bantu interact, inter-marry and share the same problems. However, during the conversation participants increasingly focus on the differences between Bantu and Baka and portray the Baka as essentially "backwards": "The Baka don't want to live like us, they want to stick to their traditions". They also argue that the Baka themselves are to blame for their own socio-economic problems: they move around a lot; when a Baka person dies, the rest of the family abandons the homestead, "you need to be more stable to improve your socio-economic

	<p>participant replies: "It has always been like that... They refuse to give you money if you do not work as they want". Another participant stands up and adds: "The Bantu are above Baka; they are always there for us". He criticizes that the Baka always go to the Bantu and behave like slaves; they should stop doing that. He states that the Baka turn the Bantu in what he is. He criticizes that the Baka are not holding together, and that there are disagreements within the Baka community as to how and if to work for the Bantu.</p>	<p>situation"; "We do not marginalise them, it is their way of life that marginalises them".</p> <p>They give more examples to stress these points: 1) During harvest season Baka demand daily up-front payments for working on the fields of Bantu, that Bantu cannot make these payments, because they only earn money from selling their crops at the end of the season, the Baka do not understand this; 2) Baka never change their clothes after working in the fields, they lack normal hygiene standards.</p>
<p>Interpretation by Conflict Team</p>	<p>The portrayal of the Bantu as aggressors who chase the Baka away from their chairs, forcing them to sit on the ground (as unequal's), and who beat and threaten them, is telling. Obviously, the Baka perceive, and want others to perceive, the Bantu as authoritative oppressors; they enact a slave- master relationship. Why did they choose to look at their relationship to the Bantu from that perspective? Most probably because they feel suppressed and inferior. However, no relationship is as simple and black and white as a master-slave dichotomy might suggest, and one participant's statement ("the Baka turn the Bantu in what he is") points to the complex dialectics of that relationship.</p>	<p>The friendly interaction in the scene strongly contradicts the impressions from the theatre and interviews with Baka participants. During the scene, the team's research assistant whispers: "They are lying". It could be that the participants are very aware of the unfair discrimination towards the Baka, which they might partially sustain through their behaviour, but equally aware of the interest NGOs take in Baka's rights and therefore try to portray themselves in a good light in the team's presence - after all, they asked at the beginning of the reflection interview whether the team was only there for the Baka. Whatever the reasons, the scene in the larger context of the theatre clearly reveals a pronounced structural divide between the two ethnic groups in Dioula, in social, economic and cultural terms. This confirms previous findings of prescribed stereotypes and narratives of the Baka as traditional and backwards and their alleged unwillingness and inability to integrate into modern life.</p>

		<p>Participants seem to believe that it's "their own fault" that they live in poverty.</p> <p>A more benevolent interpretation could be that Bantu participants indeed view their Baka neighbours as their equals and have no reservations against them, but they are unable to change the underlying structural divisions. This may frustrate them and lead them to make statements as during the reflection, i.e. blaming the Baka for their problems.</p>
<p>Source: own data</p>		

Indigenous people: villagers or forest- people?

It is obvious to any visitor to LNP that the Baka have less socio-economic resources than their Bantu neighbours: their houses are of lower quality, their average life- expectancy is low and they appear to suffer from numerous health issues. The Baka have no legal representation, as local authorities are, without exception, all non-Baka. In addition, Baka appear to encounter problems to lobby for their needs within participatory processes of LNPs' buffer zones (also see Chapter 5.2.6).

Baka's widespread alcoholism is often exploited for cheap labour or illegal poaching (E1₄; E1₂; E1₇). As an activist in Bayanga's Human Rights Centre put it: "*It is considerably easy to abuse them; they work all day if you promise them one glass of alcohol*" (I30). The Baka's marginalisation is also expressed in spatial terms: most Baka houses are situated at village outskirts.



Image 42: Fight at Funeral

PhotoVoice participant (Farmer, Baka, male, 45 years) (PV 18)

The participant took this picture during a funeral. The picture has a negative connotation: it shows people that are drunk. *"They are drunk and got into a fight"*. When asked if there are problems with alcohol in his village, he says: *"Women and men have too many problems with alcohol"*.




Image 43: Drinking Alcohol

Photo: PhotoVoice Participant (Student, Baka, female, 15 years) (PV10)

The participant took a picture of her uncle and her father drinking alcohol. The picture has a positive connotation: they are drinking right next to their family house. She does not like it when they drink outside in the village, as they will attract problems, and get into fights. *"When they drink at home, there are no problems"*..

What life is best for the Baka appears to be a contentious issue for all stakeholders, who ascribe them different needs and aspirations. On the one hand, Baka are depicted as marginalised hunter-gatherers, whose lifestyle and aspirations differ substantially from Bantu- "villagers", but who are forcefully assimilated into village-life. Following this view, Baka are dependent on forest resources, and cannot engage in activities such as livestock-keeping and agriculture; Baka did not even like non-bushmeat (E12). At times, this depiction is tinged with an ideological notion: following an anthropologist, the Baka are "unconsciously resisting the capitalist system and mindset" (E14). According to this view, the Baka need special support and Baka-only development programs. This portrayal sits surprisingly well with Bantu-accounts of the Bakas' alleged "non-modernity" and their difficulties to be integrated into village-life.

On the other hand, the Baka are represented as assimilated villagers with similar interests as their Bantu neighbours. This depiction is in line with accounts of most Baka participants. At odds with the common portrayal of the Baka as "forest-people", Baka participants told us they preferred living in the village over living in the forest, as "*we are not animals*" (C10). While holding great value for the forest, their "original habitat", the Baka emphasized that they have left the forest as their permanent home and were now interested in farming and livestock. Unlimited access to the forest is desired for a few months a year to "*do rituals, such as the Jengi⁶⁵, to do little activities... to educate the children*" (F17). During PhotoVoice interviews, it became apparent what the Baka value about village life: wooden houses, water wells, access to hospitals and schools. While one must keep in mind that only a fraction of Baka habitants in LNP's buffer-zone were interviewed, this account allows for a different assessment of Baka needs and aspirations. Here, the Baka advocate for equal opportunities and living standards within the village and express a desire for integration.

This report will not engage in debates if these accounts of Baka are already a sign of Baka being the victims of "cultural dominance" or if they only said so because researchers were present. Rather, it assumes that the "truth" moves in between these two accounts: it might be that there are Baka who prefer living in the forest, while others prefer living in the village, and others like to do both. Confronted with different development programmes, it is also highly likely that Baka individuals try to "fit" themselves into different development-frames

⁶⁵ The „Jengi“-ceremony honours the chief forest spirit to the Baka, the Jengi. It involves singing, dancing, and hunting.

(Lueong, 2016). To address Baka needs, it is imperative to look beyond ideological accounts relating to common binaries, such as “indigenous people vs. villagers” or “modern – traditional”, and to allow for contradictions within Baka communities, as individuals might hold divergent views and aspirations.

It is also important to note that the popular framing and marketing of Baka as indigenous people whose “home” lies in the forest might further exacerbate the conflict between Baka and Bantu groups and hamper the Baka’s integration into village- life. While this popular framing might help the cause of other indigenous people around the globe, “using the same technique for the Baka, who have already been permanently displaced from the forest and are now struggling to make a home on the roadsides [...], is not so helpful [...] [and instead] helps to amplify new conflicts” (Lueong, 2017: 167). Indeed, it appears as if the depiction of Baka as “non-modern forest- people” allows Bantu to paternalize the Baka and to turn a blind eye to inequality and marginalisation.

To counter political marginalization, it is vital to recognize and formally acknowledge Baka settlements and traditional authorities. This demand was also brought forward by Baka representatives during the stakeholder workshop (SW1, Annex 12).

A holistic approach to the conflict must equally consider the needs and aspirations of Bantu groups. Bantu participants often lamented the perceived preferential treatment of the Baka by NGOs, even though “*the park concerns everybody*” (TWS2). While most Bantu are also dependent on forest resources, their needs are often neglected, and they receive little outside support. This is a problem, as the privilege of Baka needs harbours the potential to reinforce social distinctions aka “us vs. them” (Rupp 2011) and the perceived ‘positive discrimination’ of the Baka is a source of conflict between the two groups (Rupp, 2011; Lueong, 2016).

6 Recommendations

Following Baynham-Herd et al. (2018: 181), policy interventions targeted at conservation conflicts can be broadly categorised into three types: “technical”, “cognitive”, and “structural”. Technical interventions attempt to influence the external environment. They may include the placement of billboards or the erection of fences. Cognitive interventions target behavioural change. They may include information dissemination, livelihood education, or conservation awareness campaigns. Structural interventions, by contrast, attempt to change the entire context itself. These may include financial instruments (i.e. insurances, compensations), alternative livelihoods or the creation of new rules. Commonly, they also target the social dimension of conflicts, i.e. stakeholder engagement, mediation programmes and conflict transformation efforts.

The recommendations of this report include all three types of interventions. The latter are considered a *conditio sine qua non* for effective conservation efforts and poverty alleviation. No billboard will be efficient if adjacent communities do not at least accept the park and its rules.

All recommendations given in the following table refer to explicit standards, such as basic human needs and basic human rights. These standards are non-negotiable and must be met. The recommendations have been derived from the analysis of the gathered data in the field and the evidence is provided in the respective chapters. Certain parts of the recommendations were developed during stakeholder workshops on the local and the national level (for full overview of the workshop results, see Annex 12).

The recommendations are categorised into three different priority levels:

- **Category A: High Priority** – Critical requirement (‘Must- have’). An essential intervention to improve the park’s governance
- **Category B: Medium Priority** – Conditional requirement (‘Should- have’). An important intervention to improve the park’s governance, but not urgent
- **Category C: Low Priority** – Optional requirement (‘Could- have’). A desirable enhancement to the park’s governance

160 Recommendations

Table 11: Overview of recommendations

Priority levels			
A: High; Critical; 'Must-have'	B: Medium; Conditional; 'Should-have'	C: Low; Optional; 'Could-have'	
Theme	Recommended Activity(-ies)	Priority	No.
Aim 1: LNP's park management is more efficient, effective, and profitable			
Improve Lobéké PA management	Improvement of living situation and working conditions of park employees	A	1.1
	Establishment of a direct line of communication between FTNS and park management	B	1.2
	Revision of MoUs between FTNS, MINFOF and WWF	A	1.3
	Employment of additional and more suitable personnel	A	1.4
Improve trilateral cooperation of TNS parks	Regular exchange and harmonised approaches of TNS parks	B	1.5
Improve attraction of LNP for tourists	Reconstruction of Djembe	B	1.6
	Creation of a website for Lobéké National Park	C	1.7
	Signature of the agreement on trans-boundary visas for TNS-visitors	C	1.8
	Provision of trans-boundary touristic circuits	C	1.9
Aim 2: Conservation efforts involve the local population and do not harm, but support local people's livelihoods			
Benefits through effective revenue sharing mechanisms	Revision of existing revenue sharing mechanisms	A	2.1

Recommendations 161

Theme	Recommended Activity(-ies)	Priority	No.
Benefits through direct employment	Training and employment of local "conservation champions"	B	2.2
	Employment of unarmed assistant eco-guardians from the villages to work in buffer-zone	B	2.3
Benefits from alternative livelihood strategies (ALS)	Provision of alternative livelihood strategies for local population (ALS)	A	2.4
	Establishment of NTFP value chains	C	2.5
	Provision of basic infrastructure	A	2.6
Improved livelihoods through governmental support			
Improved benefits of community forests	Provision of financial and administrative assistance to community forests	B	2.7
	Revision of the 'Carbon Zone' approach	C	2.8
	Adaptation of number, size and location of community forests	C	2.9
Improved access to natural resources	Revision of rules for community zone within LNP	B	2.10
	Improvement of land use planning	B	2.11
	Lobbying for inclusive and participatory forest law	A	2.12
Aim 3: Conflicts surrounding LNP are decreased and sustainably manage			
Human wildlife co-existence	Risk- and damage analysis of Human-Wildlife Conflicts	A	3.1

162 Recommendations

Theme	Recommended Activity(-ies)	Priority	No.
	Establishment of a functioning Human-Wildlife Conflict compensation mechanism	B	3.2
Improved communication between stakeholders	Institutionalisation of a constant dialogue between eco-guards and the local population	B	3.3
	Creation of a forum for dialogue and cultural exchange between Baka and Bantu groups	B	3.4
	Inclusion of Bantu in development programmes	B	3.5
Respect and protection of Human Rights	Revision of complaint mechanism against Human Rights violations	A	3.6
	Provide Human Rights trainings for eco- guards and local population	A	3.7
Empowerment of Indigenous Population	Provision of Identity Cards and Birth Certificates for Baka	A	3.8
	Equal employment opportunities and affirmative action for Baka	B	3.9
	Legal recognition of Baka settlements as villages	B	3.10
Review of law enforcement practices	Supervision of law enforcement practices of private sector in buffer zone	A	3.11
	Termination of bush meat auctions	B	3.12
Aim 4: The buffer zone of LNP is sustainably managed and respects and protects the usage- rights of the local population			
Impact of natural resource extraction in buffer zone on conservation efforts	Impact- analysis of legal and illegal logging and mining as well as bush meat trade on biodiversity in the buffer zone	B	4.1

Recommendations 163

Theme	Recommended Activity(-ies)	Priority	No.
Secure and transparent usage rights	Ensure that private sector respects traditional usage rights in LNP's buffer zone	A	4.2
	Management and Microzoning of UFAs and ZICGCS	A	4.3
Restructuring of Lobéké landscape platforms and consultative forums	Re-organize and re-structure Lobéké landscape platforms and consultative forums	B	4.4

7 Conclusion

Almost twenty years ago, Lobéké National Park was set up to provide protection to its spectacular biodiversity, including critically endangered species such as forest elephants, lowland gorillas, chimpanzees, sitatungas and bongo. Due to its exceptional natural value, the park has been declared World Heritage by UNESCO in 2012.

However, LNP has made international headlines for alleged Human Rights abuses against park residents. Its unique biodiversity is in decline, and levels of poaching have not decreased. Most park residents are living in conditions of extreme poverty: the PhotoVoice- images included in this report elucidate the severe deprivation of basic human needs. The majority of local communities depends on forest resources to eke out a living, as there is no other alternative to survive. Clearly, the park management plan's promise of "integrating conservation and poverty alleviation" (MINFOF, 2014) has not materialised yet.

This research indicates that the failure to provide both effective conservation and poverty alleviation is, on the one hand, "park- made" and due to management shortcomings. On the other, it is due to structural problems that exceed the park's direct responsibility and are related to the deficient management of its buffer-zone.

"Park- made": Management shortcomings

The park management has troubles fulfilling its primary responsibility, namely rule enforcement and monitoring. Both are critical components of effective conservation. Rules must be enforced to prevent overexploitation – that's almost a tautology, as Gibson et al. remark (Gibson, William and Ostrom, 2005: 275; also see Hayer and Ostrom, 2005; Bruner et al., 2001; Bruner et al., 2004; McShane and Wells, 2004). Wildlife trafficking is a roaring global business and the economic incentives for illegal exploitation of LNP's valuable resources, e.g. ivory, are extremely high.

However, LNP's park management does not have the necessary administrative and financial capacities to protect its flora and fauna (Chapter 5.1) it is severely understaffed and underfunded. Expertise in effective conservation management is found wanting, yet inadequate working conditions hardly attract qualified personnel. The eco- guards appear to be largely dissatisfied with their working and living conditions and perceive employment in LNP as a "punishment". Conflicts over responsibilities and mandates in the park's managerial set- up

cripple decision-making processes and contribute to the park's inefficiency (Chapter 5.1).

Furthermore, residents are not involved in the management of the resources they depend on (Chapter 5.2). This is not only noteworthy as it fails to fulfil normative requirements by Cameroonian forest law, international and national Human Rights conventions (e.g. UNDRIP), and Germany's Human Rights guideline (BMZ, 2013).

More importantly, it also constitutes a grave governance defect. Following Common Pool Resource Governance-theory and numerous empirical studies, local involvement is instrumental for effective conservation (Ostrom, 1990; Wells and Brandon, 1992; Hayer and Ostrom, 2005; Watson et al., 2014; Twinamatsiko et al., 2014). Involving park residents in enforcement and monitoring has shown to be a significant factor in protecting vegetation density and forest cover across the globe (Ostrom and Hayer, 2005: 616). In addition, it is assumed that local knowledge is better equipped to design institutions meant to solve local problems such as overexploitation, and that participation will result in use-rules that are considered legitimate – in contrast to external rule-impositions: *“Those who have relied on the resources for their own livelihoods for long periods of time, or perceive it to be their right to exploit the natural resource system, may continue their old practices and engage in violent protests when officials are sent to enforce a law that is not perceived locally as legitimate”* (Ostrom and Hayer, 2005: 600).

While LNP's management plan harbours great instruments to involve local communities in park management, this research shows that the bulk of participatory mechanisms is not working (Chapter 5.2.5): local communities are not involved in patrols or monitoring, employment opportunities by the park management are sporadic and short-term, and the “community zone” inside the park is largely unheard of. Locals do not even have access to the park's touristic attractions, and it is likely that none of them has ever been to the *Mirador* (touristic viewing platform).⁶⁶

There is strong evidence that the lack of participation obstructs conservation efforts: continuous levels of poaching clearly show that rules are not adhered to (Chapter 5.1.5). It appeared that many locals are not even aware of the exact content of use-rules and hunting quotas. Furthermore, interviews and focus group discussions revealed that residents perceive the park as an alien construct which

⁶⁶ A woman in Zega found that particularly disappointing: “Only tourists can enter the park, but we [villagers] would also like to go and see the wild animals” (F15)

was forced onto them by external actors and the park's primary objective is not understood. As a result, the park is perceived as an antagonist to development, and constraints on forest use are neither considered legitimate nor fair. As a young agitated man in Socambo summed it up: "*The climate convention wants Africa to reduce CO₂, to protect its forests. You impose that, but what is our benefit?*" (C9).

The negative perception of conservation provides a breeding ground for conflicts (Chapter 5.4). This research identified two main conflicts directly linked to LNP's conservation efforts: the conflict between eco-guards and local communities, and between wildlife and humans. Both are insufficiently responded to by the park management. The complaint mechanism against Human Rights abuses is ineffective: it is difficult to access, and many residents do not even know of its existence. Conflict transformation also requires spaces for dialogue between eco-guards and residents, but there are none. As a result, mutual mistrust and fear prevail. While wildlife-encroachment is perceived as an existential threat by all villagers, the park does little to mitigate its risks. Advices by park authorities to "*complain to the gorilla directly*" illustrate either a lack of concern or administrative overload. Whatever the reasons, research participants feel a lack of support on crop raiding and bear grudge: "*Elephants are more protected than humans*" (F11).

Context matters: the park's buffer zone

While there is significant room for improvement in the park's overall management performance, some of the challenges exceed its direct control and responsibility. They are, however, related to the management of the "landscape" the park is situated in: its 5,959 km² large buffer zone. The buffer zone is meant to integrate conservation and development objectives. However, its management is characterized by lack of investment in basic infrastructure, weak integration of local livelihood needs, conflicting government policies, and lack of control.

First, the extreme poverty prevailing in local communities (Chapter 5.3) is not caused (and cannot be solved) by the park itself. It is rather due to the lack of provision of basic infrastructure in the entire buffer zone, where most communities are situated (in fact, only few families live near or inside the park). While the park can address this lack through isolated community projects (and indeed allocates financial means to few (not yet implemented) initiatives), the extensive provision of schools, health-care centres, sanitary facilities and roads clearly exceed its objective, mandate, and capacity.

Second, many of the land use restrictions that trouble local communities are directly linked to the various concessions of private companies. Following local

accounts, logging and safari companies aggressively defend their interests against local resource- users (Chapter 5.3.5). Participatory mapping indicates that the gazetting and zoning process of the buffer zone did not consider local livelihood needs (Chapter 5.2.3).

Furthermore, commercial activities by private companies pose serious threats against biodiversity and likely have a greater impact on its decline than local resource use. Reportedly, logging companies harvest more timber within their concessions than allowed. Mining explorations in proximity to the park are actively encouraged by the government– in disregard of the fact that mining damages flora and fauna. Both logging and mining companies attract skilled workers from other areas of Cameroon, who actively engage in bushmeat hunting (Chapter 5.1.6).

Third, the political and financial integration of local stakeholders via revenue sharing and community managed zones is troubled by elite- capture, corruption, and lack of transparency (Chapter 5.2.6). Instruments such as community hunting zones and community forests are based upon unrealistic assumptions of the social equity of local “communities”: neither women nor Baka needs are sufficiently represented, and the needs of the latter are too often disregarded. The discrimination and marginalisation of Baka by their Bantu neighbours is both cause and effect of a widely construed binary of “villagers” and “forest people” that does not do the Baka any favours.

Conservation as Social Intervention in a Complicated Setting

Brandon convincingly argued 20 years ago that “a park cannot be held responsible for curing structural problems such as unequal resource allocation, corruption, economic injustice, and market failures” (Brandon, 1998: 418). However, parks are not isolated “islands” but part of a wider “landscape”. This is acknowledged in LNP’s management plan, and for good reason: a mismatch between socio- economic context and park hamper the identification of proximate and root causes of biodiversity threats (ibidem: 415ff; also see Maginnis, Jackson and Dudley, 2004; World Resources Institute, 2019).

There should not be any illusion that conservation is a “social intervention in complicated settings” (ibidem: 417), and this report has highlighted some of the variables of this setting in Lobéké. It puts forth a total of 37 recommendations for improving the governance of Lobéké National Park and its buffer zone (Chapter 6). These recommendations are based in the realisation that “context matters”, and, following insights of CPRG- theory, address questions of equity, capacity building, and conflict- resolution. Furthermore, these recommendations

underscore the importance of stakeholder- involvement. While acknowledging that the integration of conservation and development objectives is important, there are going to be trade- offs. These trade- offs ought to be negotiated by all stakeholders, particularly by those that are most affected by them: local communities.

In order to implement these recommendations and to respond to the identified challenges, long- term political and financial commitment is imperative. As a park is not a source of revenue (and should not be), financial support is required. Conservation is a global objective with primarily local costs, and Germany and other donors ought to significantly contribute to improve the governance of Lobéké National Park.

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172 Bibliography

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180 Bibliography

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9 Annexes

Annex 1 Objective system

IMPACT									
Conflicts over resources in LNP are reduced and an effective and sustainable approach to conservation is in place without constraining the needs of the local population.									
OUTCOME									
1	Actors and stakeholders implement the study recommendations to safeguard the interests and needs of the local population.	2	By taking the recommendations into account, the park management promotes sustainable livelihood strategies in line with conservation objectives of LNP.	3	Through the implementation of the study recommendations actors and stakeholders solve conflicts in a sustainable and non-violent way.				
4	By implementing the study recommendations effective biodiversity and ecosystem conservation mechanisms are enabled by the LNP management.				4	Preventive and responsive strategies of the park management against poaching and other activities threatening biodiversity are analysed and assessed.			
OUTPUT: Develop recommendations (including cost and time analysis) based on prior stakeholder feedback.									
1.1	Park management structures and processes (de jure & de facto) are analysed and evaluated; recommendations for the improvement of participatory processes are developed.	1.2	The alignment of the LNP management system with international guidelines is assessed.	2	Possible alternative livelihood strategies (including tourism as an income strategy), which do not jeopardize conservation efforts, are identified.	3	Existing conflicts in the LNP area are analysed and measures to solve or transform conflicts are proposed.	4	Conduct interviews and observations to identify activities contradicting biodiversity conservation that are happening in the LNP area.
ACTIVITIES									
For Output 1.1									
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Conduct interviews, make observations and read inquiries to identify and verify stakeholders' perceptions, key needs, interests and expectations towards LNP. - Collect and review official documents of LNP. - Detect actual implementation of participatory mechanisms on the ground [and constraints on both sides identified]. - Review official documents of LNP regarding the inclusion of other stakeholders' needs and the sharing of benefits. 									
For Outputs 1.1 and 1.2									
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Literature review: generate overview of approaches towards participatory PA management. - Assess actual implementation of park mgmt. (read external reports, observation, interviews) - Read and consult international and national guidelines and standards concerning park mgmt. 									
For Output 1.2									
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Assess existing livelihoods of local population and assess their interest and needs. - Identify positive and negative livelihood impacts of LNP for local population. - Identify and analyse conflicts between stakeholders in the LNP area using various conflict analysis tools. - Assess current conflict resolution/transformation mechanisms. - Evaluate effectiveness of existing responses to illegal activities. 									

Annex 2 Ethical guidelines

1. **Protecting research participants and honouring trust:** We endeavour to protect the physical, social and psychological well-being of those whom we study and to respect their rights, interests, sensitivities and privacy;
2. **Anticipating harms:** We are sensitive to the possible consequences of our work and endeavour to guard against predictably harmful effects. Consent from subjects does not absolve us from our obligation to protect research participants as far as possible against the potentially harmful effects of research;
3. **Avoiding undue intrusion:** We are aware of the intrusive potential of some of our enquiries and methods;
4. **Negotiating informed consent:** We inform the subjects of our study about: the purpose(s) of the study, and the anticipated consequences of the research; the identity of funders and sponsors; the anticipated uses of the data; possible benefits of the study and possible harm or discomfort that might affect participants; issues relating to data storage and security; and the degree of anonymity and confidentiality which may be afforded to informants and subjects;
5. **Fair return for assistance:** There should be no economic exploitation of individual informants, translators and research participants; fair return should be made for their help and services;
6. **Participants' intellectual property rights:** It should be recognised that research participants have contractual and/or legal, interests and rights in data, recordings and publications, although rights will vary according to agreements and legal jurisdiction.
7. **Participants' involvement in research:** As far as is possible we try and involve the people being studied in the planning and execution of our research projects, and we recognise that their obligations to the participants or the host community may not end.

Statement: Information for Participants/Stakeholders/Others

We are students from the Seminar für Ländliche Entwicklung (SLE) of the Humboldt- University of Berlin. We have come to the Lobéké- National Park to study the social and ecological impact of its current management, to analyse potential conflicts surrounding the park and to study how a participatory management could be put into practice. The study is co- financed by KfW development bank.

We do the study to the best of our knowledge and belief and none of our partner organisations impinges upon our study, data analysis, or findings. We are not here to solve conflicts and we are not here to solve problems pertaining to poverty. We hope that our study will lead to an improved participatory management of the National Park and that all stakeholders will benefit from its existence. While doing research, we follow do no harm -principles and ethical guidelines for good research practice. We always work for the greatest possible benefit of our target groups. There are no adverse consequences if participation in our research is declined. The primary data obtained will be kept safe and secure. We promise anonymity and confidentiality to all participants. The data analysis and the study report will be made public and shared with KfW, WWF, the SLE and other stakeholders. Anyone interested in the study will have free access to it.

Annex 4 Citation code

Citation Code	Method	Resource of Information/ Interviewee	Organization/ Village	Position/ Characteristic	Location	Date of Interview
C1	Community Meeting	cooperative members	Women's Cooperative	29 women, and 2 men; 5 Baka	Mambélé carrefour, House of Women's Coopérative	28.08.2018
C2	Community Meeting	Villagers	Mambélé chefferie	35, mostly Bantu	Mambélé chefferie	31.08.2018
C3	Community Meeting	Baka	Mambélé carrefour	About 40 Baka	Mambélé Carrefour, École Primaire	31.08.2018
C4	Community Meeting	Villagers	Mambélé carrefour	Villagers; mostly who works with LNP, mostly Bantu men	Mambélé Carrefour, bar	28.08.2018
C5	Community Meeting	Villagers	Koumela	About 50 Bantu; ~ 30 men and 20 women	Koumela, Community Hall	03.09.2018
C6	Community Meeting	Villagers and representatives	Libongo	Baka and Bantu	Libongo, Community Hall	07.09.2018
C7	Community Meeting	Baka	Aviation (Pk 59), Libongo	8 Baka (8 Men; aged 40-60)	Aviation (Pk 59), Libongo, House of the Baka chief	08.09.2018
C8	Community Meeting	Villagers	Bela	Baka (5 Men, 5 Women) and Bantu (around 65 Men and 12 women), Refugees from Central African Republic	Bela, Primary School	08.09.2018
C9	Community Meeting	Villagers	Socambo	Bantu (27 men, 9 women), one Baka	Socambo, Carrefour	16.09.2018
C10	Community Meeting	Baka	Mambélé carrefour	20-30 Baka (15 men and 15 women)	Mambélé Carrefour, Baka Campement (around 1km away)	17.09.2018

Citation Code	Method	Resource of Information/ Interviewee	Organization/ Village	Position/ Characteristic	Location	Date of Interview
C11	Community Meeting	Villagers	Zega (PK14)	40, mostly Bantu, but several Baka present; Mix of men and women	Zega (Pk14), Community hut/space of the village	21.09.2018
C12	Community Meeting	Villagers	Dioula	Baka (20), Bantu (5); mainly men	Dioula, Community hut/space of the village	23.09.2018
F1	Focus Group Discussion (FGD)	Eco-Guards	MINFOF Lobéké	7 men; 1 woman	HQ Mambélé	29.08.2018
F2	Focus Group Discussion (FGD)	Baka, Focus Group Nr.1	Mambélé Carrefour	2 women, 3 men; 30-50 years old	Mambélé Carrefour	01.09.2018
F3	Focus Group Discussion (FGD)	Baka, Focus Group Nr.2	Mambélé Carrefour	3 men, 2 women 30-50 years old	Mambélé Carrefour, Campement Nkoulou	01.09.2018
F4	Focus Group Discussion (FGD)	Baka, Focus Group Nr. 3	Mambélé Carrefour	4 men, 12 women	Mambélé Carrefour, Campement Ndeboh	01.09.2018
F5	Focus Group Discussion (FGD)	Villagers, Focus Group Nr. 1	Mambélé Chefferie	Bantu and Baka, mostly male	Membélé Chefferie	02.09.2018
F6	Focus Group Discussion (FGD)	Villagers, Focus Group Nr. 1	Koumela	21 Women, various ages	Koumela, Community Hall	03.09.2018
F7	Focus Group Discussion (FGD)	Villagers, Focus Group Nr. 2	Koumela	Mostly Bantu men	Koumela, Community Hall	04.09.2018
F8	Focus Group Discussion (FGD)	Baka, Focus Group Nr.1	Ndongo	Men and women; mostly over 30 years old	Ndongo, Primary School Building	05.09.2018
F9	Focus Group Discussion (FGD)	Baka, Focus Group Nr.2	Ndongo	3 men, 2 women 16-25 years old	Ndongo, Primary School Building	05.09.2018
F10	Focus Group Discussion (FGD)	Villagers, Focus Group Nr.1	Libongo	15 Representatives and notables of Libongo, both Baka (4) and Bantu (11)	Libongo, House of the Chefferie	07.09.2018
F11	Focus Group Discussion (FGD)	Villagers, Focus Group Nr.2	Libongo	15 Producers, Farmers and fishermen, all male	Libongo, House of the Chefferie	07.09.2018
F12	Focus Group Discussion (FGD)	SEFAC-workers	Libongo/ SEFAC	3 workers and around 4 other villagers (some notables)	Libongo, House of the Chefferie	08.09.2018

Citation Code	Method	Resource of Information/ Interviewee	Organization/ Village	Position/ Characteristic	Location	Date of Interview
F13	Focus Group Discussion (FGD)	Baka	Socambo	20 people: men, women, children	Socambo, Baka village	17.09.2018
F14	Focus Group Discussion (FGD)	Baka	Zega (PK14)	Baka (10 men, 5 women)	Zega (Pk 14), Open space in the village	21.09.2018
F15	Focus Group Discussion (FGD)	Bantu	Zega (PK14)	20 Bantu, 7 Women, 13 Men	Zega (Pk 14)	21.09.2018
F16	Focus Group Discussion (FGD)	Eco-Guards, FGD 1	MINFOF Lobéké	All male; 3 francophones, one anglophone	HQ Mambélé, Case de Passage	21.09.2018
F17	Focus Group Discussion (FGD)	Baka	Dioula	14 men	Dioula, Church	23.09.2018
F18	Focus Group Discussion (FGD)	Bantu	Dioula	Mostly men	Dioula, Pavillon/hut	23.09.2018
F19	Focus Group Discussion (FGD)	association members	WHCS (Women, health and conservation society)	19 members of the association (female)	Mambélé chefferie	24.09.2018
F20	Focus Group Discussion (FGD)	Eco-guards, FGD 2	MINFOF Lobéké	4 Ecoguards, all male	HQ Mambélé, Case de Passage	26.09.2018
F21	Focus Group Discussion (FGD)	Cacao cooperative members	GIC - Molisso	6 members, all male	Mambélé, at the house of a farmer	26.09.2018
E11	Expert Interview	Dr. Guy Merlin	GIZ	ProPSFE, GIZ Forest and Environment Support Program, Regional Coordinator East Cameroon	Yaoundé	07.08.2018
E12	Expert Interview	Victor Amougou	CEFAID	Head of CEFAID	Yaoundé, our accomodation	10.08.2018
E13	Expert Interview	Joseph Lekealem	MINFOF	Director of Wildlife and Protected Areas	Yaoundé	10.08.2018
E14	Expert Interview	Prof. Martin Eluga	University of Yaounde I	Head of Department of Arts and Archeology	Yaoundé, University Campus	10.08.2018
E15	Expert Interview	Roger Fotso	WCS	Country Director Cameroon	Yaoundé	13.08.2018

Citation Code	Method	Resource of Information/ Interviewee	Organization/ Village	Position/ Characteristic	Location	Date of Interview
El6	Expert Interview	Jackson Amouko	UNDP	/	Yaoundé	14.08.2018
El7	Expert Interview	Moise Kono	WWF Cameroon	Indigenous People responsible	Yaoundé	14.08.2018
El8	Expert Interview	Hanson Njiforti	WWF Cameroon	Country Director Cameroon	Yaoundé	16.08.2018
El9	Expert Interview	Romain Kana	FTNS	Program Officer	Yaoundé	22.08.2018
El10	Expert Interview	Alain Tsobeng	World Agroforestry Centre (ICRAF)	Assistant Scientist/ Tree Improvement	Yaoundé, ICRAF West and Central Africa Regional Office	12.10.2018
El11	Expert Interview	Lydie Ella	MINAS	Deputy Director of the Fight against Social Inclusion	Yaoundé, MINAS office	18.10.2018
El12	Expert Interview	Hanson Njiforti, Moise Kono, Zacharie Nzooh and others	WWF Cameroon	National WWF staff	Yaoundé, WWF HQ	24.10.2019
El13	Expert Interview	Dr. Théophile Zognou, Romain Kana, Alix Noiraud	FTNS	FTNS staff (Executive Director Program Officer, Consultant)	Yaoundé, FTNS Office	24.10.2018
El14	Expert Interview	Samuel Makon Wehiong	FTNS	Chair of Board of Directors FTNS	Yaoundé	14.08.2018
El15	Expert Interview	Christelle Domyou Itoumbou	KfW	Project Coordinator	KfW Office Yaoundé	16.08.2018
l1	Interview	Messe Venant	OKANI	Head of OKANI	Bertoua catholic center	22.08.2018
l2	Interview	Governor	East Region	Governor East Region	Bertoua, Governor's office	22.08.2018
l3	Interview	Alphonse Ngniado Wouala	WWF UTO-SE	Senior Forest Officer	Yokadouma, WWF office	24.08.2018
l4	Interview	Bruno Bisse Bell Bisse	Salapoumbé Sub-division	Sub-Prefect/ Head of Sub-Division	Salapoumbé, Sub-prefecture	27.08.2018

Citation Code	Method	Resource of Information/ Interviewee	Organization/ Village	Position/ Characteristic	Location	Date of Interview
l5	Interview	Nathalie Megezine	COVAREF N°3	President of COVAREF No 3; Also present are 5 COVAREF delegates (incl 3 Baka representatives)	Kika, Open Hall on the compound of CTSC	29.08.2018
l6	Interview	Staff	CTSC (Habitat 2000) logging company	Technical Staff	Kika, CTSC Office	29.08.2018
l7	Interview	Jean Richard Allo	Moloundou's Council	Mayor of the Moloundou Council	Moloundou, bar	29.08.2018
l8	Interview	Staff	Pepe Safari	Chef de Personnel	Kika, Open Hall on the compound of CTSC	29.08.2018
l9	Interview	Jean Baptiste Nste Andjolo	Moloundou Sub-division	Sub-Prefect/ Head of Sub-Division	Moloundou, Sub-Prefecture	29.08.2018
l10	Interview	Philippe Ambata	COVAREF N°2	Vice president	Mbatika	30.08.2018
l11	Interview	President CF To'okpwassi	Community Forest To'okpwassi	President of the Community Forest	Mbatika	30.08.18
l12	Interview	Brice Poka	SAB, CIBC, SEBC (Vicwood-Thanyr-Group) logging company	Social Mediator	Lokomo, Office at the Sawmill	31.08.2018
l13	Interview	Staff	Mayo Oldiri safari	Driver, Pisteur, Chef de Personnel	Koumela, Mayol Safari Camp	31.08.2018
l14	Interview	Member of the association	ASBABUK	Baka representative	Dissassoué, his house	03.09.2018
l15	Interview	Tabi Dieudonné Bessong	MINFOF Lobéké	Unity Head Finance and Administration	HQ Mambélé	04.09.2018
l16	Interview	Joseph Eben Penkem	MINFOF Lobéké	Chef Service Protection et Suivi Ecologique	HQ Mambélé	04.09.2018
l17	Interview	WWF Volunteer	WWF Lobéké	Volunteer	HQ Mambélé, in front of the building	04.09.2018
l18	Interview	Essombe	MINFOF Lobéké	Head of Tourism Unit	HQ Mambélé, Essembe's house	05.09.2018

192 Annexes

Citation Code	Method	Resource of Information/ Interviewee	Organization/ Village	Position/ Characteristic	Location	Date of Interview
l19	Interview	Olivier Njounan Njounan Tegomo	WWF Lobéké	Technical Advisor Ips, Community Coordination Officer	HQ Mambélé, Salle de Réunion	05.09.2018
l20	Interview	WWF Volunteer	WWF Lobéké	Volunteer	HQ Mambélé	05.09.2018
l21	Interview	Djibrilla Hessana	WWF Lobéké	Programme Manager (PM) WWF Yengi TNS	HQ Mambélé, WWF office	06.09.2018
l22	Interview	Chef de Poste	MINFOF Libongo	Chef de Poste Koumela	Libongo, MINFOF Office	07.09.2018
l23	Interview	Achilles Goué Mengamenya	MINFOF Lobéké	Conservator of Lobéké National Park	HQ Mambélé	07.09.2018
l24	Interview	Staff	Faro Lobeke Safari	LAB Responsible	Camp Loupondji	08.09.2018
l25	Interview	Francesco Falcucci	SEFAC logging company	Chef de Site	Libongo, SEFAC office	08.09.2018
l26	Interview	Terrance Fuh	WWF CAR	Primate habitation and Tourism	HQ Bayanga, CAR, WWF office	10.09.2018
l27	Interview	Franck Barrel Mavinga	WWF CAR	Community Development responsible APDS	HQ Bayanga, CAR	11.09.2018
l28	Interview	Martial Betoulet	Youth Association Ndima-Kali	Agent de Development	Bayanga, CAR, Doli-Lodge	12.09.2018
l29	Interview	Jean Richard Allo	Moloundou's Council	Mayor of the Moloundou Council	Moloundou	12.09.2018
l30	Interview	Guillaume Duboscq	WWF CAR	Technical advisor LAB to the conservateur	HQ Bayanga, CAR, LAB office	12.09.2018
l31	Interview	Martial- Yvon Amolet (1) Saint- Jérôme Sitamon (2)	Human Rights Centre Bayanga	(1) Juriste, ONG Maison de l'Enfant et de la femme Pygmées (MEFP) (2) Coordonnateur de MEFP	Bayanga, CAR, Human Rights Centre	13.09.2018
l32	Interview	Luis Aranz	WWF CAR	Principal Technical Advisor	HQ Bayanga, CAR, his office	13.09.2018

Citation Code	Method	Resource of Information/ Interviewee	Organization/ Village	Position/ Characteristic	Location	Date of Interview
I33	Interview	Terry Brincic	WCS	Head of research	HQ Bomassa, Congo	15.09.2018
I34	Interview	President CF	Community Forest Socambo	President CF	Socambo at our hotel	17.09.2018
I35	Interview	Former Adjoint du Maire	Socambo	Hotel Owner	Pavillon Socambo	17.09.2018
I36	Interview	Representative of CPF Socambo-Mongokélé	Comité Paysan Foret Socambo-Mongokele	RAGE (responsable des Affaires Generales de la CPF Socambo)	Pavillon Socambo	18.09.18
I37	Interview	Cyril Tchoudja	Mongokole Mining Company	Patron of MMC	Mbongoli, 70 km from Socambo	18.9.2018
I38	Interview	Joseph Etoundi	MINFOF Lobéké	Unity Head Research	His office, HQ Mambélé	22.09.2018
I39	Interview	Achilles Goué Mengamegna	MINFOF Lobéké	Conservator of Lobéké National Park	HQ Mambélé	27.09.2018
I40	Interview	Jerome Lewis	UCL ExCiteS	Co- Director	/	15.12.2018
M1	Meeting	MoU Conference on Lobéké and Boumba-Bek	Meeting with Baka, society and state representatives	ASBABUK, CEFAID, OKANI, FPP, WWF, State officials (MINAS, Justice), conservators of Boumba-Bek/Nki and Lobéké National Parks	Bertouá Catholic Center	22.08.2018
M2	Meeting	Kick-off meeting at LNP	WWF and MINFOF Lobéké	WWF- PM; Head of surveillance unit; Head of eco-tourism unit, senior staff	HQ Mambélé	27.08.2018
M3	Meeting	Ecoguards	MINFOF Lobéké	Head of units and ~20 ecoguards	HQ Mambélé	28.08.2018
M4	Meeting	Conservateur Nganggoue (1); Black (2)	WCS	Technical advisor anti-poaching, WCS (1) Controlleur communication monitoring (2)	HQ Bomassa, Congo	15.09.2018

194 Annexes

Citation Code	Method	Resource of Information/ Interviewee	Organization/ Village	Position/ Characteristic	Location	Date of Interview
M5	Meeting	Aymard Ebag Tsiokame	WCS	SMART expert; focal point for SMART data	HQ Bomassa, Congo	16.09.2018
M6	Meeting	18 members Or-Vert + 2 employees of the NGO AFEBEM	Or-Vert, AFEBEM	Or-Vert is an association for NTFPs	Mambélé Carrefour, house of the President of Or-Vert	26.09.2018
M7	Meeting	Indigenous people's workshop	CEFAID, CED, ministries, IP-representatives	NGO leaders, state officials, and IP-representatives	Hotel Mt. Fébé, Yaoundé	08.08.2018
P1	Participant Observations	GIS meeting with Arnaud Choumele	FTNS	External consultant	Yaoundé	13.08.2018
P2	Participant Observations	Chat in the car	FTNS	Research assistants and FTNS-driver	On the road between Yaoundé and Bertoua	21.08.2018
P3	Participant Observations I	MoU Conference on Lobéké and Boumba-Bek	Meeting with Baka, society and state representatives	ASBABUK, CEFAID, OKANI, FPP, WWF, State officials (MINAS, Justice), conservators of Boumba-Bek/Nki and Lobéké National Parks	Bertouá catholic center	22.08.2018
P4	Participant Observations II	MoU Conference on Lobéké and Boumba-Bek	Meeting with Baka, society and state representatives	ASBABUK, CEFAID, OKANI, FPP, WWF, State officials (MINAS, Justice), conservators of Boumba-Bek/Nki and Lobéké National Parks	Bertouá catholic center	22.08.2018
P5	Participant Observations	Chat with Alphonse Ngniado Wouala	WWF UTO-SE	Senior Forest Officer	Yokadouma, WWF office	24.08.2018
P6	Participant Observations	Chat with a local cacao farmer	Cocoa farm	Farmer	Mambélé carrefour	24.08.2018

Citation Code	Method	Resource of Information/ Interviewee	Organization/ Village	Position/ Characteristic	Location	Date of Interview
P7	Participant Observations I	Chat with Staff	WWF Lobéké	Logistician	Mambélé Camp Kombo, veranda of our hut	25.08.2018
P8	Participant Observations II	Chat with Staff	WWF Lobéké	Logistician	Mambélé Camp Kombo, veranda of our hut	25.08.2018
P9	Participant Observations	Chat with WWF volunteer	WWF Lobéké	Volunteer	HQ Mambélé	25.08.2018
P10	Participant Observations	Chat with Staff	WWF Lobéké	Logistician	HQ Mambélé, WWF Accommodation	25.08.2018
P11	Participant Observations I	Meeting with Djibrila Hessana	WWF Lobéké	Park Manager	HQ Mambélé, his office	27.08.2018
P12	Participant Observations II	Meeting with Djibrila Hessana	WWF Lobéké	Park Manager	HQ Mambélé, his office	27.08.2018
P13	Participant Observations	Meeting to discuss approaching of communities	WWF and MINFOF Lobéké	Staff	HQ Mambélé	27.08.2018
P14	Participant Observations	Chat with ASBABUK vice-president	ASBABUK	Asbabuk vice-president	On the road from Mambélé to Salapoumbé	27.08.2018
P15	Participant Observations	Introduction (facilitated by local PACEBCO staff)	Mambélé chefferie	Substitute of the chief, local PACEBCO staff, Vice-president of ASBABUK, local pastor, community members (Baka and Bantu) of Mambélé village	Mambélé chefferie, Pavillon de la chefferie	28.08.2018
P16	Participant Observations I	Introduction to the President of Or Vert	Or Vert association	President of Or Vert	Mambélé carrefour, her house	28.08.2018

Citation Code	Method	Resource of Information/ Interviewee	Organization/ Village	Position/ Characteristic	Location	Date of Interview
P17	Participant Observations II	Introduction to the President of Or Vert	Or Vert association	President of Or Vert	Mambélé carrefour, her house	28.08.2018
P18	Participant Observations	WWF volunteer	WWF Lobéké	Volunteer	HQ Mambélé	28.08.2018
P19	Participant Observations	Bertrand	WWF Lobéké	Logistician	HQ Mambélé, WWF Accommodation	28.08.2018
P20	Participant Observations	Small-Talk with Eco-guards	MINFOF Lobéké	Eco-Guards	HQ Mambélé, in front of the headquarters	28.08.2018
P21	Participant Observations	Chat with Members	COVAREF No 2	/	Mbatika	29.08.2018
P22	Participant Observations	Observing the COVAREF No.3	COVAREF No 3	/	Kika, Close to the Forest Company CTSC	29.08.2018
P23	Participant Observations	Travel to Kika	/	/	Road Mambélé-Kika	29.08.2018
P24	Participant Observations	Travel to Moloundou	/	/	Road from Mambélé to Moloundou	29.08.2018
P25	Participant Observations	Chat with Eco- Guard	MINFOF Lobéké	/	Moloundou, Restaurant	29.08.2018
P26	Participant Observations	Chat with Eco- Guard	MINFOF Lobéké	/	In the car on the way to Kika	30.08.2018
P27	Participant Observations	Chat with WWF Volunteer	WWF Lobéké	Volunteer	Car-ride to Salapoumbé	29.08.2018
P28	Participant Observations	Nsonkali Charles-Jones	OKANI	Baka, local head OKANI	Mambélé Carrefour, Restaurant	30.08.2018
P29	Participant Observations	XX feeding parrots	/	/	HQ Mambélé, next to the parrot cage	31.08.2018
P30	Participant Observations	Chat with research participants	/	/	villages around LNP	31.08.2018
P31	Participant Observations	ASBABUK vice president and his brother in law	ASBABUK	Baka, ASBABUK Vice-President	Mambélé carrefour, bar	31.08.2018

Citation Code	Method	Resource of Information/ Interviewee	Organization/ Village	Position/ Characteristic	Location	Date of Interview
P32	Participant Observations	Conversation with owner and other people	Lokomo	/	Lokomo, Restaurant/ Store	31.08.2018
P33	Participant Observations	Ecoguards	MINFOF Lobéké	/	HQ Mambélé, office	01.09.2018
P34	Participant Observations	Ecoguards	MINFOF Lobéké	/	HQ Mambélé, Case de Passage, living room	01.09.2018
P35	Participant Observations	Local pastor	Camps inside the neighbouring UFAs	Fields and small camps	from Mambélé in direction LNP	01.09.2018
P36	Participant Observations I	Ecotourism trip to "petite savanne"	LNP	with two ecoguards and a guide (pisteur)	HQ Mambélé, Camp pont cassé, petite Savanne (Mirador), Camp Petite Savanne	01.09.2018
P37	Participant Observations II	Ecotourism trip to "petite savanne"	LNP	with two ecoguards and a guide (pisteur)	HQ Mambélé, Camp pont cassé, petite Savanne (Mirador), Camp Petite Savanne	01.09.2018
P38	Participant Observations III	Ecotourism trip to "petite savanne"	LNP	with two ecoguards and a guide (pisteur)	HQ Mambélé, Camp pont cassé, petite Savanne (Mirador), Camp Petite Savanne	01.-02.09.2018
P39	Participant Observations IV	Ecotourism trip to "petite savanne"	LNP	with two ecoguards and a guide (pisteur)	HQ Mambélé, Camp pont cassé, petite Savanne (Mirador), Camp Petite Savanne	01.-02.09.2018

Citation Code	Method	Resource of Information/ Interviewee	Organization/ Village	Position/ Characteristic	Location	Date of Interview
P40	Participant Observations V	Ecotourism trip to "petite savanne"	LNP	with two ecoguards and a guide (pisteur)	HQ Mambélé, Camp pont cassé, petite Savanne (Mirador), Camp Petite Savanne	01.-02.09.2018
P41	Participant Observations	Arrival at the headquarters, Observation and talk with Ecoguard on the way back from the park	LNP	with two ecoguards and a guide (pisteur)	HQ Mambélé, Camp pont cassé, petite Savanne (Mirador), Camp Petite Savanne	02.09.2018
P42	Participant Observations	introduction and group forming	Ndongo	Baka community members and ASBABUK vice-president	Campement Ndongo/ Salapoumbé	03.09.2018
P43	Participant Observations	Introduction to Salapoumbé und Koumela	/	/	Salapoumbé and Koumela, on the road	03.09.2018
P44	Participant Observations	Harvesting at a cacao farm	Cacao farm	Farmers	close to Mambélé, Camp Kombo	03.09.2018
P45	Participant Observations	Conversation and farm visit with cacao farmers	Cacao farm	Farmers	close to Mambélé, Camp Kombo	03.09.2018
P46	Participant Observations	Visit of the community forest	Community forest To'okpwassi in Mbatika	/	Mbatika and CF To'okpwassi	04.09.2018
P47	Participant Observations	Interview with the steering board of CF To'okpwassi	Community forest To'okpwassi in Mbatika	President, ROF, Baka delegates and others; several members of the community forest's committee	Mbatika, COVAREF president's pavillon	04.09.2018
P48	Participant Observations	Observation	Mambélé carrefour	/	Mambélé Carrefour	05.-06.09.2018
P49	Participant Observations	General observation	/	/	HQ Mambélé	05.-06.09.2018
P50	Participant Observations	Eco-guard	MINFOF Lobéké	/	HQ Mambélé, outside	06.09.2018

Citation Code	Method	Resource of Information/ Interviewee	Organization/ Village	Position/ Characteristic	Location	Date of Interview
P51	Participant Observations	Unknown Baka woman	Mambélé carrefour	Villager	On the road from Mambélé Camp Kombo to Carrefour	06.09.2018
P52	Participant Observations	meeting at poste forestiere	MINFOF Libongo, Faro Safari, Libongo community	Chef of the poste forestiere, two colleagues, Oumar R. Ali (Faro Lobéké Safari) and a local notable	Libongo, poste forestiere	06.09.2018
P53	Participant Observations	Observation	/	/	Mambélé, Camp Kombo	07.09.2018
P54	Participant Observations I	Farm visit	Farming plot	Farmer and Notable	around 1.5km outside of Libongo	07.09.2018
P55	Participant Observations II	Farm visit	Farming plot	Farmer and Notable	around 1.5km outside of Libongo	07.09.2018
P56	Participant Observations	Talk with Charcoal producers	Charcoal production site	/	Libongo, in front of the SEFAC area	08.09.2018
P57	Participant Observations	Military Officer	Cameroonian Armed Forces	Head of local military post	Bela	08.09.2018
P58	Participant Observations	Reflections on Tourism and Park Management in Dzanga-Sangha	Dzanga-Sangha park	/	Bayanga, CAR	09.-14.09.2018
P59	Participant Observations	Drivers and polish physician	/	/	Monassao, CAR, catholic hospital	10.09.2018
P60	Participant Observations	shopping in the market	Bayanga, CAR	/	Bayanga, CAR	13.09.2018
P61	Participant Observations	Reflection on the stay at Nouabalé-Ndoki	/	/	HQ Bomassa, Congo	14.-16.09.2018
P62	Participant Observations	Vincent	WCS PNNN	LAB consultant	HQ Bomassa, Congo	14.09.2018
P63	Participant Observations I	Vincent	WCS PNNN	LAB consultant	HQ Bomassa, Congo	15.09.2018

200 Annexes

Citation Code	Method	Resource of Information/ Interviewee	Organization/ Village	Position/ Characteristic	Location	Date of Interview
P64	Participant Observations II	Vincent	WCS PNNN	LAB consultant	HQ Bomassa, Congo	15.09.2018
P65	Participant Observations	Eve	WCS PNNN	Employee	Bomassa village, Congo	15.09.2018
P66	Participant Observations	Informal Talks with Terry and Forest Hogg	WCS PNNN	Head of research; technical advisor anti-poaching	HQ Bomassa, Congo	15.09.2018
P67	Participant Observations	Forest Hogg and Zanne L.	WCS PNNN	Employees	Kayak tour near Bomassa, Congo	15.09.2018
P68	Participant Observations	Forest Hogg	WCS PNNN	Technical advisor anti-poaching	HQ Bomassa, Congo	15.09.2018
P69	Participant Observations I	Zanne L.	WCS PNNN	Communications	HQ Bomassa, Congo, common room	15.09.2018
P70	Participant Observations II	Zanne L.	WCS PNNN	Communications	HQ Bomassa, Congo, common room	15.09.2018
P71	Participant Observations	Chief, notables, farmers, CPFs, etc.	Socambo	chief, notables, farmers, three members of CPF, OFR-DPC (?), the Baka boatdriver of WWF in Socambo (photovoice)	Socambo	15.09.2018
P72	Participant Observations	Pangolin hunter	Socambo	Baka hunter/minion helping out the Bantu family that hosts us.	Socambo	15.09.2018
P73	Participant Observations	former Adjoint du Maire and his friend (photovoice)	Socambo	Former adjoint du maire or conseiller municipaux	Socambo, Restaurant	15.09.2018
P74	Participant Observations	Ecoguards and pisteurs	MINFOF Lobéké, villagers	/	Djembe	15.09.2018
P75	Participant Observations I	Informal talk with the LNP ecoguards	MINFOF Lobéké	On mission	Djembe	16.09.2018

Citation Code	Method	Resource of Information/ Interviewee	Organization/ Village	Position/ Characteristic	Location	Date of Interview
P76	Participant Observations II	Informal talk with the LNP ecoguards	MINFOF Lobéké	On mission	Djembe	16.09.2018
P77	Participant Observation	B.I.R. Officer Socambo	Cameroonian Armed Forces	Soldier stationed at local military post	Socambo	16.-18.09.2018
P78	Participant Observations	Visit of the illegal miners	Mbongoli	/	Mbongoli, Village 1.5 hours north of Socambo	17.09.2018
P79	Participant Observations	Chat with artisanal miners, visit of the mines and arrange meeting with MMC	Mongokele Mining Company, village and artisanal mines	Patron of MMC and Artisanal miners	Mbongoli	17.09.2018
P80	Participant Observations	Miners	Mbongoli	Illegal goldmine next to Mongokele Mining	Mbongoli	17.09.2018
P81	Participant Observations	Driver	FTNS	/	Socambo, in front of hotel	17.09.2018
P82	Participant Observations I	Visit Community Forest Socambo	Community Forest Socambo	/	CF Socambo	17.09.2018
P83	Participant Observations II	Visit Community Forest Socambo	Community Forest Socambo	/	CF Socambo	17.09.2018
P84	Participant Observations	Talking to a former CTSC worker	Socambo	/	Socambo	17.09.2018
P85	Participant Observations	Baka employees	Mayo Oldiri Safari	(pisteur and water carrier)	Lognia Camp, close to Dioula	17.09.2018
P86	Participant Observations I	Eco-guards	MINFOF Lobéké	/	Road from Socambo to Mambélé	18.09.2018
P87	Participant Observations II	Eco -guards	MINFOF Lobéké	/	Road from Socambo to Mambélé	18.09.2018
P88	Participant Observations	Visit of the Cacao Farm of the president of the community forest near Socambo	Cacao farm	President of community forest and farmer	Socambo	18.09.2018

202 Annexes

Citation Code	Method	Resource of Information/ Interviewee	Organization/ Village	Position/ Characteristic	Location	Date of Interview
P89	Participant Observations	Observation from the car	/	/	Road from Socambo to Mambélé	18.09.2018
P90	Participant Observations	Visit of a Safari Camp on the way to Mbongoli	Mayo Oldiri Safari Camp	Baka guards and their families	Between Mbongoli and Socambo	18.09.2018
P91	Participant Observations	chat with research assistants	research assistants	/	On the road	19.09.2018
P92	Participant Observations	Report from research assistant	research assistants	/	Mambélé Camp Kombo	19.09.2018
P93	Participant Observations	Police Guard	Cameroonian Police Force	Check-point at park entry (PK27)	Entrance LNP, Road to PK14	19.09.2018
P94	Participant Observations	Farmer	Mambélé	/	Between Mambélé and Camp Kombo	19.09.2018
P95	Participant Observations	Farmer	Mambélé	/	HQ Mambélé, Main camp for LNP staff	19.09.2018
P96	Participant Observations	long chat with Germain Ngandjui	PNUD-GEF, UNDP Cameroun	National expert on management strategies and sustainable funding of protected areas	HQ Mambélé	20.09.2018
P97	Participant Observations	Farmer	Mambélé	/	His farm; between Camp Kombo and Carrefour	21.09.2018
P98	Participant Observations	Baka FGD Participants	Zega (Pk 14)	/	Zega (Pk 14)	21.09.2018
P99	Participant Observations	Field walk and chat with the chief	Zega (Pk 14)	/	Zega (Pk 14)	21.09.2018
P100	Participant Observations	Visit of the farms in PK27	PK27	/	PK 27	21.09.2018
P101	Participant Observations	driver	FTNS	/	Mambélé, Barrière	23.09.2018
P102	Participant Observations	observations (with Achilles Mengamenya)	MINFOF Lobéké	Conservator LNP	HQ Mambélé, Camp Combo	23.09.2018

Citation Code	Method	Resource of Information/ Interviewee	Organization/ Village	Position/ Characteristic	Location	Date of Interview
P103	Participant Observations	two Baka, a village notable, community forest representative and other Bantu	Dioula	notable, ASBABUK member, forest exploiter, farmers and fisher/hunter	Pavillon/hut	23.09.2018
P104	Participant Observations	Achilles Mengamenya whilst providing us with files of reports	MINFOF Lobéké	Conservator LNP	HQ Mambélé, conservator's office	25.09.2018
P105	Participant Observations	Eco-guards getting weapons for patrol	MINFOF Lobéké	/	HQ Mambélé, office in front of the conservator's	25.09.2018
P106	Participant Observations	Responsible Person for forest operations	Community Forest Dioula	/	Dioula	25.09.2018
P107	Participant Observations	Short visit of Community Forest Dioula	Community Forest Dioula	/	Dioula	25.09.2018
P108	Participant Observations	Observations during Preliminary Findings-Workshop	stakeholders around the park	/	Mambélé Carrefour, PACEBCO	28.09.2018
P109	Participant Observations	Answers to our presentation / stakeholder meeting	Stakeholders around the park	/	Mambélé Carrefour, PACEBCO	28.09.2018
P110	Participant Observations	"Pepe"	Pepe Safari	Owner of Pepe Safari	Mambélé Camp Kombo	29.09.2018
P111	Participant Observations	Questions on COVAREFs and participative mechanisms		Record of questions during FGDs in communities around LNP	HQ Mambélé	-
P112	Participant Observations	General Observation		/	On the road	-
P113	Participant Observations	Dr. Theophile Zognou	FTNS	Executive Director	Yaoundé, in the car to IRIC	-

204 Annexes

Citation Code	Method	Resource of Information/ Interviewee	Organization/ Village	Position/ Characteristic	Location	Date of Interview
P114	Participant Observations	Community members	Bela, Libongo, Socambo, Zega (PK 14), etc...	/	villages around LNP	-
P115	Participant Observations	Baka	Mambélé carrefour	/	Mambélé Carrefour	-
PV 1	Photovoice	Participant 1	MINFOF Lobéké	Eco- Guard (male), Bantu, 28 years old	HQ Mambélé, WWF Accommodation	30.08.2018
PV 2	Photovoice	Participant 2	MINFOF Lobéké	Eco- Guard (male), Bantu	HQ Mambélé, WWF Accommodation	01.09.2018
PV 3	Photovoice	Participant 3	Mambélé Chefferie	Farmer (female), Bantu, 60 years old	Next to community building	02.09.2018
PV 4	Photovoice	Participant 4	Mambélé Chefferie	Farmer (male), Bantu, 26 years old	Next to community building	02.09.2018
PV 5	Photovoice	Participant 5	Ndongo	Farmer (male), Baka, 58 years old	Primary School	05.09.2018
PV 6	Photovoice	Participant 6	Ndongo	Farmer (female), Baka, 25 years old	Primary School	05.09.2018
PV 7	Photovoice	Participant 7	Ndongo	Student (female), Baka, 15 years old	Primary School	05.09.2018
PV 8	Photovoice	Participant 8	Ndongo	Teacher (male), Baka	Primary School	05.09.2018
PV 9	Photovoice	Participant 9	Socambo	Boat driver (male), Baka, 39 years old	TV Room in front of hotel	18.09.2018
PV 10	Photovoice	Participant 10	Socambo	Student (female), Baka, 15 years old	At restaurant	18.09.2018
PV 11	Photovoice	Participant 11	Socambo	Farmer (male), Bantu, 42 years old	TV Room in front of hotel	18.09.2018
PV 12	Photovoice	Participant 12	Socambo	Restaurant owner (female), Bantu	At restaurant	18.09.2018
PV 13	Photovoice	Participant 13	Zega (PK 14)	Farmer (female), Baka, 21 years old	Village	21.09.2018


Citation Code	Method	Resource of Information/ Interviewee	Organization/ Village	Position/ Characteristic	Location	Date of Interview
PV 14	Photovoice	Participant 14	Zega (PK 14)	Farmer (male), Baka, 24 years old,	Village	21.09.2018
PV 15	Photovoice	Participant 15	Zega (PK 14)	Farmer (male), Bantu, 22 years old,	Village	21.09.2018
PV 16	Photovoice	Participant 16	Zega (PK 14)	Farmer (female), Bantu, 38 years old	Village	21.09.2018
PV 17	Photovoice	Participant 17	Dioula	Farmer (male), Baka, 34 years old	Church building	25.09.2018
PV 18	Photovoice	Participant 18	Dioula	Farmer (male), Baka, 45 years old	Church building	25.09.2018
PV 19	Photovoice	Participant 19	Dioula	Farmer (female), Baka, 25 years	Church building	25.09.2018
PV 20	Photovoice	Participant 20	Dioula	Farmer (female), Baka, 20 years old	Church building	25.09.2018
SW1	Workshop	About 40 participants	Stakeholders	Representatives of most Cameroonian entities and groups worked with during research around LNP (communities, park management, private enterprises)	Mambélé, PACEBCO-Office	28.09.2018
SW2	Workshop	About 30 experts	MINFOF, WWF, Okani, GIZ, FTNS, etc.	No representatives from LNP but from national and regional level	Yaoundé, Hotel Azure	18.10.2018
T1	Theatre of the Oppressed	Villagers (Focus Group Nr.1)	Mambélé carrefour	Baka (2 women, 3 men)	in front of their houses	01.09.2018
T2	Theatre of the Oppressed	Villagers (Focus Group Nr.3)	Mambélé carrefour	Baka men	in front of their houses	01.09.2018
T3	Theatre of the Oppressed	Villagers (Focus Group Nr.3)	Mambélé carrefour	Baka women	in front of their houses	01.09.2018
T4	Theatre of the Oppressed	Villagers (Focus Group Nr.2)	Mambélé carrefour, campement Nkoulou	Baka, 2 men and 2 women	Next to a participant's house	01.09.2018

Citation Code	Method	Resource of Information/ Interviewee	Organization/ Village	Position/ Characteristic	Location	Date of Interview
T5	Theatre of the Oppressed	Villagers	Mambélé chefferie	Baka	next to the community hall	02.09.2018
T6	Theatre of the Oppressed	Villagers	Mambélé chefferie	9 Bantu women	community hall	02.09.2018
T7	Theatre of the Oppressed	Villagers	Zega (PK 14)	All Baka; 2 women, 2 men	In front of house	21.09.2018
T8	Theatre of the Oppressed	Villagers	Zega (PK 14)	All Bantu; 1 woman, 3 men	Behind house	21.09.2018
TWS ₁	Theatre of the Oppressed_ Workshop	Villagers	Dioula	More than 20 Baka men, women and children	Inside church	25.09.2018 and 26.09.2018
TWS ₂	Theatre of the Oppressed_ Workshop	Villagers	Dioula	More than 15 Bantu men, women and children	Inside church	25.09.2018 And 26.09.2018

Annex 5 Conflict Analysis Tools

ABC – Triangle:

Following Galtung, a conflict consists of three basic interrelated elements: [A] the attitudes of the conflict parties, [B] their conflict behaviour (violent or non-violent), and [C] the contradiction central to the conflict (seemingly incompatible goals).



Attitudes (A) involve the perceptions, presumptions and feelings of the conflict parties. Often, they serve as justifying tools (i.e. 'victim' and 'enemy'-constructions, accusations). Attitudes cannot be observed directly but are inferred from analysis. The behaviour (B) of conflict parties is the most evident aspect of a conflict (the "top of the ice-berg"). It can be violent (verbal or physical) or non-violent. The contradiction (C) of seemingly incompatible goals (i.e. disagreements regarding the distribution of a resource, of power, or the structuring of a political system) caused the conflict to arise. Frequently, the incompatible goal is forgotten over the course of the conflict, and itself disputed among the conflict parties. A conflict can start at any point in the triangle, and its three elements are mutually reinforcing.

This triangle draws our attention not only to "spectacular" evidence of conflict (i.e. violent behaviour), but also to the attitudes and structural inequalities that lie underneath (the "catalysators" of evident conflict). It also implies that subjective meanings and experiences (i.e. 'enemy'-constructions) are as critical as 'objective'

contradictions (i.e. access to a limited resource) in conflict. Drawing an ABC-triangle for each conflict party can help to elucidate the causes of conflicts, conflict parties' attitudes towards other actors involved, and their behaviour in dealing with the conflict.

PIN- Tool:

This tool seeks to identify needs (,what we must have'), interests (,what we really want'), and positions (,what we say we want') for each conflict party. It is based on the idea that there are universal human needs. In a quest to satisfy these needs, people pursue certain interests and positions. For example, a party might have the position that a piece of land is "hers" and belongs to her only. Her interest is to cultivate fruit and vegetables on the land, and her need is to be fed. Following PIN, needs and interests (i.e. the need for food, the interest in land) are easier to reconcile than positions (i.e. "this land belongs to me only").

But what are universal human needs? Following Galtung, human needs might vary over time and space, however there are four basic universal needs that "[h]uman beings will continue striving for [...] under almost all circumstances (Galtung, 2000:35)": survival-, well-being-, identity- and freedom needs. These needs are non- negotiable and are of equal value and importance. When using the PIN- Tool, it is highly important to listen to the interlocutors when identifying needs or a lack thereof; otherwise, the subjective bias of the researcher might hinder a reasonable analysis (i.e. by judging well- being needs as more important than identity- needs – despite the fact that people are known to sacrifice their lives for their religious and cultural identity (Galtung, 2000: 84)).

While not all conflicts revolve around basic human needs, PIN can help to find common ground of the conflict parties and to develop strategies to transcend the conflict.

Annex 6 Commitment of honesty ("Engagement sur l'honneur")



République du Cameroun <i>Paix-Travail-Patrie</i> ----- MINISTÈRE DES FORETS ET DE LA FAUNE ----- DELEGATION REGIONALE DE L'EST ----- PARC NATIONAL DE LOBEKE ----- B.P :15 YOKADOUMA -----		Republic of Cameroon <i>Peace-Work-Fatherland</i> ----- MINISTRY OF FORESTRY AND WILDLIFE ----- REGIONAL DELEGATION FOR EAST ----- LOBEKE NATIONAL PARK ----- PO.BOX:15 YOKADOUMA -----
N°	EH/MINFOF/DRE/PNL	Mambele
<u>ENGAGEMENT SUR L'HONNEUR</u>		
Je soussigné		
Né le à		
Fils de et de		
CNI Duà		
reconnais avoir été interpellé en date du		
Pour.....		
.....		
.....		
dans le Parc National de Lobéké et sa zone Périphérique		
Je reconnais avoir été bien sensibilisé en la matière. Je m'engage à respecter les différentes Textes et la Loi Forestier en Vigueur et que la Prochaine fois la Loi soit appliquée dans sa Rigueur sur moi.		
En foi de quoi le présent engagement sur l'honneur est établi pour servir ce que de aroit./.		
Le Suspect		Le Verbalisateur
	Le Verbalisateur	

Figure 17: Commitment of honesty ("Engagement sur l'honneur")

Source: XX


Annex 7 Distribution of Central African hunter-gatherer groups




Map 11: Distribution of Central African hunter-gatherer groups

Source: Duda, 2017:50

Annex 8 Mapping of the land and resource use of the Baka inside and around Boumba-Bek and Nki NPs




Annex 9 Subsistence activities of villagers from Dissassoué - participatory mapping



Map 13: Subsistence activities of villagers from Dissassoué - participatory mapping

Source: CEFAID, MINFOF Cameroon and WRI, own data


Annex 10 Area inside LNP that is traditionally used by adjacent communities



Map 14: Area inside LNP that is traditionally used by adjacent communities

Source: CEFAID, MINFOF Cameroon and WRI, own data

Annex 11 Examples of insufficient community lands



Map 15: Examples of insufficient community lands

Source: CEFAID, MINFOF Cameroon and WRI, own data

Annex 12 Seasonal calendar and description of Non-Timber-Forest-Products

Table 12: Seasonal calendar for Non-Timber-Forest-Products

Local Name	Koko	Mangue	Djansang	Poivre	Mbalaka	Tondo	Pepeh	Rondelle	Kanda	Ebaye
English Name	Gnetum leaves	Bush mango	Njangsa	Wild pepper	African Oil bean tree	?	Calabash nutmeg	?	?	?
Scientific Name	<i>Gnetum spp.</i>	<i>Iringia gabonensis</i>	<i>Ricinodendron heudelotii</i>	<i>Piper guineensis</i>	<i>Pentaclethra macrophylla</i>	<i>Aframomum spp.</i>	<i>Monodora myristica</i>	?	?	?
January	X		(X)						X	
February	X		(X)		X				X	
March	X									
April	X									
May	X									
June	X	X			X		X	X		
July	X	X			X		X	X		
August	X	X		X	X		X	X		X
September	X		X	X		X				X
October	X		X			X				X
November	X		X							
December	X		X						X	

Source: Workshop with the NTFP-cooperative Or-Vert in Mambélé (M6)



= light dry season





= heavy dry season




= light rainy season

= heavy rainy season

Table 13: Non-Timber-Forest-Products and their processing and utilization		
NTFPs	Picture	Processing and Utilization
Koko		Koko is a liana with edible leaves. This green leafy vegetable can be found throughout the year. It is mostly used for personal consumption. For commercial purposes and transportation, it is dried. It is sold by the NTFP-cooperative to traders in Yokadouma. There are not many competitors for this product.
Gnetum leaves		
<i>Gnetum spp.</i>		
Mangue		Besides for its flesh, the fruit's dried seed is used as the basis of a sauce called "arachide" (peanut). Furthermore, the seeds contain a lot of oil. Theoretically, the tree could be domesticated, but people collect bush mango in the forest during collection season. The NTFP-cooperative sells bush mango in large amounts to buyers from Yokadouma and even Bertoua, and from there, it goes further up to Yaoundé and Douala. There is high competition for this product.
Bush mango		
<i>Irvingia gabonensis</i>		
Djansang		When the fruits are falling from the tree, they are left in the shade to rot. The rotten fruit is washed off, and the seeds are peeled and used as spice or as medicine for children. The oil from the oil-rich seeds is used e.g. in coffee.
Njangsa		
<i>Ricinodendron heudelotii</i>		
Poivre		Wild pepper is a liana. The kernels need to be dried until they turn black. It is used as a spice for e.g. sauces.
Wild pepper		
<i>Piper guineensis</i>		

Mbalaka			<p>The big “beans” fall out of the fruit without further ado and are used for oil production. An old medical recipe for using Mbalaka is to cut the seeds into small pieces, boil them for a long time, and leave them in water for three to four days before finally peeling them. If consumed,, it can serve as snake antidote. It can also be put on snake bites as a paste. If the entire “bean” is roasted on fire and its inner part is eaten afterwards, snakes reportedly sense it and flee from you..</p>
African Oil bean tree			
<i>Pentaclethra macrophylla</i>			
Tondo			<p>Tondo is a shrub-like tree that always continues to grow after being cut (growth from the stump). There are different types of Tondo, either sweet or spicy as chili. It can be eaten, but is also used for spiritual or medical purposes . Reportedly, it protects against any threats while traveling.</p>
?			
<i>Aframomum spp.</i>			
Pepéh		<p>The seeds are mainly used as a spice for sauces, but Pepéh can also be used as medicine against stomach ache and to help with digestion. It can also be rubbed onto children when they are sick.</p>	
Calabash nutmeg			
<i>Monodora myristica</i>			
Rondelle		<p>The green fruits fall from the tree and crack. The collected fruits are used as a spice for sauces and resemble wild garlic.</p>	
/			
/			
Kanda		<p>When fruit falls off the tree its seeds are dried, peeled and grinded and used as a spice. The powder is used to prepare creamy sauces.</p>	
/			
/			

Ebaye		<p>The fruits of the Ebaye-tree are peeled and boiled. It is used as medicine against back and stomach pains, and reportedly protects against bad spirits. Ebaye also helps women with menstruation pain. Furthermore, is used as a spice for sauces (Mongjobi) or fish.</p>
/		
/		
<p>Source: Workshop with the NTFP-cooperative Or-Vert in Mambélé (M6) Photos: Tobias Beyer</p>		

Annex 13 Recommendations workshops Mambélé & Yaoundé

The research team facilitated a workshop in Mambélé and in Yaoundé to communicate research findings to the study's key stakeholders, and to jointly develop recommendations to tackle identified problems. The study team tried to ensure the inclusion of all voices by working in small groups and moderating the discussions.

Mambélé workshop

Table 14: Mambélé Workshop	
Who?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Representatives from Baka and Bantu villages (chiefs, notables, mayors, members of COVAREF, farmers) ▪ LNP park management (MINFOF Conservator, Head of Units and Ecoguards) ▪ Members of associations (Woman Health Group; GIC) ▪ Representatives of local NGOs (CIFED) ▪ Private sector representatives (VICWOOD-THANRY GROUP and Mongokele Mining Company)
How?	<p>Participants were divided into three groups: Baka, Bantu, and Park Management and private sector. Each group was asked to prioritize the research findings and to select the three in their view most pressing issues. Hereafter, the groups presented their selection to the plenum, and the entire plenum decided upon five topics to be further explored. These topics were subsequently discussed in randomly selected small- groups using the "Carusell"- method: under guidance of one to two team moderator(s), each group discussed a topic for thirty minutes and then moved on to the next. As a result, every group had the opportunity to discuss all five topics. Finally, the small groups came together in plenum, and chosen representatives presented the main debates and recommendations.</p>
What?	<p>Most pressing issues by group:</p> <p>Baka: Ineffective Community Zone; No benefits from eco- tourism; Unrecognized villages and settlements</p> <p>Bantu: Human- Wildlife Conflicts; Livelihood restrictions without alternatives; No benefits from ecotourism</p>

	<p>Park management: Livelihood restrictions without alternatives; Human Rights violations; Ineffective revenue- sharing mechanisms</p> <p>Five topics chosen in plenum:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Human-Wildlife Conflicts2. Human-Rights violations3. Ineffective revenue sharing mechanisms (including revenues from eco-tourism)4. Restrictions on livelihood activities and ineffective community zone (merged)5. Unrecognized villages and settlements
Source: Stakeholder- Workshop Mambélé, 28.09.2018	

Recommendations	What?	How?	Who?
1. Human-Wildlife Conflicts	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Compensation mechanism (indemnity payments) ▪ Rapid response to chase off animals ▪ Preventive techniques ▪ Mapping of wildlife incidences and planning of new farms accordingly 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Fund with MINFOF ▪ Establish agency ▪ Establish a decentralized fund 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Park ▪ MINFOF ▪ Private actors ▪ NGOs
2. Human-Rights violations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Encourage a dialogue between eco-guards and the local population ▪ Alternative livelihood support ▪ Clearly demarcate the limits of the zones of the park ▪ Establish a seasonal calendar of NTFPs ▪ Involve people in the management of resources (fauna and flora) ▪ Implement the Mambélé convention 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Monitoring and denunciation system ▪ Sensitization and education of the local population and the eco-guards ▪ Dialogue and Empathy ▪ Permanent assistance of Human Rights-NGOs in all villages 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Eco-guards ▪ Local population ▪ NGOs ▪ Park Management
3. Revenue sharing mechanisms	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Establishment of an information and monitoring system for revenue sharing ▪ Capacity building and support for the management of the revenues (evaluation, financing and monitoring) ▪ Enable micro financing of projects ▪ Community forests should start forest operations without waiting for partners 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 100% of community forest revenues should stay in the community ▪ The town hall should manage the revenues from forest operations (40% to communities) and from ZIC (taxe d'abatage) ▪ COVAREF should manage the taxes from the ZICGC (abatage, affermage) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ State ▪ COVAREF ▪ UFA ▪ Communities

<p>4. Restrictions on livelihood activities by different actors</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Training and technical assistance for: fishing, farming, livestock raising, fish ponds, bee-keeping / snail keeping and artisanal mining ▪ Special rights and support for Baka ▪ Awareness- raising on and demarcation of community zone ▪ Social integration of Baka women ▪ Support for administrative village structures ▪ Representation of all villages in park management council ▪ Signing and implementation of MoU ▪ Permanent consultation of communities in order to develop alternative livelihood opportunities ▪ Provision of animal protein (other than bushmeat) ▪ Cultural centre 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Implement and respect the decisions taken by stakeholders with regards to alternative livelihoods ▪ Meetings to inform people about best practices of fishing, farming, etc. ▪ Vocational training ▪ Provision of equipment ▪ Training for trainers 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ State ▪ WWF ▪ FTNS ▪ Private companies
<p>5. Communities without official recognition</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Implement an independent representation of Baka vis-à-vis the authorities and external actors: ▪ Inclusion of Baka camps in official maps and communal development plans ▪ Adapt territorial administration to the status quo to reflect the current reality and manage it accordingly 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Designation of notables ▪ Recognition of Baka settlements as villages ▪ Recognition of Baka chiefs (this recommendation was opposed by traditional Bangando and Bakwélé chiefs) ▪ Revision of communal development plans 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ MINADT ▪ Communes of Salapoumbé and Moloundou ▪ Baka representatives (e.g. ASBABUK)

		<ul style="list-style-type: none">▪ Creation of a second chéfferie between Nguilili and Kika and at Mbongoli▪ Disincorporation of Libongo from Bela and of Socambo from Mongokélé	
Source: Stakeholder- Workshop Mambélé, 28.09.2018			

Table 16: Yaoundé Workshop	
Who?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Research organisations (ICRAF, University) ▪ Ministries (MINFOF and MINAS) ▪ NGOs (CEFAID, OKANI, WWF) ▪ FTNS ▪ GIZ
How?	<p>Participants were randomly divided into four different groups. Under guidance of two team moderators, the small groups discussed four topics chosen by local stakeholders in Mambélé. After one hour, the small groups came together in plenum, and chosen representatives presented the main debates and recommendations.</p>
What?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Human-Wildlife Conflicts 2. Human-Rights violations 3. Ineffective revenue sharing mechanisms (including revenues from eco-tourism) 4. Restrictions on livelihood activities and ineffective community zone (merged)
Source: Stakeholder Workshop Yaoundé, 17.10.2018	

Recommendations	What?	How?	Who?
1. Human-Wildlife Conflicts	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Creation of buffer zone between the park and agricultural fields ▪ Relocating the agroforestry zone further away from the park ▪ Increase livestock raising ▪ Decentralized complaint and compensation mechanism ▪ Land-use planning with integrated space for wildlife 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Financing of the mechanisms through revenues from forest operations; should not go through Yaoundé 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ State ▪ Park ▪ Private sector ▪ Communities ▪ Local and national NGOs
2. Human-Rights violations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Mapping and analysis of actors ▪ Finding convergent and divergent interests ▪ Sustaining divergent interests and win-win scenarios ▪ Managing divergent interests 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Complaint mechanism ▪ Human rights trainings for all actors ▪ Mediation by neutral party agreed upon by both conflict parties ▪ Put in place a follow-up and evaluation mechanism, e.g. platform 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ State ▪ International organisations ▪ Local NGOs ▪ Private sector ▪ Farmer associations ▪ Collectivités Territoriales Décentralisées (CTD) ▪ Communities ▪ Investors (of the foundation) ▪ Churches ▪ Traditional authorities
3. Revenue sharing mechanisms	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Monitoring platform for the revenues coming from forest exploitations including a complaint mechanism ▪ Building capacities in the management of revenues ▪ Local structure for the management of 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Revenues for the communities go through the municipality ("maire") ▪ COVAREF get the revenues to a bureau in Bertoua and it is designated to LAB, microprojects and running costs ▪ Community Forests 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ State ▪ Private sector ▪ Park ▪ COVAREF ▪ Local NGOs

	touristic activities	<p>receive 100 % of the revenues generated by them (10% for management, 90% for development)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Distribution of ecotourism revenues: 20% to the state, 40% to the communities, 20% to the park, 20% for Eco touristic programmes 	
4. Restrictions on livelihood activities by different actors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Implement the Mambélé Convention ▪ Dialogue between the local population (exclusively Baka) and the companies 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Provide a guarantee for investors ▪ Signing the MoU and integrate a monitoring system ▪ Creation of a permanent dialogue platform between companies and the population 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ State ▪ Park ▪ Private sector ▪ Neutral Mediator
Source: Stakeholder-Workshop Yaoundé, 17.10.2018			

Annex 14 Detailed recommendations of the study

Table 18: Detailed recommendations of the study					
High priority		Moderate priority		Low priority	
No.	Recommendation	Activities	Benefits	Best Practice	Responsibility
1.1	Improve living situation and working conditions of park employees	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Trainings include the offer to accompany eco-guards to learn about LNP and surveillance missions ▪ Development of conflict-sensitive way to determine who the champions and participating ▪ Adapt length of leaves to travel time ▪ Provide funding for improved housing of eco-guards ▪ Ensure that current plans of FTNS to improve housing are put into practice ▪ Ensure regular payment of bonuses ("prime de saisi") that are limited to objects that are illegal in every context (cable snares, war weapons, protected species) and do not exceed the value of the confiscated object to avoid the incentive of fraud 	<p><u>Short term:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The basic needs of park employees are met <p><u>Long term:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Park employees have a high work motivation and positive attitude towards LNP ▪ Working in LNP becomes more attractive. 	/	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ LNP PM ▪ FTNS ▪ KfW
1.2	Improve communication between FTNS and park management	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Install a permanent FTNS representative in LNP park management 	<p><u>Short term:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ FTNS and park management communicate directly and can take decisions on time <p><u>Long term:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Cooperation 	/	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ LNP PM ▪ FTNS

No.	Recommendation	Activities	Benefits	Best Practice	Responsibility
			<p>between FTNS, MINFOF and WWF is improved</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The park management is more efficient and effective 		
1.3	Revise MoUs between FTNS, MINFOF and WWF	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Organise joint meetings and workshops of both staff from the local and the national level to identify issues that cause uncertainty and conflict Adjust MoUs where necessary based on the topics identified in the workshops 	<p><u>Short term:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> All actors have a clear awareness of each other's responsibilities and mandate The risk for misunderstandings and misinterpretations of contractual obligations and mandates is decreased <p><u>Long term:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Cooperation between FTNS, MINFOF and WWF is improved The park management is more efficient and effective 	/	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> FTNS WWF MINFOF
1.4	Employ additional or more suitable personnel	<p>In accordance with the management plan:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Employ more WWF senior staff Employ people with expertise suitable to the different units Support the Participation Unit with MINFOF personnel 	<p><u>Long term:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Suitable and experienced technical advisors improve park management capacities in conservation, research, monitoring of infectious diseases and community 	As a guide, see: Appleton M.R. (2016) ⁶⁷	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> LNP PM

⁶⁷ Appleton M.R. (2016): Competences for Personnel of Protected Areas and Other Conservation Sites: A Global Register and User Guide. IUCN: Gland, Switzerland. Available online: <https://www.iucn.org/content/a-global-register-competencies-protected-area-practitioners>

No.	Recommendation	Activities	Benefits	Best Practice	Responsibility
			<p>work</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The coordination of research and monitoring is facilitated and networking with research centres/universities and scientists interested in working in the park is improved 		
1.5	Regular exchange and harmonised approaches of TNS parks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Establish a newsletter to inform NNNP and DSNP (and donors) about activities, newly filled positions, tourist numbers etc. ▪ Harmonize approaches and strategies on anti-poaching efforts, management strategies, human rights, paramilitary field missions and use of technologies ▪ Establish regular eco-guard exchanges – in the framework of the Protocole d'Accord sur la Circulation du personnel TNS – between staff of the TNS parks to strengthen both information exchange, harmonization of approaches and team-spirit within TNS ▪ Assess how the BLAB management can be restructured so it is less dependent on the conservators and more capable of acting ▪ Jointly invest in 	<p><u>Long term:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ TNS cooperation is improved in terms of research, tourism, staff performance and anti-poaching measures 	Newsletter NNNP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ PM ▪ TNS parks ▪ FTNS

No.	Recommendation	Activities	Benefits	Best Practice	Responsibility
		equipment, housing, boats and team building measures			
1.6	Reconstruct Djembé	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Renovate housing for tourists in Djembé and establish an office for the payment of the park entrance fee ▪ Build adequate housing for eco-guards in line with the construction work planned for the headquarters ▪ Rebuild the bridges to enable land access to Djembe and install telecommunication networks 	<p><u>Short term:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Cross-boundary tourism is strengthened as tourists coming from CAR or Congo can access LNP at Djembe ▪ Housing of eco-guards is improved <p><u>Long term:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The improved accessibility of Djembe and simplified information exchange between eco-guards and LNP headquarters improve anti-poaching measures ▪ The well-being of eco-guards is fostered, increasing their motivation to work 	/	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ LNP PM ▪ FTNS ▪ KfW
1.7	Website for LNP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Create a website for LNP that informs potential tourists, donors, researchers and others about LNP and its activities 	<p><u>Short term:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ LNP's public profile is heightened. <p><u>Long term:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Easily accessible, reliable presentation of information attracts more tourists and researchers 	See website of DSNP ⁶⁸	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ FTNS

⁶⁸ <http://www.dzanga-sangha.org/>

No.	Recommendation	Activities	Benefits	Best Practice	Responsibility
1.8	Sign the agreement on trans-boundary visas for TNS-visitors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Lobby for the signature of the agreement on transboundary visas for TNS- visitors by Cameroon on national level 	<p><u>Long term:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Tourist exchange within the TNS landscape is enabled and tourists from CAR and CG are encouraged to visit LNP 	/	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> BMZ KfW German Embassy WWF Cameroon.
1.9	Provide trans-boundary touristic circuits	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Offer travels by boat from Bayanga or Bomassa to Djembe 	<p><u>Long term:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Better advertisement and touristic offers bring additional benefits to all three parks of TNS 	/	
2.1	Revise existing revenue sharing mechanisms	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Simplify the revenue sharing guidelines and procedures. Identify an appropriate mechanism to directly distribute revenues from ecotourism and from private companies (logging and safari) to communities (confer CIFOR, 2015) Establish a participative information and monitoring system for revenue sharing, e.g. COVAREFs should present their cash flows to the communities on a frequent basis and the Communal development plans should be kept up to date 	<p><u>Short term:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Revenues arrive at the local level and are shared in a transparent way Local communities can manage revenues and establish and monitor development projects <p><u>Long term:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> LNP and conservation demonstrate economic value to local communities Local communities accept and support conservation and LNP 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> UWA Revenue Sharing Programme, Bwindi Impenetrable National Park, Uganda⁶⁹ 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> MINFOF MINFI Private sector LNP PM Local NGOs COVAREF CPF Communities

⁶⁹ UWA Revenue Sharing Programme: <http://www.greengrowthknowledge.org/case-studies/lessons-learned-20-years-revenue-sharing-bwindi-impenetrable-national-park-uganda>

232 Annexes

No.	Recommendation	Activities	Benefits	Best Practice	Responsibility
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Develop capacities of local population for managing revenues (administrative, evaluation, financing and monitoring) ▪ Renegotiate the Mambélé convention and consider all private, state and civil society actors in the area 			
2.2	Train and employ local "conservation champions"	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Employ locals from villages around LNP's buffer zone (Baka and Bantu including women) with regular salary and cultural-sensitive work contracts for peer-to-peer awareness raising on conservation and law enforcement ▪ Start with two to three pilot villages to train two "conservation champions" per village with the following responsibilities: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a) Help develop tools for peer-to-peer awareness raising in communities b) Accompany eco-guards to learn about LNP and surveillance missions 	<p><u>Short term:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Awareness raising on conservation and anti-poaching is more effective due to peer-to-peer format ▪ Formal employment linked to conservation is offered <p><u>Long term:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Park rules and forestry law are known and understood by local communities ▪ Support from local communities for conservation efforts ▪ Contact points between community members and park employees mitigate conflict potential 	For contracts, follow best practice of BaAka contracts in Bayanga, e.g. regarding flexible work days per month (125)	WWF
2.3	Employ unarmed, local village rangers to work in	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Employ locals (Baka and Bantu include women) from pilot 	<p><u>Short term:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Locals participate 	UCL Extreme Citizen Science	WWF or another NGO with

No.	Recommendation	Activities	Benefits	Best Practice	Responsibility
	the buffer zone	<p>villages with regular salary and cultural-sensitive work contracts for assistance of eco-guards</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Train assistant eco-guards together with MINFOF eco-guards where possible on (1) monitoring tasks to support eco-guards, (2) other surveillance tasks that are suitable for non-literate people, e.g. dismantling of snares ▪ Use COVILAB members (Baka participation to be ensured) as starting point ▪ Provide conflict mediation and team-building measures ▪ Ensure that village rangers' employment is coordinated with MINFOF and in close cooperation with MINFOF eco-guards 	<p>in conservation and contact points between villagers and eco-guards mitigate conflict potentials</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ A small number of locals benefit in terms of employment and training <p><u>Long term:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Buy-in from local communities for conservation efforts is strengthened ▪ Surveillance missions are enhanced due to additional conservation staff for the LNP buffer zone 	around the Dja reserve ⁷⁰	international financial support
2.4	Identify and provide alternative livelihood strategies (ALS) for local population in LNP's buffer zone	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Identify appropriate ALS in a participatory manner to ensure the population's buy-in and suitability of ALS to local needs ▪ Engage a third party (e.g. international development organisation, national institution or NGO) with expertise in rural development and establishment of ALS to guide the development of ALS 	<p><u>Short term:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Appropriate ALS for the local population are identified <p><u>Long term:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The local population has adequate alternatives to entering the forest and generates additional income ▪ The local population's attitude towards the park improves 	Facilitate exchange on best practices with DSNP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ LNP PM ▪ FTNS ▪ Third party

⁷⁰ <https://uclexcites.blog/category/cameroon/>

No.	Recommendation	Activities	Benefits	Best Practice	Responsibility
2.5	Establish NTFP value chains	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Identify suitable NTFPS for the establishment of NTFP value chains with the help of ICRAF, AFDEBEM and an interested private company based on criteria such as: abundancy, market potential (national and international), preservability, and domestication potential ▪ Conduct an environmental impact assessment on the increased utilization of the proposed NTFPs ▪ Guarantee fixed prices and purchase quantities for the farmers (contract farming) and provide training on sustainable collection and preservation for quality control ▪ Improve market access for NTFPs by forming cooperatives to increase number of marketable products. Already existing cooperatives should receive proper support with marketing of products and organisation of sales ▪ Grant access for the population to NTFP sources in community and 	<p><u>Long term:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The local population has additional income sources ▪ Natural resources are sustainably valorised ▪ NTFP are domesticated within agro-forestry systems 	Timorganic, a private company in Timor-Leste, supports smallholder farms to produce marketable products with trainings on quality standards, etc. and buys from them. ⁷¹	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ LNP PM ▪ FTNS ▪ Private sector ▪ Potential partner like ICRAF or AFDEBEM

⁷¹ <http://www.timorganic.com>

No.	Recommendation	Activities	Benefits	Best Practice	Responsibility
		buffer zone			
2.6	Provide Basic Infrastructure in Buffer Zone	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Assess and prioritise existing and required infrastructure according to the needs of the different communities with a focus on clean drinking water, medical care and education ▪ Develop a roadmap in strong collaboration with the local population, MINAS and a third actor ▪ Create a sustainable financing mechanism (including local private sector, see Forest Law N°94/01 Art. 66) that is dedicated to development projects in the LNP buffer zone ▪ Install a responsible unit and an independent monitoring committee (by MINAS and communities) to distribute the funds and control the financing ▪ Provide vocational training of the local population - especially teachers and doctors but also technicians for well-maintenance ▪ Abolish school fees for economically weak groups to incentivise education (MINEDUB) 	<p><u>Short term:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Local population stops feeling neglected and the attitude towards conservation improves. <p><u>Long term:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The living conditions of the local population improve significantly. 	/	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ MINFOF ▪ MINFI ▪ MINAS ▪ MINEDUB ▪ WWF ▪ LNP PM ▪ FTNS ▪ Consultancy/ NGO ▪ Local Communities
2.7	Provide financial	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Train local forest 	<u>Long term:</u>	/	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ WWF

No.	Recommendation	Activities	Benefits	Best Practice	Responsibility
	and administrative assistance to community forests	<p>communities on (sustainable) logging, certification and equipment</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Assist the community forest steering boards with the setting up of logging contracts and general accountancy ▪ Ensure that revenues and spending are published and controlled regularly. ▪ Organise timber sale and help to establish stable partnerships with consumers (preferably supporting the 'Reseau des forets communautaires de Boumba-Ngoko'); properly fund this network and its office ▪ Determine contact person for community forests inside the LNP park management that can be approached by villagers in case of mismanagement 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The community forests are better managed and economically empowered. ▪ 100% of the revenues from community forest stay in the community of concern in line with Forest Law N°94/01 Art. 54 & Art. 66. 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ MINFOF ▪ UTO SE ▪ FTNS ▪ REDEFOC ▪ LNP PM
2.8	Revise the 'Carbon zone' approach	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Ensure that subsistence hunting and harvesting of NTFPs are not restricted by carbon zones, i.e. abolish the need for permissions ▪ Clarify imponderability linked with REDD+ and the carbon zones (e.g. uncertainty of payments for certificates) and provide alternative sources of payments 	<p><u>Short term:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Usage rights are ensured ▪ Long term: ▪ Informed consent on the installation of carbon zones 	/	

No.	Recommendation	Activities	Benefits	Best Practice	Responsibility
2.9	Adapt number, size and location of community forests	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Support the establishment of community forests in Zega, Kika, Bela and Libongo ▪ Adapt community forest areas (size and sites) to ensure economic profitability for small scale logging 	<p><u>Long term:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The economic empowerment and participation of local population in forest management is improved 	/	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ LNP PM ▪ UTO SE ▪ FTNS ▪ Community forests
2.10	Revise rules for community zone within LNP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Abolish (unofficial) payments for the use of the community zone by local population and prolong the permission to enter the community zone to 30 days ▪ Ensure that permission for access to the community zone can be obtained at all Chef du Poste in LNP's buffer zone ▪ Reassess current limitations of possible usage period ▪ Improve access of the community zone for villagers from Libongo, Mbongoli, Zega and PK27, Molindo, i.e. by changing its geographic scope or by establishing a second community zone in the East 	<p><u>Short term:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The community zone can be accessed by all adjacent communities <p><u>Long term:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Less conflicts between Mambélé and other villages ▪ Local communities can meet their livelihoods needs ▪ The local population's attitude towards the park improves 	For the adapted zoning confer the community zone at Boumba Bek National Park	
2.11	Improve land use planning	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Establish an own ZICGC and COVAREF for Libongo. Parts of ZIC 30 and 29 neighboring the communities should be cut out, joined and established as a ZICGC, with a new 	<p><u>Short term:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Participation of the concerned communities in natural resource management is increased ▪ Allows for a just distribution of 	/	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ MINFOF ▪ MINADT

No.	Recommendation	Activities	Benefits	Best Practice	Responsibility
		COVAREF taking care of <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Recognize Libongo and Socambo as distinct settlements, e.g. with an independent MINFOF chef de poste Create a second "chefferie" between Nguilili and Kika. Ensure representation of Mbongoli 	timber and hunting revenues between communities		
2.12	Lobby for inclusive and participatory forest law	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ensure national and international standards on human rights, participatory conservation and Indigenous People are integrated in the ongoing reform of the forestry law Elaborate legal regulation of (traditional) usage rights and participatory resource governance Ensure coherence and legal clarity 	<u>Long term:</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Conservation, exploitation of natural resources and participation are balanced, and the law complies with international obligations 	/	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> BMZ KfW WWF international
3.1	Analyse risk perception and actual risk for Human Wildlife Conflicts in LNP's buffer zone	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Employ scientists to carry out an in- depth analysis on risk perception and actual risk of HWC in LNP's buffer zone Use study data to design prevention and mitigation responses to wildlife impact in LNP's buffer zone 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Risk analysis of HWC enables to design appropriate prevention and mitigation responses to (perceived) wildlife impact 	SAFE WWF	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> FTNS WWF
3.2	Establish a functioning Human-Wildlife Conflict compensation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Devolve assessment and payment responsibility to the park management Increase 	<u>Short term:</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The assessment of damage is accurate and quick 	/	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> LNP PM FTNS

No.	Recommendation	Activities	Benefits	Best Practice	Responsibility
	mechanism	administrative capacity of the park management to deal with complaints <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Install focal points around LNP that can deal with complaints ▪ Create a fund dedicated to Human-Wildlife Conflict compensation ▪ Implement a verbal complaint mechanism ▪ Raise local population's awareness and provide trainings on evidence-preservation and compensation procedure 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The compensation process is fair, transparent, and prompt ▪ The transaction costs for lodging a complaint have significantly decreased ▪ The compensation mechanism is accessible for the poor and illiterate <p><u>Long term:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The local population's attitude towards the park and conservation improves. 		
3-3	Institutionalise a constant dialogue between eco-guards and the local population	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Create solution-oriented dialogue forums (suggested frequency: every second month) with the purpose of discussing current technical issues that require collaboration between eco-guards and the local population (e.g. poaching) ▪ Park management, CEFAID (NGO trusted by the marginalized Baka population) and CED (a more neutral actor that is approachable for all sections of the local population) organize these dialogues collaboratively ▪ Consider: Incentives for both sides to participate; representation of the 	<p><u>Short term:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Open exchange on technical issues and improved cooperation ▪ Increased contact leads to a better understanding of each other's problems and needs <p><u>Long term:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Reconciliation between local population and eco-guards 	/	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ LNP PM ▪ CEFAID ▪ CED

240 Annexes

No.	Recommendation	Activities	Benefits	Best Practice	Responsibility
		local population by popularly appointed spokesperson			
3.4	Establish a forum for dialogue and cultural exchange between Baka and Bantu groups	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Organise workshops, excursions, field campaigns and activities relating to conservation, indigenous knowledge and civic education 	<p><u>Short term:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Regular exchange between groups <p><u>Long term:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Conflict between groups is decreased and mitigated. 	Youth Association Ndima-Kali, Central African Republic ⁷²	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> LNP PM
3.5	Include Bantu in development programmes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Address the needs and concerns of Baka and Bantu communities Include Bantu in development programmes addressing Baka 	<p><u>Long term:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Baka and Bantu both profit from support by (inter-) national NGOs and from development programmes. Bantu needs and concerns are considered in Baka-only development programmes. 	/	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> LNP PM FTNS KfW
3.6	Revise complaint mechanism against Human Rights violations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Put new lead organisation in charge of the complaint mechanism (i.e. MINAS as ministry or RFUK / CED as NGO – possibilities to be evaluated by WWF) with WWF providing funding Increase presence of new lead organization through focal points in major towns and do regular field visits to inform local communities about the 	<p><u>Short term:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Local residents are able to file complaints Complaints are registered and investigated. <p><u>Long term:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Local population has access to justice 	Human Rights Center Bayanga (DSNP)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> LNP PM Third actor: MINAS, RFUK or CED

⁷² <http://www.ndimakali.org>

No.	Recommendation	Activities	Benefits	Best Practice	Responsibility
		<p>mechanism, their rights and how to file complaints</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Set up procedures that cater to the needs and means of all people by guaranteeing accessibility (legal assistance for illiterate; translators Baka-French, etc.) 			
3-7	Provide Human Rights trainings for eco- guards and local population	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The LNP park management continues to provide Human Rights trainings to eco-guards on a regular basis. ▪ The training is extended to residents of local towns and villages in the form of awareness-raising campaigns. ▪ Trainings focus on the implementation of usage rights and the difference between Human Rights violations and lawful law enforcement practices. 	<p><u>Short term:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Local residents and eco-guards can distinguish between lawful and unlawful practices of law enforcement. <p><u>Long term:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Eco-guards do not commit any Human Rights violations. ▪ Conflicts around usage rights are reduced. 	Human Rights trainings for eco-guards in DSNP and NNNP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ LNP PM
3-8	Issue identity cards and birth certificates for Baka	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Issue birth certificates and identity Cards for Baka in LNP's buffer zone, free of charge ▪ Educate Baka communities on the procedural of acquiring birth certificates and identity cards ▪ Enable the provision of birth certificates and identity cards in villages around LNP 	<p><u>Short term:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Baka have access to formal institutions and to legal employment opportunities <p><u>Long term:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Baka enjoy same rights and privileges as their Bantu neighbours. 	Universal Birth Registration Campaign", Plan International, Cameroon	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Local Authorities ▪ MINAS ▪ MINADT

242 Annexes

No.	Recommendation	Activities	Benefits	Best Practice	Responsibility
3.9	Provide equal employment opportunities and affirmative action for Baka	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Provide vocational Training for Baka (to work i.e. in police, hospitals, schools, companies) ▪ Establish a Baka-quota for employment in companies around the park and for representation in COVAREF ▪ Provide free access to basic infrastructure, i.e. hospitals 	<p><u>Long term:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Baka are enabled to assume their legal rights ▪ Baka needs and concerns are represented in COVAREF ▪ Baka are enabled to partake in public life ▪ Baka have free access to basic infrastructure 	/	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ MINAS ▪ MINFOF
3.10	Recognize Baka settlements as villages	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Legally recognize Baka settlements as villages and install Baka chiefs to enable an independent representation of Baka vis-à-vis the authorities and external actors ▪ Include Baka settlements in the maps (used by MINFOF and WWF) and in the communal development plans 	<p><u>Long term:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Legal certainty for Baka villagers is established 	/	
3.11	Supervise the safari companies active in LNP's buffer zone	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Establish a MoU between MINFOF, MINDEF and safari companies including these points: ▪ Quotas for eco-guards as part of patrols by safari companies (25%) Quarterly patrol reports of safari companies to park management ▪ Obligatory Human Rights trainings for safari and military personnel 	<p><u>Short term:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Safari companies comply with Human Rights <p><u>Long term:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The level of law enforcement is standardised in LNP's buffer zone 	/	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ MINFOF ▪ MINDEF ▪ Safari companies

No.	Recommendation	Activities	Benefits	Best Practice	Responsibility
3.12	End bush meat auctions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The park management abandons its practice to auction confiscated bush meat and instead eliminates it 	<p><u>Short term:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Health risks due to partly decomposed bush meat are eliminated <p><u>Long term:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The local population understands that the confiscation of bush- meat is not a secondary income-source for eco-guards 	/	MINFOF, ecoguards
4.1	Analyse the impact of legal and illegal logging and mining as well as bush meat trade on biodiversity in the buffer zone	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Commission studies on impacts from legal and illegal logging and mining as well as bush meat trade on biodiversity in LNP's buffer zone and consider socio-economic trade-offs ▪ Establish a dialogue between MINFOF and Ministry of Mines, Industry and Technological Development (MINMIDT) with support from international NGOs, donors, German Embassy (BMZ) to bring policies in accordance and to minimise adverse effects of mining and logging within the protected Lobéké landscape⁷³ 	<p><u>Short term:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Impacts of illegal and legal logging and mining as well as of bush meat trade are analysed and inform the park management's conservation efforts and surveillance missions <p><u>Long term:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Political and financial coherence between natural resource extraction and conservation in LNP's buffer zone is ensured 	/	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ MINFOF ▪ MINMIDT ▪ German Embassy ▪ KfW ▪ LNP PM

⁷³ Mentioned as priority action by the WWF programme manager (l21)

244 Annexes

No.	Recommendation	Activities	Benefits	Best Practice	Responsibility
4.2	Ensure that private sector respects traditional usage rights in LNP's buffer zone	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Private actors' adherence to Forestry Law of 1994, Art. 8, 9, 26, 86, LNP management plan, ZICGC management plans and UFA management plans is supervised to ensure the population's access rights to the forest ▪ Private actors are obliged to integrate traditional usage rights into their management plans 	<p><u>Long- Tern:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The level of law enforcement is standardised in the Lobéké landscape ▪ Private actors comply with national laws ▪ The local population's access to the forest is ensured 	/	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ MINFOF ▪ LNP PM ▪ Safari and logging companies
4.3	UFA and ZICGC management and micro-zoning	<p>UFA management and micro-zoning:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Oblige logging companies to publish UFA management plans for transparency ▪ Create a "green belt" around the LNP core zone where the only activities allowed are minimal-impact logging and NTFP gathering ▪ Revise zoning within UFAs by means of participatory usage-mappings to improve location of agricultural usage zones ▪ Revise usage rights of the population within UFAs in a participatory process including private sector MINFOF and communities. The latter shall be supported by an adequate organisation to ensure a just 	<p><u>Short term:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Legal certainty and recognition of farmers' and forest dwellers' livelihood activities ▪ Conflicts between private sector, ecoguards and local population are reduced <p><u>Long term:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Ensures that buffer zone serves as buffer for LNP and equally satisfies needs of local population as foreseen by UNESCO 	/	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ MINFOF ▪ Private sector ▪ Communities ▪ LNP PM

No.	Recommendation	Activities	Benefits	Best Practice	Responsibility
		<p>inclusion of the population's opinion</p> <p>ZICGC micro-zoning and management:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Micro-zoning within all ZICGCs to comply with their management plans ▪ Adapt ZICGC micro-zoning to ensure that micro-zone for subsistence hunting does not overlap with micro-zone for sports hunting ▪ Create interest groups of subsistence hunters within the COVAREF and stepwise transfer management of sustainable subsistence hunting to them 			
4.4	Restructure Lobéké landscape platforms and consultative forums	<p><u>'Comité de gestion':</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Ensure meeting once a year (not sporadically, see park management plan 4.2.9) to adjust programs and elaborate strategy ▪ Officially include regional delegate of MINAS in the new management plan <p><u>'Comité consultatif local':</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Rally local representatives of concerned ministries more often (~ four times a year) to harmonize local efforts ▪ Officially include MINAS social affairs assistants in 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Overarching strategy for Lobéké landscape development is harmonised ▪ Participation is increased ▪ Development and conservation efforts are balanced 	/	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ LNP PM ▪ MINFOF ▪ MINAS ▪ Communities ▪ FTNS ▪ UNESCO

No.	Recommendation	Activities	Benefits	Best Practice	Responsibility
		<p>Moloundou and Salapoumbé</p> <p><u>'Plateforme de concertation communautaire':</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Annual gathering of representatives of all villages (including Baka and Women) within the Lobéké buffer-zone in Mambélé ▪ Disseminate information on community projects, changes in administration or law, changes within the personnel etc. ▪ Integrate representatives' opinion to inform the project priority list ▪ Record and send complaints (on community development, resource access) to UNESCO and FTNS ▪ Include complaints-mechanism-report and revenue-sharing-report into the information being spread ▪ Adequate budget must be allocated for transport and accommodation of participants 			
Source: Study Team					

